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Abstract
This thesis investigates the creation, operation and impact of four industrial
developments in the Highlands of Scotland in Corpach, Aviemore, Dounreay and
Invergordon in the period 1945 to 1982. The thesis is structured as follows: the
introduction details the development of economic policy towards the Highlands and
Scotland more generally, encompassing a literature survey to provide the necessary
background and context of the developments, followed by individual case study
analysis of the four developments, followed by a conclusion that assesses the overall
themes present in the preceding case studies and introduction. Within the conclusion
is a discussion of the regional policy aspect of the four developments, the effect the
developments had on the areas in which they were located in terms of population and
unemployment  change  and  the  political  economy  and  politics  of  Highland
development.
The argument developed in the thesis is that the motivations behind the four
industrial projects detailed in the case studies were more complex than the publicly
and privately stated justification for creating and establishing the developments that
they would act as growth centres and attract further industries to the areas in which
they were located. The thesis posits that developments in the Highlands only took
place as a consequence of Scottish Office actions ‘winning’ large industrial projects
for the area and only when Scottish Office policy aims converged with UK national
economic and political interests. Consequently, short-term political goals usurped
effective long-term economic development, resulting in a lack of infrastructural
development  that  severely  hindered  the  stated  aims  and  justification  of  each
development acting as a growth centre. Further, the argument is made that as a result
of these short-term political goals, a policy of grand gestures of large-scale industrial
developments that were inappropriate for the areas in which they were located was
pursued, resulting in the eventual closure of all but the Aviemore complex. In short,
the thesis is about the implementation failure of large-scale industry in the Highlands,
post-1945.3
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Chapter One. Introduction
The thesis is based on a framework of chronologically ordered discussion of
the four industrial developments at Corpach (by Fort William)
1, Aviemore, Dounreay
and Invergordon in the form of individual case studies.
2 In each case government
sponsored the developments in a purported attempt at regenerating the Highlands by
having them act as growth centres in order to try and reverse the long-standing issues
of population decline, high-outward migration and high unemployment through
intervention in and planning of the Highland economy. Corpach received a paper-
pulp mill, Aviemore a winter sports and tourist facility, Dounreay the second nuclear
Prototype Fast Reactor (PFR) and Invergordon an aluminium smelter. Each of the
case studies serve as evidence for the failure of economic planning and intervention
in the Highlands to address adequately the issues they were intended to solve, as well
as  going  some  way  towards  explaining  the  retreat  of  government  from  the
intervention in and planning of the Scottish economy as a whole. The thesis covers
the period 1945-82 for three reasons: first, the end of the Second World War presents
a logical starting point for the discussion of the development of economic policy in
Scotland, being as it were at the beginning of a period of relative stability in
comparison to events prior to it; second, by 1982 two of the four developments
discussed, Corpach and Invergordon, had ceased operations altogether, combined
with the policy decisions of the Conservative government from 1979 to step back
from the interventionist policies followed in Scotland by their predecessors represents
a reasonable time at which to stop. The majority of the case studies are focused on the
government’s role in the four developments and are primarily based on governmental
archival material. As a result, the bulk of the discussion is on the planning stages,
                                                
1 Given the proximity of Corpach to Fort William geographically, the mill is often described in the
governmental correspondence and media of the time as both the Corpach Mill and the Fort William
Mill. For the purposes of this thesis both terms are used interchangeably and mean the same
development.
2 Although technically Dounreay predates both Corpach and Aviemore, the growth centre argument
was used in relation to the establishment of the second reactor after the creation of Corpach and
Aviemore. Consequently, Dounreay is the third case study discussed in the thesis.10
with discussion reaching into the operation and closure of certain developments
dependent on government’s involvement in them and as far as the archives allowed.
The purpose of this introduction is to provide a background to governmental
involvement in the Scottish and Highland economies up to the creation of the four
developments and provide context for the discussion that follows. The introduction is
structured in the following sub-sections: Introduction to the background to the four
developments and arguments contained in the thesis; Justification for the thesis;
Historiographical analysis of the literature; Regional Policy Development in Post-
1945 Scotland; Reporting Scotland: Scottish Council (Development & Industry)
Reports and the ‘new’ regional development policies; A Development Authority for
the Highlands: the creation of the Highlands and Islands Development Board and
Highland development.
This thesis argues that a combination of short-term political considerations,
the urgent desire for a quick fix to social problems in the Highlands and UK national
economic concerns took precedence over the effective planning of regional industrial
development in the area for the longer term, as was claimed was happening both
publicly and privately by governmental bodies charged with administering the
creation of the developments. As a result, the thesis highlights the disconnect between
regional economic development and political development. The resulting lack of
infrastructural development in the Highlands contributed to a lack of embeddedness
in the industrial developments on which the case studies focus, and their failure to
solve  the  problems  they  were  reputedly  intended  for.  Moreover,  this  lack  of
infrastructural development ensured the area’s continued unsuitability for large-scale
manufacturing that exists into the current day. In short then, it is an analysis of the
implementation failure of governmental economic intervention and planning in the
Highlands in the post-1945 period.11
The thesis takes its title from a quote by Sir Douglas Haddow, head of the
Civil Service in Scotland between 1965-73. Haddow saw the Highlands as a problem
area that had to be kept quiet by ‘chucking buns across the fence’ if necessary. In the
course of saying this, leaning over a map, Haddow is reputed to have put his elbow on
Fort William, stretched his arm out along the Great Glen and made a gesture
westwards stating ‘as far as that area is concerned, it’s out’, referring to the intentions
of the Scottish Office in its approach to economic development in the region.
3 Of the
four developments the thesis is concerned with, three fall into the area of the
Highlands that Haddow’s elbow missed - only Dounreay falls outwith, purely a
consequence of locational factors relative to Fast Reactor research in the 1950s. The
‘fence’ Haddow refers to is the Highland region boundary line, further reinforcing the
idea that the Highlands is a distinct region from the rest of Scotland with its own
peculiar characteristics. As a result, the thesis posits that the four developments were
not the bespoke solution to Highland development that they were purported to be, but
a reactionary set of policy achievements that had less to do with long-term integrated
economic development of the region as satisfying short-term political and economic
goals at Scottish and UK national levels.
The issues of economic planning and intervention in Scotland dominated the
economic development of the country from the Second World War’s end until the
early 1980s. This was especially so in the Highlands, where any major economic
development that took place, from the creation of the Hydro electric schemes in the
immediate period following the Second World War to the establishment of the
industrial developments with which this thesis is concerned, did so with the hand of
government firmly behind it. The literature on Scottish twentieth century economic
history has only recently begun to address the issues of economic intervention and
planning however, having been largely focused on the decline of the staple industries
of shipbuilding, coal and steel, due in no small part to the thirty year rule on closure
of official documents and the availability of extensive business archives pertaining to
these industries. The opening of these documents, as well as the introduction of the
                                                
3 Hetherington, A, Highlands and Islands: A Generation of Progress, (AUP, Aberdeen, 1990), pg. 3.12
Freedom of Information Act, has allowed access to government documents relating to
the issues of economic planning and intervention and resulted in more attention being
focused on the role of government in the economic development of the Scottish
economy in the post-Second World War period in the literature in recent years.
4  The
responses  to  the  staple  industries’  decline  were  shaped  and  determined  by
government. Administrative leadership in the Scottish Office and its constituent parts
largely drove economic and industrial development in the country in the search for a
panacea to the economic and social problems experienced during the period. From
1945 to 1962 the Department of Health Scotland (DHS) and the Scottish Home
Department (SHD) had determined economic policy jointly and reported to the
Secretary of State for Scotland. The creation of the Scottish Development Department
(SDD) in 1962 was a response to recommendations set out in the Toothill Report of
1961
5 that called for the establishment of a new department in the Scottish Office
solely responsible for:
…the major economic duties of the existing Scottish departments… supported
by an economic unit to advise on general measures needed to ensure the health
and growth of the economy, on the implications for Scotland of national
economic policies, on the broad issues of investment policy, on the economic
implications  of  the  programmes  of  public  investment,  and  on  the  wider
economic effects of major issues before departments.
6
                                                
4 See Peden, GC, ‘The Managed Economy: Scotland, 1919-2000’ in Devine, Lee & Peden (eds.), The
Transformation of Scotland: The Economy Since 1700, (EUP, Edinburgh, 2006), pp 233-266, Levitt, I,
‘The Origins Of The Scottish Development Department, 1943-62’, in Scottish Affairs, No. 14, Winter,
1996, pp 42-66, ‘The Creation of the Highlands and Islands Development Board, 1935-65’, Northern
Scotland, vol. 19, 1999, pp 85-105, ‘Too Deeply Committed: Aviemore, The Scottish Office and
George Pottinger, 1959-72, Scottish Affairs, No. 51, Spring, 2005, pp 25-58, ‘Regenerating the Scottish
Highlands: Whitehall and the Fort William Pulp Mill, 1945-63’, Journal of Scottish Historical Studies,
Vol. 25, no.1, 2005, pp 21-39.
5 The report was named after the chairman JN Toothill of Ferranti Ltd, appointed by the Scottish
Council (Development & Industry) (from now on SC(DI)) to head the inquiry. For more on Toothill,
see Wilson, JF, ‘Toothill, Sir John Norman (1908–1986)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,
(OUP, Oxford, 2004).
6 SC(DI), Inquiry Into The Scottish Economy, 1960-1961, (SC(DI), Edinburgh, 1961), pg. 191. For a
more detailed discussion of the establishment of the Scottish Development Department, see Levitt, I,
‘The Origins Of The Scottish Development Department, 1943-62’, in Scottish Affairs, No. 14, Winter,
1996, pp 42-66 and Coats, AW, ‘The Changing Role of Economists in Scottish Government Since
1960’ in Public Administration, Winter, 1978, vol. 56, Issue 4,1978, pp 399- 424.13
Toothill had visited France and other European countries in late 1960 and had been
suitably impressed by the commitment to central economic planning to recommend
the creation of a central Scottish Development Department to coordinate planning in
Scotland. Toothill’s justified the need for a new integrated department by arguing that
the only way to achieve growth was by a ‘simultaneous attack’ on past traditions. His
experience at Ferranti was that the company had found difficulty in coordinating its
sales, design and accountancy departments to work together to exploit a new teaching
machine. As a result, the company created a successful new division under the control
of the managing director, the example of which directly influenced Toothill’s belief
in the ‘concentration’ of effort required for the Scottish Office.
7 Further, Toothill’s
recommendation for the Scottish economy that ‘More diversification is needed’ and
that if this was to be achieved ‘more new firms must be attracted to Scotland’
8 was
again influenced by his personal beliefs - his experience of and success in setting up a
central electronics laboratory and training school at Crewe Toll as well as starting the
first Scottish higher national certificates in electronics
9 gave him the firm conviction
that diversification into new industries and technologies would serve the country’s
industrial structure and economy well.
Following  Toothill’s  recommendations,  Douglas  Haddow  -  the  former
Secretary of the Department of Health Scotland who was heavily involved in the
discussions regarding the creation of the new body - became the head of the new
Scottish Development Department, merging the physical and economic planning
responsibilities previously held jointly by Haddow’s old department and the Scottish
Home Department, the ‘acknowledged custodian’ of Highland policy.
10 The new
department’s name was no accident - Maclay felt that the then Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan would object to the new department being named ‘Local Government and
Planning’ as planning would imply the ‘the application of a rigid blue-print’ to the
disadvantage of initiative. ‘Development’ instead brought out the government’s
                                                
7 Levitt, I, ‘The Origins of the Scottish Development Department, 1943-62’, pg. 57.
8 SC(DI), Inquiry Into The Scottish Economy, 1960-1961, pg. 22.
9 Wilson, JF, ‘Toothill, Sir John Norman (1908–1986)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,
(OUP, Oxford, 2004).
10 National Archives of Scotland folder (from now on NAS), DD15 234 folder notes.14
commitment to a ‘flexible economy’ where officials in the Scottish Office could
identify in advance the opportunities for investment.
11 The new department thus gave
economic planning and intervention in Scotland a key platform from which to
develop - a distinct department charged specifically with economic development
through planning. Prior to his new appointment, as Secretary of the Department of
Health Scotland, Haddow was also responsible for town and country planning and
before that was private secretary to the then Secretary of State for Scotland, Tom
Johnston between 1941 and 1943. As a result, both roles provided Haddow with the
experience and knowledge necessary to play an effective role in the newly created
department, not least the commitment to defending Scottish interests at Whitehall so
effectively demonstrated by Johnston.
12 Haddow’s new role in the SDD, to all intents
and purposes, would see him act as the overseer, on behalf of the Secretary of State,
of all economic development that government was involved in the length and breadth
of the country; from the creation of the new towns built to accommodate the Glasgow
overspill programme, to the construction of the BMC car plant in Lanarkshire, to the
location of the nuclear power facility in Dounreay in Caithness. Indeed, during the
period almost all major economic and industrial development in the country had some
form of government involvement with the Civil Service playing a defining role in it.
Ian Levitt has called this role, with some justification, a symbol of ‘the Government’s
administrative commitment to arrest industrial decline.’
13
This commitment was to manifest itself in the subsequent creation of several
more administrative bodies aimed at rejuvenating the Scottish economy - the Scottish
Economic Planning Board (SEPB) in 1964, the Highlands and Islands Development
Board (HIDB) in 1965, the Scottish Economic Planning Department (SEPD) in 1973
and the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) in 1975.
14 The aim of each of the new
                                                
11 Levitt, I, ‘The Origins of the Scottish Development Department, 1943-62’, pg. 58.
12 Levitt, I, ‘Haddow, Sir (Thomas) Douglas (1913-1986), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,
(OUP, Oxford, 2004).
13 Levitt, I, ‘The Origins Of The Scottish Development Department, 1943-62’, pg. 59.
14 For an in depth analysis of the work of the Scottish Development Agency, Henrik Halkier’s
Institutions, Discourse and Regional Development: The Scottish Development Agency and the Politics
of Regional Policy (Peter Lang, Brussels, 2006) should be consulted.15
administrative developments was to reduce the economy’s reliance on the declining
staple industries and create new labour intensive manufacturing based industries that
would take up the slack in economic performance and job losses, caused by the
archaic declining industrial structure in the country, through the diversification of the
industrial manufacturing base. The ultimate intention was that the industries created
would become self-sustaining and would act as growth-centres, attracting other
industries to the areas in which they were situated by virtue of their presence there. In
short, they were all Toothill-inspired. The four developments in the Highlands with
which this thesis is concerned were direct examples of this. Of these developments,
Aviemore was crucially also an attempt at diversifying the new industries in the
Highlands away from manufacturing through the creation of a tourist facility aimed at
increasing both domestic tourism (visitors from the UK), as well as foreign tourism
(visitors from outwith the UK).   These Highland developments were government
attempts at regenerating the Highland economy through industrial intervention,
diversification and economic planning.
Justification
George Peden has argued twice in print over the last fourteen years that
twentieth century Scottish economic history in general has been somewhat neglected
in the considerable literature on the twentieth century economic history of Britain
since a burst of activity in the 1970s.
15 Whilst Peden’s argument could be considered
as a matter of opinion, depending the value you place on Scottish history, it is
certainly  the  case  that  twentieth  century  Highland  economic  history  has  been
neglected in both the main British literature as well as the Scottish literature. In some
respects this is not entirely surprising - the Highlands and Islands is an area at the far
north end of the UK, of approximately one half of the Scottish landmass
16 and, during
                                                
15 Peden, GC, ‘An Agenda for the Economic History of Twentieth Century Scotland’, Scottish
Economic and Social History, vol. 13, (Economic & Social History Society of Scotland, Glasgow,
1993), pp 5-26. & ‘The Managed Economy: Scotland, 1919-2000’ in Devine, TM, Lee, CH & Peden,
GC, (eds.), The Transformation of Scotland: The Economy Since 1700; (EUP, Edinburgh, 2005), pg. 1.
16 HIDB Annual Report 1966, (HIDB, Inverness, 1966), pg. 3.16
the twentieth century, its population witnessed a steady decline from its nineteenth
century numbers. Further, any major development that has taken place in the area in
the  post-war  period  has  done  so  with  governmental  guidance  and  finance.
Consequently, any meaningful discussion of the area in relation to the wider issues in
Scottish  and  British  economic  history  could  only  realistically  take  place  with
reference  to  governmental  documents,  which  until  recently  have  been  mostly
inaccessible  due  to  the  thirty  year  closure  rule.  Thus,  the  occurrence  of  any
substantial body of work on the Highlands - an area on the periphery of the economic
activity, political life and social policies of much of Scottish society, let alone British
society - in British post-war economic history literature has been, until recently,
somewhat lacking. The area’s physical peripherality is then key to understanding its
economic development in the post-war period.
The Highlands in the post- Second World War period effectively served as a
testing ground for governmental economic policy in respect of the Scottish economy
as a whole. In particular the Fort William mill development, the first of the four
Highland developments in the thesis, was described as ‘a test case for industries in the
Highlands’ and the area as having ‘the significance of a laboratory, the experiment in
progress being to determine the effects of a major new industry on the locality, on the
country as a whole, and on the industry itself.’
17 More recently, Michael Fry has
written about ‘A Great Outdoor Laboratory’ discussing the Highlands during the
period between 1945-99, but barely touches on the four developments with which this
thesis is concerned. Given that these developments were undoubtedly the largest
experimental economic developments the area had ever seen, this is a little peculiar.
Fry prefers instead to focus largely on the impact of North Sea Oil on mostly non-
Highland areas and in the latter part of the chapter, the impact of the HIDB,
essentially neglecting the most convincing justification of the title of his chapter
altogether by ignoring the developments this thesis discusses.
18 The Highlands during
                                                
17 SC(DI), Development Committee Survey and Report of Fort William to Ballachulish, February 1950,
NAS SEP4/2622.
18 Fry, M, Wild Scots: Four Hundred Years of Highland History, (John Murray, London, 2005), pg.
288.17
this period was an area with very little infrastructure, heavy industry or population - it
was felt by many in the Scottish Office in particular that by locating industry there the
problems  could  be  reversed.  The  only  difficulty  was  that  industry,  somewhat
understandably, had little interest in locating in the area given its characteristics. As a
result  of  industry’s  unwillingness  to  locate  in  the  area,  government  sought  to
experiment with economic planning and intervention to attempt to solve the social
and economic problems the region was facing by locating the four developments
there, primarily by financial inducement.
Various governments in the immediate post-1945 period used economic
planning and intervention and large-scale modernisation projects in an attempt to
diversify the Scottish economy to offset secular decline in the staple industries and
provide Scotland with new industries. Specifically, there was significant government
investment in the Scottish motor industry with factories built at Bathgate and
Linwood, a new steel strip mill constructed at Ravenscraig to provide materials for
these factories, nuclear power stations at Hunterston and Torness established, a petro-
chemical complex at Grangemouth and the creation of several new towns at Irvine,
East Kilbride, Cumbernauld and Glenrothes and Livingston to accommodate the
overspill in the congested Central Belt region. The four large industrial projects in the
Highlands were part of, and in some cases presaged, this wider governmental policy
of directing industrial diversification and modernisation of the Scottish economy.
Thus, relative to the wider issue of industrial change and the development of the
Scottish economy, the history and failure of these developments is instructive in
understanding the retreat on the part of government from taking an active role in the
planning and management of the Scotland’s economic fortunes and the subsequent
development from a heavily-industrialised, manufacturing-based economy to one
dominated by services. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the developments
in the Highlands in an attempt to understand and contribute to a greater understanding
of the Scottish and Highland economic experience in the post-1945 period and
investigate what wider lessons can be learned from them. The fact that there has been
little relative analysis of these developments and governmental activity in the area18
during the period therefore gives rise to the opportunity of analysing what happened
for the benefit of developing a Scottish and Highland dimension to the considerable
literature available on British twentieth century economic history.
A Scottish and Highland dimension is important for the discussion of economic
history  in  Britain  in  the  twentieth  century  for  several  reasons.  Perhaps  most
importantly, in relation to Peden’s point regarding the lack of work on Scottish
economic history, is the issue of the treatment of Scotland within the existing
literature itself. Scotland has been mostly treated as a region of the UK rather than as
a  country  with  its  own  set  of  very  distinctive  regions,  each  with  distinctive
experiences and problems. As this was almost undoubtedly the view of many in
Whitehall, it has thus filtered into the non-Scottish-specific literature on British
economic history.
19  This is an understandable and entirely defensible point. As such,
that there has been little relative discussion of the Scottish and indeed Highland
experience  during  the  period  gives  rise  to  the  opportunity  to  analyse  policy
construction, implementation and effect through the lens of the Scottish experience
contributing  towards  a  more  comprehensive  understanding  of  the  economic
experience of the whole of the UK, as well as Scotland, particularly in relation to the
development and execution of regional policy from 1945 onwards.
The Scottish Office, under the Secretary of State for Scotland, during the post-
Second World War period drove many of the policy developments in Scotland
through the creation of various departments, boards and agencies. Throughout the
period the Scottish Office played the public role of defender of the national interest,
leading and promoting economic policy in Scotland as bespoke policy for achieving
growth,  but  in  actuality  tailoring  it  to  UK  national  needs.  Accordingly,  the
development of economic policy in Scotland, and in the case of this thesis the
Highlands, has clear relevance to the literature on UK economic history for the same
period.  This  thesis  focuses  on  the  application  of  national  economic  policies;
                                                
19 See for example Scott, P, ‘The Worst of Both Worlds: British Regional Policy, 1954-1961’, Business
History, 38:4, 1996, pg. 60.19
specifically  the  pursuit  of  economic  growth  through  economic  planning  and
management, through the regional policy instruments of the Scottish Office, in
particular the SC(DI) (through secondment of Scottish Office civil servants to the
council), the SDD and the Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDB).
20 In
doing  this,  the  influence  of  social  and  political  factors  including  the  rise  of
nationalism in Scotland, the UK’s balance of payments concerns and the Highland
lobby are addressed. As well as providing an analysis of the Highland experience
during the post-1945 period that contributes towards a wider understanding of both
Scottish and British economic experiences, the thesis also adds to the literature on the
Highlands and Scotland and goes some way towards redressing the imbalance in both
the UK and Scottish literature on the post-1945 period that has seen the region’s
physical peripheral status reflected in historical analyses of the area.
Historiography
The main texts concerning twentieth century Scottish economic history
21 have
generally paid scant attention to the experiences of the Highlands during the post-war
period, save for some analysis of the HIDB and the occasional chapter on the area, or
mention of it, within the context of regional policy analysis. Devine & Finlay include
a chapter by Cameron on the Highlands that analyses the change in the region over
the twentieth century, assessing thematically the development of the area in relation
to recognition at Scottish, UK and European levels of the historical problems present
                                                
20 Whilst the Advisory Panel on the Highlands and Islands played a role in advising the Secretary of
State for Scotland on Highland matters, its actual influence in policy making post-1945 was more
limited. Consequently, it does not feature prominently in the discussion.
21 Campbell, RH, Scotland since 1707: The Rise of an Industrial Society, (Basil Blackwell, Edinburgh,
1985), Cooke et al, Modern Scottish History, 1707 to the Present, volume 2: The Modernisation of
Scotland, 1850 to the Present (East Linton, 1998), Devine, TM & Findlay, RJ, Scotland in the 20th
Century, (Edinburgh, EUP, 2000), Devine, TM, Lee, CH & Peden, GC, (eds.), The Transformation of
Scotland: The Economy Since 1700; (EUP, Edinburgh, 2005), Finlay, RJ, Modern Scotland: 1914-
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throughout its history. Cameron’s conclusion is that there are signs of renewed
confidence in the area over the last twenty years
22, a point echoed by Mary Scanlon,
current MSP for the Highlands.
23 At present, there is no existing monograph on the
area’s post-1945 economic history, although there are several articles and chapters.
24
Historians of twentieth century Scotland have preferred, understandably given the
wealth of industry, population and statistics on the area, to focus instead on the
Central Belt region as well as the role of government in Scotland for their writings
and analysis. This thesis plugs into the existing literature and develops the themes
within in it by demonstrating how the experience of the Highlands was conditioned to
a  considerable  extent  by  the  role  of  government  and  economic  planning  and
intervention, shedding some light on a somewhat neglected area. There is a general
focus on land issues, and in particular crofting, in the Highlands within the wider
Scottish historical literature
25, which given the dominance of the issue of the Highland
Clearances  within  the  minds  of  many  Scots  even  today  is  unsurprising.  Fry’s
revisionist history of the region, Wild Scots, argues that ‘the concept of clearance is
inadequate to characterise the general course of modern history’
26, a view Hunter
describes somewhat succinctly as ‘just crap’
27, although Fry’s revisionist argument is
supported by Harper in her book Adventurers and Exiles: The Great Scottish Exodus,
1790-1914.
28 Cameron has recently provided some historical context and comparison
with the current discussion of land issues in the region, describing the HIDB’s actions
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in the 1960s as ‘an unsuitable vehicle for instituting land reform’ and trying to present
a solution to the problems in the area revolving around issues other than land.
29
Cameron also quotes Lord Bannerman of Kildonan, a staunch supporter of the HIDB
and the Highlands
30, who, in relation to Highland problems, remarked,
The Highland problem, however, does not require just red-hot words; it
requires a widespread militant action from the people left in the Highlands to
show their anger at the chronic neglect of their country by London centralised
government.
31
Lord Bannerman’s proposal demonstrates the validity of Haddow’s assertion about
the Highlands being a ‘troublesome area’ in fairly succinct terms, or at the very least
the potential for the area to be troublesome. The question of land ownership in the
Highlands is a hangover from the Clearances and is one that remains in the current
day with Hunter asserting that the area was dealt ‘the rawest of raw deals’ in relation
to the Clearances in a speech to the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2007.
32
The issue of the Highland Clearances casts a lingering spectre over all
discussions of the experience of the Highlands in the twentieth century and in many
senses this thesis is no different - the problems of depopulation, high unemployment
and low wages were a long-standing consequence of the Clearances with the issue of
depopulation taken as a characteristic feature of Highland life.
33 However, where this
thesis differs is that it does not focus on the Clearances per se, but rather how
government saw fit to endeavour to remedy the enduring effects the Clearances had
on the area in the second half of the twentieth century. Although the Highlands
effectively  missed  the  Industrial  Revolution’s  spread  of  heavy  industry  and
manufacturing  first  time  round,  with  the  notable  exception  of  the  Duke  of
                                                
29 Cameron, E, ‘‘Unfinished Business’: The Land Question and the Scottish Parliament’, pg. 94.
30 Finlay, RJ, ‘Bannerman, John McDonald, (1901-1969)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,
(OUP, Oxford, 2004).
31 Cameron, E, ‘‘Unfinished Business’: The Land Question and the Scottish Parliament’, pg. 94.
32 http://heritage.scotsman.com/index.cfm?id=1398942007 accessed 03/09/2007.
33 HIDB Annual Report 1968, (HIDB, Inverness, 1969), pg. 7.22
Sutherland’s failed attempts to utilise steam power and the railway lines built to serve
the Highland lairds’ hunting lodges, the various governments of the post-war period
identified the area as being ripe for industrial development. However, the area missed
out on the Industrial Revolution the first time round due to its lack of farmable land
and perhaps most crucially, its peripherality. This thesis details government attempts
at solving the problems in the area and assesses them in respect of the UK national
situation and the development of economic policy as administered by the Scottish
Office on behalf of the UK government.
Recently, there have been a few historians who have focused on the Highlands
in the post-Second World War period in relation to economic history, but none on the
experience of the Highlands as a whole during the period. Chronologically speaking,
Peter Payne’s book The Hydro was the first non-governmentally commissioned study
in the literature on twentieth century Scottish economic history to focus explicitly on
the  role  of  government  in  the  Highlands,  detailing  the  development  of  the
Hydroelectric dams that brought electrification to the Highlands, essentially laying
the groundwork for the post-war belief that the area could be industrialised.
34 This
however was explicitly not the intention of the Hydro schemes - it was made clear at
the time that the electricity produced by the dams was primarily for domestic use, in
spite of recommendations by the Cooper Committee
35 for the new developments to be
utilised for industrial applications.
36 Furthermore, Tom Johnston, as Secretary of State
for Scotland between 1941-1945, was very keen for the Hydro to be ‘used as an
instrument for the rehabilitation of the Highlands’ and presented it to Parliament as
such.
37 Johnston had preferred the creation of the Hydro, with a ‘strong social remit’
as a means to develop the Highlands industrially to the recommendations of the
Hilleary  Report  for  the  appointment  of  a  Highland  development  agency  with
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executive powers to aid economic development.
38 However, Johnston’s newly created
North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board (NSHEB) was limited legally by statute and
financially by its expenditure on the dams to simply providing electricity and liaising
with any relevant agencies charged with aiding development in the area. The creation
of the Advisory Panel on the Highlands and Islands in 1947 by Joseph Westwood was
a reaction to the existence of the Hydro, with the justification that its existence
negated the need for a development agency. As a result the new Advisory Panel was
simply intended to advise the Secretary of State on how best to proceed with
Highland development.
39 The example of the Hydro in the Highlands undoubtedly
went some way towards contributing to the idea that the development of industry
could help solve the ills of the area however. Labour-intensive manufacturing would
require manpower to build and operate it, as well as services when in operation. The
issues of depopulation, unemployment and wages could thus be addressed by locating
heavy industries in the area, while they could also contribute to the diversification of
the Scottish economy. At least that was the theory.
Ewen Cameron has written extensively on the Highlands in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, focusing much of his writing on land issue questions, producing
several articles, chapters in books and two monographs on the area.
40 Of this body of
work, Cameron’s article ‘The Scottish Highlands as a Special Policy Area, 1886-
1965’ is of most relevance to this thesis. In it, Cameron details the historical context
of the development of a Highland policy since the 1880s as well as strategies
successor governments have used ‘to justify the perpetuation of a distinct Highland
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policy area’.
41 In assessing these policies he also identifies the paradigm of ‘special
status’ under which policies have been formulated in respect of the Highlands.
Cameron concludes that as a result of this paradigm, there has been little actual
change in policy towards the area with the government actively addressing new
policies as ‘atonement for the wrongs of the past’
42, most obviously in Willie Ross’
proclamation upon the creation of the Highlands and Islands Development Board that
It is regrettable in this day and age when we are placing so much emphasis on
regional development, we have not faced this problem, which has been present
for over 80 years, and used the powers that are in the special Scottish set up, to
experiment and to prove a successful way to do things, which could have been
applied to other areas now suffering from exactly the same problems which
started in the Highlands 100 years ago.
43
Cameron’s assessment of governmental action being conditioned by ‘atonement for
the  past’  concurs  with  Hunter’s  argument.  Further  he  also  observes  how  any
disagreement with the idea that the Highlands is a special case deserving special
treatment has been met with protests of not being ‘sufficiently sensitive to Highland
needs’.
44 These needs inevitably focused on the concern for crofters - a peculiarly
Scottish term for an individual who farms a small rented arable plot of land, usually
attached to a house and with a right of pasturage with other similar farms. Crofters
have long held a prominent role in Highland life with their position in the area
cemented by the Crofters’ War in the 1880s culminating in the passing of the
Crofters’ Holding (Scotland) Act 1886 after a Royal Commission chaired by Lord
Napier and Ettrick establishing the Crofters’ Commission. The new act secured
tenancy for crofters as long as rent - fixed fairly by a land court - was paid with
compensation for improvements allowed and with the allowing of crofts to be
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bequeathed to relatives. This enshrined the rights of crofters in law and effectively
negated any possibility of further land clearances in the Highlands.
45
The Commission then went out of existence in 1912 with the creation of the
new Board of Agriculture before being reappointed in 1956 after a Committee of
Enquiry was set up by the Scottish Office to review crofting matters at the suggestion
of the Advisory Panel on the Highlands and Islands
46, resulting in the passing of the
Crofters (Scotland) Act, 1955. The new commission was to keep under general
review all matters relating to crofting and in particular the ‘need for industries to
provide supplementary occupations for crofters or work for their families’ and to
submit advice to the Secretary of State on these matters.
47  Crofting was, and still is to
a degree, seen as the traditional way of life in the Highlands - any policies that
impinged on this were often seen as an attack on the established and romanticised
way of life of toiling the land, albeit not necessarily be the crofters themselves. Thus,
the special treatment needed by the area was justified on the basis of heritage,
emotional  attachment  and  posterity.  However,  the  increasing  seriousness  of
depopulation in the Highlands led to the Commission working with the Highland
Panel on solutions to the problem. Cameron identifies the support of the STUC, and
later and more crucially the Labour Party, for the establishment of a Highland
development authority in the late 1950s and early 1960s respectively as key to the
acceptance of the ‘special’ status of the Highlands within the Scottish Office, which
was not the case prior to this. The calls for a new authority led one official in the
Scottish Office in 1960 to comment that the ‘real problems and emotional appeal’ of
the area meant that it merited concessions, as ‘one does not willingly abandon an
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accepted name’ and that ‘MPs and Whitehall are more ready to make concessions for
the ‘Highlands and Islands’ than they would be for the ‘Crofting Counties’ a phrase
which has all the wrong overtones.’
48 This subtle change in tack in governmental
circles of identifying the area with crofting to an area no longer as confined and
defined by its traditions, at least superficially, signalled the end of crofting being
considered as the most important aspect of Highland industry, opening up the
possibility that the area could modernise through industrial development without
being dominated by the crofting argument. Cameron concludes that policy in respect
of the Highlands has operated subject to constraints not limited to geography
49, an
argument certainly true in relation to the developments with which this thesis is
concerned.
Ian Levitt has also written on the region
50, with his most recent work on the
developments at Aviemore and the Corpach mill being published in 2005. Levitt’s
work on Aviemore and Corpach are cited in each of the case studies in this thesis as
secondary sources and as such form part of the later discussion. Levitt’s primary
themes in his work on the Highlands are the issues of Scottish sentiment and the
democratic deficit in the Scottish Office’s treatment of the Highlands - that the
Scottish Office was to a degree constrained in its policy actions in the Highlands by
public sentiment for the region, but with little actual political accountability past the
issue of sentiment.
51 There is a degree of overlap between Levitt’s most recent work
and this thesis, most obviously in the two case studies mentioned, although Levitt’s
focus in these articles is primarily on administrative policy development within the
Scottish Office in relation to the Highlands and complements much of what the thesis
details. The greater focus on the development of regional policy in respect of the
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Highlands and its application in this thesis as well as the analysis of the other two
case studies (Invergordon and Dounreay) means that, taken together, Levitt’s work
and this body of work build up a greater understanding of the Highland economy in
the post-1945 period and how it related to, relates to and was affected by, the wider
issues of not just the Scottish economy, but the also UK experience during the period.
The literature on the economic experience of the UK in the post-1945 period
is vast and very detailed. Thus, due to constraints of space, a brief survey of the most
current developments in the literature in relation to regional policy decisions in the
UK, relative to the period in which the developments that this thesis is concerned
with were created, will be addressed. Scott, Tomlinson and O’Hara’s work on
regional policy during the period forms the basis for the current discussion of the UK
regional policy analysis in the literature and builds upon the work of Rhodes, Moore
and Parsons from the 1970s.
52 Tomlinson provides a brief overview of regional policy
as part of a wider discussion of the economic policy of the Labour government 1964-
70, concluding that it was less about regional planning as it was about regional policy,
a distinction he makes clear through his assessment that ‘Policy for the regions was
largely under the control of the Board of Trade until 1969’ and that the new boards
created ‘never became economic planning bodies in the sense of having significant
autonomous power over actions in their regions.’
53 The HIDB had some autonomy in
its actions, but not so much as could be reasonable described as significant. The
Scottish Office however did. The analysis in this thesis of the four developments in
the Highlands provides a Scottish aspect to Tomlinson’s assessment and shed new
light on the administration of regional policy in the UK.
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Scott’s work on regional policy decisions in the UK focuses on the period up
to 1964.
54 One of the main themes in this thesis, the short-termism of regional policy
in  Scotland,  is  an  extension  and  development  of  Scott’s  assertion  that  ‘the
government’s perception of the regional problem as essentially a short-term problem
of localised unemployment was demonstrated by the introduction of the Local
Employment Act (1960).’
55 Where Scott was talking about regional policy through
the 1950s and early 1960s in Britain generally, the discussion in this thesis of short-
termism in policy execution in relation to the Highlands and Scotland provides further
evidence to support this aspect of his view onward throughout the 1960s. Whilst
policy  in  the  Highlands  was  not  focused  exclusively  on  remedying  localised
unemployment, there was certainly a short-term aspect to it. Scott goes on to discuss
the  ‘sea-change  in  the  emphasis  of  policy’  in  the  UK  brought  about  with  the
publication of the Toothill Report in the early part of the decade
56, a point this thesis
makes in the discussion of the development of regional policy in Scotland. Scott then
discusses how government at the UK level considered Toothill’s recommendations in
December 1961 in a memorandum compiled by John Maclay, the Secretary of State
for Scotland, before setting up a Civil Service working party to examine the issues
raised. The consequence of this, Scott argues, was that the recommendations made by
Toothill became a central component of the government’s UK regional growth
strategy.
57 In Scotland, the recommendations of Toothill were fully taken on board
and, as discussed earlier, resulted in the creation of the SDD and inspired the four
developments with which this thesis is concerned, directly informing the growth
centre  strategy  pursued  by  the  Scottish  Office.  Thus,  the  thesis  is,  in  part,  a
development of Scott’s arguments, but focused on Scotland and in particular the
experience of the Highlands.
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Where Scott focuses on the period up to 1964, O’Hara has produced recent
work on the regional policies of the Wilson government 1964-1970, filling a gap in
the literature.
58 O’Hara states, ‘Less work has gone into explaining regional policy
between 1964 and 1970, partly because of a lack of available evidence.’
59 The same
can more or less be said for regional policy in Scotland, with the exception of Levitt’s
recent work. In examining the influences on regional policy in the late 1960s in his
article on the subject, O’Hara focuses on party politics at the UK level in the context
of the economic environment, the structure of government, the influence of ‘new
regional economics’ and the impact of new knowledge and statistics. In it, O’Hara
concludes that ‘the minutiae of policy tools were dependent on personal, official and
interdepartmental rivalry.’
60 Although O’Hara neglects to mention Scotland in the
article, his conclusion in this respect applies equally to regional development in
Scotland, particularly the four developments this thesis details - Willie Ross’ actions
as Secretary of State for Scotland during the discussions for the siting of the PFR are
a prime example of O’Hara’s argument. In his most recent offering on the subject of
regional policy, a chapter in his monograph on the Wilson government 1964-70,
O’Hara concludes that regional planning was about, amongst other things, ‘how to
meet the requirements of the dynamic economics of the South East and Midlands’
61,
ignoring Scotland altogether. O’Hara’s chapter does give some recognition to the
distinction between Scotland’s regions, mentioning the different primary industries
and opportunities for growth in Central Scotland and the Highlands
62, but curiously
does not make any mention of the HIDB - the first ever regional development agency
in  the  UK  -  in  either  his  chapter  ‘Regional  Planning’  in  From  Dreams  to
Disillusionment or his article ‘A Journey Without Maps: The Regional Policies of the
1964-70 British Labour Government’ on the subject. Similarly, Tomlinson also omits
to mention the HIDB in his discussion of regional policy in the UK in his monograph
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on the Labour government of 1964-70.
63 Levitt has produced two articles detailing the
creation of the HIDB and its first two years of operation
64, adding to the existing
literature produced by Alexander, Hetherington and Grassie.
The literature on Highland economic history during the twentieth century can
be split into two camps - the first being government-sponsored or written by former
governmental officials and the second produced by independent observers. Both
camps have focused on the role of government in the area during the post-war period,
in particular the HIDB. In part this can be explained by the fact that almost all of the
economic development in the Highlands during this time period took place with
government firmly involved. The HIDB was perhaps the most obvious example of
this. However the thirty year closure rule on official government documents has
hindered discussion of the economic experience of the area during the whole period
save for a few pieces. Sir Kenneth Alexander, former chairman of the HIDB, has
produced two chapters discussing the role of the HIDB and the problems faced by the
board under his tenure.
65 There has also been two books written by former journalists;
Alistair Hetherington, a former editor of The  Guardian and Controller of BBC
Scotland
66, and James Grassie.
67 Hetherington’s work brought together a number of
Scottish writers, primarily Highland-based or from the area, and discusses the
changes in the Highlands since 1965, the year the HIDB first came into being,
concluding that ‘The Highlands are no longer viewed as a place which the young
must leave in order to succeed.’
68 Grassie’s book is a look at the experimental nature
of Highland development through the lens of the HIDB’s activities, detailing the role
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the board played in everything from fishing development through to the closure of the
last large-scale industrial development established in the area by the government, the
Invergordon  smelter.  Grassie  concludes  his  analysis  by  assessing  the  board’s
activities in the aftermath of the Invergordon closure as ‘keeping many smaller
companies  afloat,  sheltering  the  dim  flame  of  development  from  the  gale  of
recession’
69, predicting the future path of the board and its successor body HIE.
The  fact  that  government  played  such  an  active  role  in  industrial  and
economic development, even before the HIDB’s founding, is instructive in that it
demonstrates the view of government that the Scottish economy was unable by itself
to generate solutions to the problems facing it and its regions, in this case the
Highlands. Further, it shows quite clearly that this was the view of government also.
The development of governmental policy in respect of the regions in Scotland is
therefore crucial in understanding why this was the case.
Regional Policy Development in Post-1945 Scotland
For much of the twentieth century, Scotland’s geographical composition,
location, the size of its economy and inherent reliance on industrial manufacturing
have meant that throughout the period the country has suffered from problems of poor
economic  performance.  The  overdependence  on  traditional  industries  such  as
shipbuilding, steel and coal, located in the central industrial belt, resulted in the
lagging behind of the Scottish economy in performance compared to the British
economy as a whole. The creation of the Scottish National Development Council
(SNDC), and latterly the enactment of the Special Areas Acts of 1934 and 1937 mark
the beginning stages of the growth of regional policy within Scotland. The creation of
the SNDC in March 1930 by the Convention of Royal Burghs was a reaction to the
encouragement of the then Labour government, in what Harvie calls a ‘purely
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cosmetic move’
70, to regional groups for industrial development. Harvie’s analysis is
a little harsh however as the SNDC, along with the Clydesdale Bank and others, were
one of the first groups to identify the structural imbalance in the Scottish economy
and its heavy reliance on the staple industries as the root cause of the social and
economic difficulties of the country
71, providing the basis for much of the future
economic policy pursued as a means to solving the problems. The recognition of a
structural imbalance would later become a recurring theme of any analysis of the
Scottish economy by commentators and government alike until the early 1970s. The
SNDC was born out of nationalist pressure and gathered momentum from the
beginning of the 1930s in tandem with the growing pace of factory closures between
1932 and 1934 where 58 factories opened, but 88 closed.
72 That nationalist pressure
precipitated the SNDC’s creation is important as it demonstrates that there was a
precedent for the growth of nationalism in Scotland affecting governmental policies
in respect of the Scottish economy, one of the arguments put forward in this thesis.
The SNDC’s momentum saw it gain the support of the STUC and even
become the recipient of governmental funding. This evidence of increased awareness
of the need for action in respect of the regional problems manifested itself in the
government’s  creation  of  the  Special  Areas  Acts  of  1934  and  1937,  with  the
appointment of a Special Areas Commissioner for Scotland - Sir Hugh Rose whose
‘Special Area’ covered the central Scottish industrial belt, excepting Glasgow.
73
Presaging many later prominent figures in Scottish economic life, Rose would go on
to  press  government  for  industrial  restructuring  as  the  essential  cure  for
unemployment only to be rebuffed with the response that ‘further involvement lay
beyond the competence of government.’
74 The Special Areas Acts were the first
specific pieces of legislation to deal with the problem of regional depression and
disparity in terms of unemployment and economic development in Britain as a whole
and were inextricably linked with the idea of ‘National economic recovery’. It was
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felt by those in government that only economic recovery on a national scale could
alleviate the problems facing the depressed areas.
75
The introduction of these Special Areas was a reaction to the spread of the
problems of regional inequalities that had been previously confined to rural areas.
76
Unemployment played a major role in this. The 1930s saw unprecedented levels of
unemployment and it became incumbent on the government to do something about it;
the political impact of the unemployment figures led Neville Chamberlain to admit in
a speech to Parliament that ‘there was no possibility of comparatively small figures in
unemployment rates for a decade.’
77 The resultant acts were designed to address the
problem  and  symbolised  a  move  away  from  laissez-faire  government  to  more
interventionist policies that have characterised governmental approaches to the
economy since. The problems between the regions were identified in a series of
studies commissioned by the government in the early 1930s and eventually led to the
passing of the Special Areas acts resulting in the appointment of Special Area
Commissioners charged with the task of rehabilitating the identified areas
78 and the
formation of the Special Areas Reconstruction Association.
79 The disparities between
the regions in terms of unemployment can be seen in Table 1.1:
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Table 1.1 Regional Unemployment Rates for 1931
Area Unemployment (%)
South East 7.8
East Anglia 9.4
South West 8.1
West Midlands 12.1
East Midlands 9.6
North West Yorkshire/
Humberside
16.2
North 19.2
Wales 16.5
Scotland 16.1
Northern Ireland n/a
Source: Lee, C, Scotland and the United Kingdom, (MUP, Manchester, 1995), pg. 67.
It is clear from the Table 1.1 that there was considerable difference among the regions
and the acts were intended to go some way to addressing the imbalance between
them. The table also reveals how even in the early 1930s the South East suffered
lower unemployment levels than the others - a pattern that would continue until the
present day and come to characterise one of the main differences between the regions
in the UK throughout the twentieth century.
However, as important as these acts are in tracing the development of regional
policy in Britain, they were not that far-reaching. Several historians have invariably
described these regional policy decisions as ‘ad hoc’ and without any real sense of
purpose other than to serve political necessities
80, arguing that the acts were not a part
of an integrated set of policies designed to foster growth in the economy as a whole
but were a reaction to political problems and designed to maintain the legitimacy of
government  in  the  face  of  rising  unemployment  and  growing  concern  at  the
government’s ability to combat it. However, criticism of regional policy was by no
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means a new thing. In the beginning there was criticism of the term ‘Special Areas’
by Ernest Bevin who argued ‘It is of no great inducement to anybody to open a
business… when you tell him he is going to a place where there is a depression’.
81
Bevin’s words fell on deaf ears, however, before he later went on to become the
Minister of Labour in the wartime government and was instrumental in many of the
economic planning mechanisms put in place under the same government during the
Second World War. Bevin’s words would later have a degree of resonance when
trying to persuade companies to locate in the Highlands, albeit not entirely due to
depression being the main issue - peripherality took that role - resulting in financial
inducements playing a major role.
The Scottish Economic Committee (SEC) was set up in 1936 as a sub-
committee  of  the  SNDC  (although  it  also  spanned  the  Scottish  Office)  -  the
‘authoritative Scots body’ recommended by Sir Hugh Rose in his first report of
November 1935.
82 During the SEC’s short lifetime, along with the other agencies that
were created (Hillington Industrial Estate, Glasgow Empire Exhibition, Special Areas
Reconstruction Association and the Scottish Development Council) it was important
in ‘ideologically conditioning the Unionist Party to accept the legitimacy of using
state apparatus as means of economic and social regeneration.’
83 Harvie also points
out that the SEC was regarded with some suspicion within Whitehall at this time
however. This was possibly a result of its belief in centralised allocation of industry
as advocated by Hugh Dalton’s committee of enquiry for the Labour Party in 1937,
later becoming the basis for the 1945 Distribution of Industry Act.
84 The SEC and the
other agencies were some way ahead of the game it would seem in respect of using
planning as a means to alleviate economic and social problems, at least in a regional
context,  calling  for  greater  governmental  intervention  and  support  for  the
development of new industries. The committee played a major role in its short three
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year lifetime in the establishment of industrial estates in Scotland (such as the
Hillington estate) to bring in new industry and, crucially to this thesis, the economic
development of the Highlands. The SEC set up a further committee chaired by
Professor Hilleary in 1937 to investigate the problems in the Highlands and what
would be required to solve them, producing what is often regarded as one of the
landmarks in modern Highland economic history.
85 Hilleary’s report, published in
1938, proposed a development board for the Highlands with executive powers as well
as development in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, tourism (especially in light of the
development of the motor-car in the UK) and the development of industrial centres
where possible.
86 The report presaged the creation of the HIDB almost thirty years
later and formed the blueprint for much of the approach of the board in the late 1960s
and 1970s. Hilleary’s proposals generated much discussion on how best to proceed
with Highland development but this was as far as they went with world events
severely impacting on the discussion.
87
The outbreak of war in 1939 saw the suspension of the SEC, but opened the
floodgates for a spate of economic planning measures, going some way towards
providing the impetus and indeed the confidence for subsequent governments to
believe that they were best placed to foster economic growth as well as alleviate the
economic and social ills of the nation, regions and all. The wartime economy allowed
for  the  implementation  of  various  measures  that  were  designed  to  allow  the
government to dictate the production of what was needed for the war effort. The
Barlow  Report  of  1940,  otherwise  known  as  the  Royal  Commission  on  the
Distribution of the Industrial Population, advised that for the problem of the Special
Areas to be resolved a check on the growth of the South East of the UK, and in
particular London, had to be implemented.
88 Although the SEC had been suspended at
the outbreak of war, economic planning in Scotland was beginning to take off. The
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appointment of Tom Johnston as the Labour Secretary of State in 1941 heralded the
start  of  numerous  reforms  of  government  designed  to  administer  post-war
reconstruction  and  economic  planning.  The  corporatist  arrangements  between
government, industry and labour were in full swing. Based on the premise of state
intervention, the government set about preparing for the post-war period on the basis
of economic planning. Johnston’s arrangements for Scotland were predicated on his
own  not  inconsiderable  power,  such  was  the  perceived  threat  of  Scottish
Nationalism.
89 Johnston believed that a strong voice for Scotland, nationalism with a
small ‘n’, in the UK national Cabinet would be an effective tool for combating the
increase in Scottish Nationalism.
90 Finlay states that amidst the ‘triumph of state
intervention and the coming of the Welfare State… the leaders of Scottish industry
found their interests well protected and promoted by the government’.
91 He argues
that the policies of the reconstruction period under Johnston in Scotland were not
distinct from the policies of the 1930s other than that industry was now included in
the corporatist arrangements.
The introduction of the Clyde Valley Regional Plan of 1946
92, influenced by
the success of Roosevelt’s Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) electrification of rural
areas in the USA, provided the blueprint for the regeneration of the Clyde basin and
identified the major problems concerning housing provisions in the area and the need
for a solution. Relative to the Highlands, the TVA demonstrated the positive impact
electrification of rural areas could have, mimicked by the creation of the Hydro-
electric schemes in the North of Scotland, establishing itself as a kind of blue print for
Highland development. George Houston, one of the drafters of the proposals for a
Highland Development Authority, later to become the HIDB, cites the TVA as an
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influence on the plans for the new board.
93 Grassie, writing in 1983, described the
board as ‘a dynamic body on the lines of the TVA’.
94
The establishment of the New Towns Act of 1946 allowed for the creation and
planning of new towns by government appointed development organisations to solve
the problem of a shortfall in housing stock and a rising population.
95 The successor
1947 Town and Country Planning Act, still in use today, provided the government
with the means to direct expanding firms to Development Areas by the issuing of
Industrial Development Certificates (IDC), necessary for planning permission to be
granted for factories over 5000sqft.
96 This allowed the government to direct firms to
these  areas  in  order  to  try  to  combat  unemployment.  IDCs  also  prevented
industrialists building in congested areas, but where the refusal of an IDC may have
led the firm to delay or abandon the development, financial inducement could then be
used to persuade the firm otherwise, as was the case with the Corpach, Aviemore and
Invergordon developments. This issuance of IDCs was in addition to the construction
of new towns, reinforcing the growing importance of regional policy under the
Distribution of Industry Act.
97 The construction of the new towns of Cumbernauld,
Livingston,  Glenrothes,  East  Kilbride  and  Irvine  was  intended  as  another
supplementary measure to the policy of siting factories in development areas. The
new towns were designed to relieve urban pressures on the larger cities of Glasgow
and Edinburgh, both of which were suffering from deterioration in the quality of their
housing stocks.
98 This dual intention of sparking economic growth and alleviating
social problems was part of a wider approach to regional policy that found its roots in
the fear of a return of the mass-unemployment of the Great Depression. The building
of new towns and the obvious requirement of building materials, labour and the
construction of the necessary infrastructure, as well as the siting of new factories next
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to them, provided ample employment opportunities for people moving to these
areas.
99 Moreover, the dualistic intent to spark economic growth and alleviate social
problems was one that would come to characterise much of the development of the
Highlands later in the period.
The post-war period also saw the discarding of the term ‘Special Areas’,
replacing it with the term ‘Development Area’; a result of the Distribution of Industry
Act  of  1945  and  latterly  the  Distribution  of  Industry  Act  1950  (designed  to
supplement the 1945 act). The new development areas now included Glasgow
100 and
were based on unemployment figures.
101 It was now the case that the entirety of
Scotland was a ‘Development Area’, with the notable exception of Edinburgh. These
two acts, as well as the Employment White Paper of 1944 and the Town and Country
Planning Act of 1947, supplemented and modified by the Distribution of Industry
(Industrial Finance) Act of 1958 followed by the Local Employment Act 1960,
became the foundations of post-war regional policy and acted as the principal statutes
for regional development
102 until the recommendations of the Toothill Report in 1961
were taken on board by government - particularly in Scotland. These acts and policies
were aimed at the alleviation of unemployment in the most depressed areas as the
main focus of regional policy. The Distribution of Industry Act and the Town and
Country Planning Act were used by the Board of Trade as a means of controlling
industrial location by allowing government to designate Development Areas, grant
loans and issue Industrial Development Certificates for industrial buildings. These
powers would later come into play when government was looking to industrialise the
Highlands through the need for an IDC in order to build a factory of a substantial
size. Thus, when industrialists were looking to build a large new factory Government
was able to dictate where it should be situated. The Highlands, an unattractive
location for many industrialists due to its remoteness, thus became a more attractive
proposition when grants were available to locate and an IDC readily attainable. As a
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direct result of the Distribution of Industry Acts of 1945 and 1950, loans and grants
totalling £5.8m were made available to firms in Scotland between 1945 and 1958. As
a result of the Distribution of Industry (Industrial Finance Act) of 1958, an extra £2m
was made available of which £0.9m was earmarked for new enterprises. Between
1945  and  1960,  49m  sqft  of  factory  building  for  manufacturing  industry  was
completed in Scotland, 11m sqft of which was financed directly by government. By
1959, 75,000 people (3.3% of the workforce) were employed in Board of Trade
factories in Scotland by 1959.
103
The SEC’s suspension at the outbreak of the Second World War eventually
led to it being renamed the Scottish Council: Development and Industry SC(DI) in
1946 and the loss of its semi-autonomous capabilities. The new arrangements saw
representation from parts of industry, unions and local authorities and the creation of
joint bodies between the Scottish Office and other ministries dealing with industry in
favour of a centralised system of permits and advanced factories built by the Board of
Trade. Harvie states ‘the valuable semi-autonomy of the SEC was lost - tragically at a
time when increasing numbers of decisions ended up in the hands of less-than expert
Whitehall mandarins.’
104 Although the semi-autonomy was lost, Harvie’s assessment
of it as being tragic is perhaps a little melodramatic. The new SC(DI) would serve the
Scottish economy with advice, expertise and suggestions for economic development
with a degree of distinction that carries on to the present day.
Reporting Scotland: Scottish Council (Development & Industry)
Reports and the ‘new’ regional development policies
The involvement of the Scottish Council (Development & Industry) (SC(DI))
in Scottish economic life started with its formal creation from the ashes of the
Scottish Development Council and Tom Johnston’s Scottish Council on Industry on
3
rd June 1946 at a meeting in the heart of Scottish administrative life, St Andrew’s
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House in Edinburgh. The meeting was overseen by the then Secretary of State for
Scotland, Joseph Westwood, and brought together members from local authorities,
the Chambers of Commerce, Scottish Banks and private firms.
105 The new body was a
company limited by guarantee and funded by subscriptions from its members. Its
explicit mission statement was to advise ‘the Secretary of State for Scotland in regard
to the Industrial, Commercial and Economic problems of Scotland.’ The SC(DI),
along with the Advisory Panel on the Highlands and Islands (a Scottish Office group
set up to advise the Secretary of State for Scotland) and the Scottish Board for
Industry, then went on to produce a further report focusing on Highland Transport
costs in 1951.
106 The report recommended four measures to offset the disadvantages
facing the area in terms of transport:
i)  increasing the efficiency of the transport system, including road, rail
and sea links.
ii)  a deliberate policy of lowering transport charges over long distances.
iii)  assistance to be given to particular industries- namely agriculture,
fisheries and forestry.
iv)  special steps taken to deal with the problem of very isolated areas.
107
These measures were by no means revolutionary - indeed they can be considered as a
common sense approach in many respects. However, transport remains a serious
problem in the area even until the present day with Highlands and Islands Enterprise
(the successor to the HIDB) calling for improved transport infrastructure in the area
repeatedly in its A Smart, Successful Highlands and Islands report of 2005.
108 The
recommendations of the SC(DI)’s report were never taken on board although it
certainly contributed to the idea that the SC(DI) was of value to thinking on the
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Scottish economy and an active contributor to the seeking out of solutions to the
economic problems facing the country.
The  role  of  the  SC(DI)  in  Scottish  economic  life  had  become  quite
pronounced after the publication of several influential reports detailing the economic
conditions facing Scotland and Scottish regions during the 1950s. The SC(DI)
produced reports on the economic climate of several regions in Scotland of which the
Development  Committee  Survey  and  Report  of  Fort  William  to  Ballachulish,
(Edinburgh, 1950), the Report of the Committee on Highland Transport Costs,
(Edinburgh, 1951) and Report of the Committee on Local Development in Scotland,
(Edinburgh, 1952) are of most relevance to this thesis. The 1950 report on Fort
William and Ballachulish revealed that there was little or no unemployment in the
area but warned of the dangers of committing the area to over-reliance on the Fort
William  aluminium  smelter
109, whilst the report on Highland transport costs
concluded that government should pursue a policy of increasing the efficiency of
existing transport services in the area whilst deliberately lowering costs and providing
special assistance in this respect to the Highland industries of agriculture, fishing and
forestry
110 - almost exactly the same calls that the  Smart, Successful Highlands and
Islands document in 2005 made, more than fifty years after the Highland Transport
document was produced.   
The most famous and influential of the SC(DI)’s reports during this period
was undoubtedly Alec Cairncross’ Report of the Committee on Local Development in
Scotland of 1952 that revealed how Scotland’s industrial structure was overly
dependent on the declining Staple Industries of Coal, Steel and Shipbuilding.
111
Cairncross had finished his time working as economic advisor to the Board of Trade
and then as Director of the Economics Division of the Organisation for European
Economic Cooperation before returning to the University of Glasgow as Professor of
Applied Economics. It was while at Glasgow that Cairncross wrote his report on the
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Scottish economy, working as part of the Department of Social and Economic
Research whose focus was mostly on regional policy
112, presaging much of the future
focus on the discipline that would inform the Labour party’s manifesto commitment
to it in the 1964 UK election. The title of Cairncross’ report, Report of the Committee
on  Local  Development  in  Scotland,  demonstrates  the  focus  on  local/regional
development  as  a  means  towards  remedying  the  ills  of  the  nation.  Moreover,
particularly in relation to this thesis, one of the assessors on the committee was REC
Johnson, on secondment from the Scottish Home Department, who would later go on
to become the under secretary responsible for regional development in Scotland and
play a considerable role in the location and planning for the Aviemore and Corpach
developments. Cairncross’ report made clear in its summary of findings that it had
‘envisaged the problem of local development in national rather than that of local
terms’ and that policy should be guided by three objectives:
i)  To accelerate the growth of new industrial communities in promising
locations; industrial growth should come first, ahead of even the need
to reduce unemployment in other areas.
ii)  To make fuller and more economical use of manpower and natural
resources that are in danger of being wasted.
iii)  To arrest the decline of communities, and the consequent waste of
material and social assets which they possess, in cases where a little
help might restore them to a thriving condition.
113
Relative to the Highlands, the new focus on regional policy and the findings
of Cairncross’ report meant the area began to be viewed as not just a part of Scotland
as a whole, but as a distinct region with its own set of distinct problems, at least in
Scottish circles if not Whitehall. The three main recommendations detailed above
demonstrate a clear link between the projects undertaken in the Highlands and the
guiding principles set out by Cairncross and his committee. All four developments
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discussed in this thesis were planned for with Cairncross’ report’s findings firmly in
mind, from its approach envisaging the problem of local development in national
terms through to the commitment to arresting the decline of communities. Further, the
Cairncross  Report’s  suggestion  that  ‘the  dynamic  character  of  industrial
development… may involve the growth of new centres of industry in order to exploit
the possibilities of technological advance’
114 relates directly to each of the four
developments and the government’s aims for them to create new growth centres,
based on new technologies. The Cairncross Report in this respect was therefore the
base  from  which  many  in  Scotland  would  go  on  to  argue  for  industrial  and
infrastructural development in the Highlands in order to offset the difficulties facing
the area. Cairncross followed up the report by editing a book by members of his
department entitled The Scottish Economy: A Statistical Account of Scottish Life with
the intention that the book go some way towards addressing the problem of unreliable
and scarce statistics on Scottish economic and social life
115, a problem that exists into
the current day with there still being no National Accounts for Scotland produced.
116
However, it wasn’t until the production in 1961 of perhaps the most influential report
by the SC(DI), the Toothill Report, An Inquiry Into the Scottish Economy,
117  that the
industrial development of the Highlands would really begin to gain momentum.
Cairncross’ influence in stimulating the discussion gave rise to the production of the
Toothill  Report,  providing  the  starting  point  from  which  Toothill  based  his
recommendations for the establishment of growth centres.
118 Scott describes the
Toothill Report’s growth strategy as having ‘strong similarities to that proposed by
the Scottish Council nine years earlier’
119 and with some justification.
The idea of the ‘region’ in Scottish economic life was firmly established by
the publication of the Toothill Report. Chaired by JN Toothill, the then chairman of
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Ferranti Ltd.
120 Ferranti was an electronics firm brought to Scotland in 1941 that went
on to become the foundation for the creation of Silicon Glen.
121 The report was
arguably the most influential report written on the Scottish economy in the post-
Second World War period and the effective starting point for all subsequent economic
and  industrial  policies  and  development  in  Scotland  until  the  election  of  the
Conservatives in 1979. The SC(DI)’s commissioning of Toothill to investigate how to
remedy the ills facing the Scottish economy marks what is the effective beginning of
large-scale governmental intervention in location of new industries in Scotland in the
1960s. The Toothill Report encouraged the idea of the ‘region’ and called for more
governmental intervention in the economy to rectify the problems experienced by the
country.
122 The report took the view that unemployment was not a sufficient criterion
for the application of regional policy. It argued instead that regional characteristics
such as ‘geographical location, communication facilities, development potential or
established industrial base, offered the best prospects for generating economic
growth’.
123 It was this idea of ‘growth centres’ that was to characterise regional
economic policy in subsequent years, not just in Scotland but the UK as well.
Toothill’s recommendations were not original or new, but rather a synthesis of
already existing ideas concerning the way forward for regional policy in Britain.
124
They were, however, the beginning of a new approach to British regional policy in
Scotland. From seeking to address issues of unemployment, the government sought to
identify areas of potential growth in the hope that it could use them to stimulate
growth in the surrounding areas. This would inform the later decision to establish the
Industrial Development Act 1966 that scheduled the whole of Northern England, all
of Scotland except Edinburgh and most of Wales and South West England as
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Development Areas with the hope that this would encourage industry ‘voluntarily’ to
move to the attractive ‘growing points’ within these new areas.
125
In March, 1962 the SDD was created as a result of the acceptance of the
recommendations of the Toothill Report by John Maclay, the Scottish Secretary of
State under Macmillan, before Maclay was later relieved of his duties the following
July.
126 Had Maclay disagreed with the proposals put forward by Toothill it is quite
conceivable that there could have been no creation of the SDD at all or for quite some
time at least, such was the power of the Scottish Secretary’s position within the
Scottish-based Civil Service. The creation of the Scottish Economic Planning Board
in 1964
127 was a precursor to the unveiling of the National Plan in 1965, which was
meant to signal the new dawn of economic planning in Britain. In Scotland, the SDD
was at hand to provide a Regional Development Division to work hand in hand with
the new regional bodies (planning boards and councils) in formulating and executing
the new Plan. Although the regional planning bodies were failures elsewhere, the
Plan for Scotland, produced by the new Scottish Secretary of State, William Ross,
was  far  more  detailed  than  its  counterparts
128 and echoed many of the
recommendations of the Toothill Report as well as linking growth to the improvement
of infrastructure.
129 The intention was that the regional bodies would focus on
achieving economic growth through centralised economic planning, in turn helping
the UK national economic situation.
The election of Labour in 1964 brought with it a renewed vigour for economic
planning and regional policy, vowing to use the ‘white heat of the technological
revolution’ as a tool for growing the UK economy. This approach crystallised
Wilson’s  approach  towards  planning  and  the  issue  of  modernity.  Toothill  had
recommended the introduction of new, science-based industries that could help
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establish growth centres
130, the Wilson government delivered them with an ambitious
programme for the development of nuclear power across the country, of which
Dounreay  was  a  part,  the  establishment  of  two  aluminium  smelters  (later
supplemented with another) - including the Invergordon plant - powered by two of
the  numerous  new  nuclear  reactors  planned  and  several  other  technologically
advanced manufacturing plants, including the Corpach mill – the first integrated
paper pulp mill in the UK. The link between Toothill’s recommendations for new,
science-based industries and Labour’s programme for a ‘technological revolution’ is
thus  clear.  Combined  with  Labour’s  commitment  to  developing  the  regions,
Toothill’s recommendations resulted in a hitherto unseen focus on the Highlands
during the 1960s and 1970s which has not been repeated. The establishment of the
UK’s first ever Regional Development Agency in the form of the HIDB further
enhanced the view that the Highlands was an area in which the government could
play a defining role.
A Development Authority for the Highlands: the creation of the
Highlands and Islands Development Board and Highland
development
The same year as the National Plan was unveiled, the Highland Development
Act 1965 was passed and allowed for the creation of the Highlands and Islands
Development Board. At the introduction to the House of Commons debate on the
passing of the Act, speaking as Secretary of State for Scotland, Willie Ross made the
following statement:
For 200 years the Highlander has been the man on Scotland’s conscience…
No part of Scotland has been given a shabbier deal by history from the ’45
onwards. Too often there has only been one way out of his trouble for the
person born in the Highlands - emigration.
131
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In making this statement, Ross was utilising a well-used tool in Scottish politics - the
emotional appeal of the Highlands of Scotland. Romanticised by Robert Burns in his
poem ‘My Heart’s In The Highlands’, where it is characterised as ‘the birthplace of
valour’ and ‘the country of worth’, the area has long held an emotional appeal to
many Scots. Levitt and Cameron have both been identified Scottish sentiment for the
region and the fall-out from the Clearances (the ’45 as Ross calls it) as constraints on
policy  towards  the  area.  The  new  HIDB  was  intended  as  the  government’s
demonstrable administrative commitment to the area’s regeneration, sat alongside the
four developments with which this thesis is concerned, couched in the rhetoric of
atonement  for  past  actions.  That  Ross  mentioned  emigration  from  the  area  is
important - it was recognition by the Government that the area was suffering and in
order for it to remain a viable economic community governmental help was required,
in much the same fashion as the Scottish economy was incapable of helping itself
also.
The new board was charged with the task of stimulating growth in the
Highlands and Islands of Scotland. This was to see the halcyon days of government
involvement in the area. Calls for a development board in the Highlands had been
canvassed by the Scottish Trade Union Congress (STUC) in the 1950s and 60s but
had been met with a cool reception from the Conservative governments of the time.
132
The HIDB’s new chairman, Professor Robert Grieve
133, was intent on taking a
proactive approach to planning in the Highlands, in part as a response to warnings by
opposition  MPs  that  the  board  should  not  be  little  more  than  an  ‘exercise  in
theoretical socialism’.
134 The idea that the Highlands suffered from special concerns
that meant it needed its own authority dedicated to developing the area was met with
support in the Labour party in the early 1960s. Maclay had originally viewed the idea
of a Highland development authority as ‘yet another piece of machinery’ - a view
endorsed by the Cabinet meeting that minuted:
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There was a limit however, to the amount of industrial investment which
could usefully be made in Scotland; for the Highlands in particular the right
solution of the problem of unemployment in the long-term might well be
either an increase in emigration or the acceptance of a rather lower standard of
living than obtained elsewhere in the United Kingdom.
135
However, with the upcoming election firmly in mind, the Conservative frostiness
towards the idea melted markedly. The Conservative Party had embarked upon a
revival of regional policy in the late 1950s and early 60s, motivated by the fear of the
social and political consequences of significant unemployment in the regions, the
belief that better use of labour was required to achieve higher growth and policies
required for this should also include regional unemployment.
136 Nevertheless its
primary concern in Scotland was the growing effect of the declining Staple Industries
and the rising unemployment in Central Scotland.
The  HIDB’s  chairman,  Professor  Robert  Grieve  was  the  former  Chief
Planning Officer for Scotland and had played a central role in the formulation of the
Clyde Valley Regional Plan, as well as serving as the foundation Professor of Town
and Region Planning at the University of Glasgow from 1964 until his appointment to
the chairmanship of the HIDB. Whilst at Glasgow he wrote an Occasional Paper with
Professor Donald Robertson entitled The City and the Region where the two set out
their views on town and country planning. In his section of the paper, Grieve
discussed the ‘increasingly important role of planning in problems of the Scottish
Economy.’
137 The HIDB under his stewardship would provide him with the
opportunity to utilise planning as a means towards remedying the problems in the
Highlands and by extension, the Scottish economy as a whole.
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The loss of five Scottish by-elections after the 1961 census went some way
towards focusing the Conservatives’ attentions on other areas in Scotland too, lest it
be accused of ignoring them. This was undoubtedly a factor in its reversal of opinion
on the issue of a Highland development authority.
138 The 1961 census also marks
another arguably more important milestone in the discussion of government policy in
the Highlands in the post-war period. The census’ publication revealed what had been
long expected in many parts of the Highlands and indeed Scotland itself - the
Highlands was suffering from severe depopulation and high unemployment. The
1961 Census was the first to ask a direct question on migration, asking what a
person’s usual address was the previous year in comparison to their present address.
139
This  was  the  first  time  that  the  Census  was  able  to  display  (limited)  data  on
population movement within Scotland. However, this development illuminated, to a
degree, the problems of out-migration from the Highlands to the rest of Scotland and
beyond,  with  the  Central  Belt  being  the  major  recipient  of  the  departing
Highlanders.
140
Produced the same year as the Toothill report, the Census revealed the extent
of depopulation in the Highlands, as outlined in Table 1.2.
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Table 1.2 Population Change in the Highlands of Scotland, Scotland and the UK
Year 1921 1931 1951 1961 % Change +/−
between 1921-61
Highlands 371372 323277 316471 304161 -28.10
Scottish 4882500 4803000 5096400 5179300 +6.10
UK 44072000 44074000 50290000 52807000 +19.82
Source: Highlands & Islands Development Board Annual Reports, 1971 & 1981 &
www.parliament.uk/commons/ lib/research/rp99/rp99-111.pdf
The Census revealed a population loss of 28.1% in only forty years. Compared to
Scotland, the Highland’s loss was considerable against what was a fairly small
increase nationally at the Scottish level of 6.1%. However, the UK population at this
point had increased markedly by 28.1%, showing just how serious the problem of
population decline was in the Highlands. This gave considerable cause for concern
amongst many in government at both Scottish and British levels resulting in the
development of policy aimed at halting the migration flow south (for example, the
HIDB’s flagship policy was entitled Operation Counterdrift and aimed directly at
reducing the net outflow of migration from the Highlands). It was not politically
desirable to have large-scale population movement from the Highlands given its
importance to the vocal Highlanders in the Central Belt region between Glasgow and
Edinburgh  where  the  majority  of  the  Scottish  population,  and  Scottish  based
parliamentary seats, were located. Unemployment in the area was a concern and
continued to be so until the developments this thesis is focused on took place and
began to operate. Further, the area accounted for around two thirds of the entire
Scottish  landmass  and  it  was  considered  a  potential  security  concern  to  have
effectively  nobody  living  there.  Of  course,  there  was  the  small  matter  of  any
development in the Highlands being predicated on people actually being there as
well.
In relation to the four developments discussed in the thesis, the HIDB was
instrumental in the siting of the Invergordon aluminium smelter and the location of52
the second reactor at Dounreay. Attempts were made by government to encourage
development south of the Highlands also, especially in the central industrial belt,
where, in 1980, 75% of the population and 80% of Scotland’s industry was located.
141
This manifested itself in the creation of a Scottish automobile industry with car
factories being opened in Bathgate and Linwood, as well as the opening of the
Ravenscraig steel strip mill and the nuclear power stations Torness B and Hunterston
B on the east and west coasts respectively, the Grangemouth petro-chemical plant as
well as the development of several new towns. These new developments were in
response to the decline of the old industrial structure and its unfavourable effects on
the Scottish economy.
142 Warren identifies the old industrial structure as ‘the most
obvious source of weakness in the Scottish economy’
143 and this was a major concern
for the policy makers of the time. The theory was that by diversifying the industrial
manufacturing base with new industries decline could be halted and reversed. The
HIDB  saw  its  task  as  making  sure  that  the  Highlands  wasn’t  left  out  of  the
diversification, enabling it to halt the depopulation in the area and solve the other
problems present whilst demonstrating the commitment of the government at Scottish
and UK levels to the region.
Growing nationalist sentiment also caused unease amongst not just Unionist
politicians but also the Civil Service, primarily because their political masters were
uptight over it. The growing support for the SNP in the early 1960s where the
nationalists saw their position and influence in Scottish political life grow - putting up
fifteen candidates in 1964, winning 64,000 votes followed by twenty three candidates
in 1966, before going on to win sixty nine burgh and county seats in 1967, gaining
200,000 votes. The real sign that the Nationalists were a growing force in Scotland
came with Winnie Ewing’s by-election win in Hamilton in 1967 in a staunchly
Labour seat and on paper the safest the party had in Scotland.
144 Growing support for
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the Nationalists was of great concern to the Labour party at this point, with it
recognised as being a ‘force to be reckoned with’ for Labour MPs.
145 Willie Ross
upped his attacks on the party, dismissing the SNP as ‘Tartan Tories’ and viewed his
role as Secretary of State as protecting the Union through gaining as much as he
could  for  Scotland,  following  happily  enough  in  the  footsteps  of  his  Labour
predecessor  Tom  Johnston  who  had  perfected  the  art  of  using  the  Nationalist
bogeyman as a means of securing investment in Scotland. The result of this was that
by the end of the 1960s, public expenditure per head of population in Scotland was
some 20% higher than the British norm, yet the most fundamental problem of
structural imbalance in the economy still existed.
146 Grand gestures of large industrial
manufacturing bases may have curried favour with the electorate, but did little to help
an economy almost wholly dependent on the hand of government directing its every
move. The HIDB was a welcome construction in the Highlands in that it further
focused attention, as well as expenditure, on the area. By the end of the 1960s
government was spending 10% of all expenditure in Scotland on the Highlands
147,
having established the four developments with which this thesis is concerned.
With the background for the developments now established, the discussion will turn
to the individual discussion of each development in case study form.
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Chapter Two. The Fort William Paper Pulp Mill: A Test
Case For Industry
Source: Gateway Magazine, Scottish Pulp and Paper Mills Special Number, Autumn
1966 (Wiggins, Teape & Co Ltd., London, 1966), front cover.55
Introduction
The small village of Corpach near Fort William, on the straights of Loch Eil
and Loch Linnhe, found itself as a perhaps unlikely starting point for what was to
become a very costly and environment-changing industrial venture marking the
beginning of government-sponsored attempts at industrialising and regenerating the
Scottish Highlands in the post-Second World War period. The plan was to build an
integrated paper-pulp mill at Annat Point on ground zoned for agricultural use to take
advantage of government-planted maturing forests throughout the Highlands region
in Scotland. It was one that appeared in most cases to make sense and was arguably
the most appropriate of the four major industrial ventures undertaken by government
with which this thesis is concerned, at least superficially. Permission was granted for
the mill in 1963 as a result of the passing of the Fort William Pulp and Paper Mills
Act. In September 1966 the mill opened for business. However, the venture was beset
with problems from the outset. There weren’t enough matured trees available in
Scotland in the short term to ensure the mill’s full operating capacity could be
reached without importing more wood, although there would have been in the longer
term. The woodland area of the Highlands had increased from 4% coverage of the
region  in  the  1940s  (post-Second  World  War),  of  which  25%  was  coniferous
plantation, to 12% in the 1980s of which 83% was plantation
148, primarily as a result
of a continued governmental policy of afforestation. However, the trees would need
time, which the mills did not have, to reach full maturation before they would be of
any use. Further, the transport costs of getting the necessary supplies to the mills,
both from home and abroad, proved to be very expensive eventually causing the
project considerable economic difficulties. The pulp part of the mills, the largest
employer, closed in 1980 causing large scale unemployment in an area that had, prior
to the mill’s location there, had nearly full employment. The questions addressed in
this case relate to the rationale behind locating and constructing the mill at Corpach,
its intended aims and explanations for its eventual failure.
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During World War Two, Scotland produced 99m cubic feet of pitprops for use
in its coalmines, the major market for forestry products in Scotland, clearing vast
swathes of forests from the country. By 1953 only 5.6m cubic feet of pitprops were
delivered to mines for use however, but accounted for some 85% of demand.
149 The
considerable reduction in demand in this market meant that the forests planted as part
of the afforestation policy of the government, pursued since the creation of the
Forestry Commission in 1919, were left to grow with very little end-use for them,
save for the strategic purpose of having timber reserves in case of war.
150 The
contraction of the mining industry and growth in the use of steel supports throughout
the 1960s would further affected demand.
151 Solly Zuckerman’s governmental report
of 1957, Forestry, Agriculture and Marginal Land, recommended a change from the
defence-based forestry policy (for use in the event of war) to a more social-based
forestry policy.
152 Consequently, the policy of afforestation served an important
further purpose in the Highlands other than providing for timber reserves, in helping
stabilise a certain level of population and providing some supplementary industry.
These were two very important factors in relation to Highland history in light of the
denudation of forestry (the two world wars had used up about a third of all Scottish
forests)
153 and depopulation the area had experienced and was experiencing
respectively.
The Scottish paper industry in the 1950s was mainly focused on specialised
papers. It was argued in a House of Commons debate in 1959 by William Hamilton
MP for Fife West that the market for specialised papers was not capable of ‘great
expansion and the industry itself [was] incapable of mass production methods.’
154
Half the paper produced in Scotland at this time was esparto-based (a kind of grass)
                                                
149 Anderson, ML, A History of Scottish Forestry vol.2, (Thomas Nelson and Sons, London, 1967), pg.
458.
150 Warren, C, Managing Scotland’s Environment, (EUP, Edinburgh, 2002), pg. 60.
151 Rowthorne, R & Wells, JR, De-industrialisation & Foreign Trade, (CUP, Cambridge, 1987), pg.
112.
152 HMSO, Forestry, Agriculture and Marginal Land, (HMSO, London, 1957).
153 Warren, C, Managing Scotland’s Environment, pg. 61.
154 Hansard, vol. 610, House of Commons Debate on Scotland (Paper-Making Industry), 30/07/1959,
col. 722 - 728.57
with a further quarter of production being cardboard. These two products were based
primarily on grass pulp and waste paper respectively and mixed with 10% wood
pulp
155, indicating that paper making in Scotland at this stage was in the main not
based on Scottish forest plantation stocks. Between 1951-57 a total of £15m was
invested in the industry and by 1959 17,000 people were employed in paper making
in Scotland
156 compared to 100,000 in the UK as a whole in the early 1960s.
157
However, by 1959 the coming of the European Fair Trade Association agreement also
saw capital expenditure in the industry decline as a direct result of the fear that the
industry would be squeezed out by cheap Scandinavian imports.
158 The paper industry
in Scotland was by no means on its knees, but it certainly was not ripe for expansion
either.
By 1961 the UK as a whole was importing 97% of its consumed sawn
softwood (coniferous wood can used for paper production), an increase from 1951’s
level of 94%.
159 UK trade with European nations at the same point in time for sawn
softwood was such that the UK was importing 955,000 standards
160, of which 847,000
standards came from Finland and Sweden alone.
161 The UK imported a further
358,000 standards from the USSR at the same stage
162, bringing together a total of
1.313m standards of imported sawn softwood. The over-reliance on imports was
something that government was seeking to reduce during this period. The surplus
capacity of the unfelled maturing softwood forests in Scotland from the afforestation
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programme was clearly a tempting proposition to business for exploitation. At the
same  time  the  government  was  beginning  to  recognise  the  need  for  Highland
development, paper companies were interested in locating a mill close to a supply of
wood to improve efficiency of production and reduce costs without having to rely on
imported wood. So much so that a consortium of companies: Bowater, Wiggins
Teape, the Reed Paper Group and Thames Board, had expressed an interest in siting a
mill  in  the  Highlands  to  take  advantage  of  the  untapped  resource  in  1959.
Government interest can perhaps unsurprisingly, given its major role in afforestation,
be traced to an earlier period than this however.
163 Further, the pressing concern of
Highland development brought the two issues closer together. If a way of marrying
the issue of Highland development and exploiting the natural resource of the forests
in Scotland could be found, the government could reduce its reliance on imports of
sawn softwood and help its balance of payments concerns. A paper-pulp mill was one
such way of doing this. The problem was then, where to site it?
Scottish forestry development and the ‘need’ for a mill
At the fifth meeting of the Executive Committee of the SC(DI) on the 11
th
September  1950,  it  was  suggested  by  the  Local  Authorities  Hydro-Electric
Committee that a survey should be undertaken of the Lochaber area from Fort
William to Ballachulish.
164 The intention of the survey was to determine the need for
and possibility of introducing further industry into the area to counter balance the
belief  that  it  was  over-reliant  on  aluminium  smelting.  The  British  Aluminium
Company had located smelters in the Highlands to take advantage of the availability
of cheap power sources in the form of hydro-electricity. In a chapter in the survey,
entitled The Danger of the Dependence on the Aluminium Industry, it states that
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The first point of note from these employment figures is that the aluminium
industry, with factories at Fort William and Kinlochleven, provides more than
one-third of the employment in the area, a proportion of which must be
regarded as too great for the good of the district unless it can be shown that this
industry is invulnerable.
165
Of course, no industry is invulnerable, but there was no explanation of what would
have constituted a ‘good’ level of reliance on the industry in the area. The report then
went on to detail the ‘special characteristics’ of the Lochaber area in comparison to
the Highlands. The report’s findings that the Lochaber region, containing Fort
William and Ballachulish, states, ‘There is little or no unemployment. Indeed, there is
a shortage of workers throughout the area, greater in some parts than others.’
166
British Aluminium had expressed difficulty in attracting workers to the region to
operate the smelters and the report picked up on this. The report also argued that this
could be made easier with the provision of good housing and reasonable working
conditions. The attitude that in order to attract workers to the Highlands the main
things  that  were  needed  were  nice  houses  and  jobs  was  one  replicated  in  the
arguments for the other large-scale industrial developments that followed. Given that
many of the officials who worked on the paper-pulp mill project also worked on these
projects it is not surprising. Of course, decent living conditions and employment was
the minimum that was needed to attract workers to the area.
The employment situation in the region was of little concern to the SC(DI),
however. That the SC(DI) recommended in the report for further industry to be
located in the Lochaber region, in spite of concerns over employment, is instructive in
helping understand the change in attitudes within the organisation that eventually
resulted in the production of the Toothill Report in 1961 and its suggested focus on
‘growth  centre’  theory.  The  SC(DI)  was  beginning  to  recognise  that  simply
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alleviating unemployment was no longer sufficient criteria for regional policy and
that a new approach was needed. The Lochaber survey states, in relation to locating
new industries in the area,
It may seem that the new industries which have been suggested for the area
savour more of desperation than practicability, though there may be exceptions,
such as glass tailoring, crafts and a few others. This does not mean that no real
effort should be made to follow up the suggestions. On the contrary, we are
here dealing with a test case for industries in the Highlands… In the Survey
area and its surroundings the answers should be beginning to be seen; for the
district has the significance of a laboratory, the experiment in progress being to
determine the effects of a major new industry on the locality, on the country as
a whole, and on the industry itself.
167
The last sentence held particular resonance later in the 1960s for those in the Scottish
Office who took up the idea of locating a large industrial venture in the area as a test
case for industry. So much so, that this idea of ‘testing’ the suitability of the
Highlands for industrial expansion and regeneration became common parlance in
correspondence between departments regarding the Fort William development.
Highland development as an experiment is an enduring idea that is still used in the
literature today and with some justification.
168 Expanding the industrial base of the
Highlands was an experiment on the government’s part at remedying social ills with
economic policies. Locating an industrial venture in the Lochaber area to help stem
depopulation was recommended by the report as a means of ensuring dispersal of
industry from the Central Belt region. It stated,
It would be less than honest if I did not state my view that the essential factor
for the future of the Highlands is a policy of national decentralisation and
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dispersal. Without this, only a little success can be expected from efforts to halt
depopulation and bring new industries. There are powerful industrial, social,
strategic and economic reasons for thinking that much more effort should be
applied to developing certain types of industry in the countryside…. Yet official
policy, while requiring the Highlands to plan, is all directed to bringing work to
the Development Areas of the Central Valley. Indeed, the latest figures show
that the position is being reached where new people must be brought into the
Clydeside area to man the jobs now available, in spite of the fact that in large
areas it is impossible to find sites for housing the existing population with
decent standards of light, air and other amenities.
The designation of the Highlands as a development area in 1949 meant that if an
industrialist wanted to locate there, they were able to apply for grants and loans to
help with this. Moreover, even if an industrialist didn’t want to locate there, they
could be persuaded to do so by government offering more generous terms, or refusing
the issuing of an IDC altogether. The SC(DI) knew this full well of course in making
its recommendations about locating industry in the Highlands, encouraging the idea
that the Highlands could sustain industry and be a profitable area to site industry in.
The SC(DI)’s survey followed the Scottish Office’s Advisory Panel on the Highlands
review  of  forestry  policy  in  1952  that  recommended  development  take  place,
especially in the North-West of the Highlands area
169, gaining support from the
SC(DI) upon its learning of the recommendation. With the forestry planting that had
taken and was taking place in the Highlands a paper-pulp mill was the logical choice
to satisfy the recommendation. It of course had the further benefit of being of national
use in helping Britain with its balance of payments problems.
It was not until 1958 that the idea of locating a pulp mill in the Highlands
became a distinct possibility. In a House of Lords debate on forestry in late 1958, it
was  mentioned  by  the  Government’s  spokesman  in  the  House,  the  Earl  of
Waldergrave, that Britain was the largest importer of timber and timber products in
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the world and produced only 10% of its requirements, or in other words, imported
about  1000m  hoppus  feet  of  timber  and  timber  products,  worth  about  £370m
annually, with around 100m Hoppus feet felled annually.
170 The debate discussed at
length the growing surplus of thinnings in the forestry industry and what to do with
them, an accumulation from the sawmilling industry that had grown as a result of the
aforementioned large scale planting of softwoods in Scotland before and after the
Second  World  War.
171 The Earl of Airlie argued for Government support in
establishing a pulp mill in Scotland ‘as quickly as possible’, after other forest-owning
Scottish Lords had suggested the same solution.
172 Earl Waldergrave responded that
‘The forestry industry cannot run to the Government and say ‘Set up a pulp factory
and buy all our wood at guaranteed prices’’, although Waldergrave did go on to say
that  ‘[Government]  will  help  private  industry  at  the  appropriate  time’  before
intimating that the appropriate time was when private industry had demonstrated that
it was helping itself. The Earl of Buckinghamshire, on behalf of Lord Lovat at the end
of the debate about transport costs, concluded that it cost £20 to transport timber from
Inverness  to  London,  £15  from  the  Borders  to  London,  but  only  £10  from
Scandinavia to London.
173 It is clear then that, relative to transports costs, the
Scandinavian mills had a considerable advantage in not only economies of scale, but
in transport costs also. Further, it demonstrates the periperhality of the Highlands and
the difficulties of getting to and from the area. The Earl’s conclusion to the debate
would later prove to be somewhat prophetic.
By the middle of the next year, there was a suggestion by a Member of
Parliament, Sir James Duncan of South Angus, during a Commons debate on the
matter in July 1959 that,
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One outlet, and it may be the main outlet, from the thinnings of these vast
acreages which are coming into marketable form in the next twenty years, will
be pulp… This is a young, growing industry and I hope Government… will not
do anything to hinder or hurt the output from British forests, because I believe it
is an industry which we ought to foster, being of very great importance to the
Highlands of Scotland.
174
Sir James’ point was a sentient one. The growing interest in constructing a pulp mill
was  a  natural  reaction  to  the  growing  surplus  of  thinnings  from  the  care  and
maintenance of the afforestation programme that had been in full swing since the
Second World War. Indeed, even prior to the war there had been interest in siting a
pulp mill in the Highlands. In 1933, T Dalgleish of the Scottish Landowners Co-
operative Forestry Society put forward a proposal for the supply of a pulpwood mill
from Sitka spruce that had been grown on a thirty year rotation to no avail, following
on from experiments in making paper from sawdust at Donside paper works in
Aberdeen in 1918 during World War One.
175 Also of consideration was the substantial
imbalance in UK wood pulp imports in comparison to production, exposing the
country to the vagaries of international price fluctuations. The UK wood pulp
production compared to imports for the ten years prior to this debate can be seen
below, adding further support to the idea of constructing a pulp mill:
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Table 2.1 United Kingdom production and imports: wood pulp, all grades, 1948-
58 (in thousand short tons, air dry weight)
Year Production Imports Trade
Difference
1948 63 1300 -1237
1949 86 1478 -1392
1950 137 1603 -1467
1951 159 1872 -1713
1952 154 1611 -1457
1953 142 1797 -1655
1954 159 2148 -1989
1955 149 2512 -2363
1956 160 2464 -2304
1957 178 2395 -2217
Source: Appendix 1.7, from Reader, WJ, Bowater: A History, (CUP, Cambridge,
1981), pp. 356-157.
The fairly clear reliance on imports of pulp from the above table and the growing
supply  of  thinnings  available  for  making  pulp  as  a  result  of  the  afforestation
programme were powerful arguments for constructing a pulp mill to take advantage
of the latter, whilst going someway to offsetting the former. The issue of the
Government’s unwillingness to take an active role in locating a mill anywhere, let
alone Scotland, was short-lived when it became apparent that a consortium of private
companies,  operating  under  the  name  Scottish  Pulp  (Development)  Ltd.,  were
interested in setting up a pulp mill to take advantage of the growing supply of
thinnings in the Highlands. The managing director of the consortium Dr Theodor
Frankel, an Austrian immigrant and Wiggins Teape manager, had apparently been
impressed while on holiday in the South of France with a colleague by reforestation
in the area and foresaw the potential of reforestation in Scotland linked with pulp and65
paper making.
176 With it clear to Scottish officials that something had to be done in
the Highlands and it clear to officials in London that the UK was heavily reliant on
wood pulp imports for its papermaking industry, an opportunity was beginning to
present itself to government that could satisfy a number of its aims at both national
and regional levels. Further, the experience of wartime supplies of paper and pulp
from the Nordic countries being cut off during World War Two highlighted the need,
at least in the minds of some paper manufacturers
177, for developing the domestic
paper and pulp industry. Perhaps more foremost in their minds however was the
introduction of the European Free Trade Area, of which several Nordic countries
were to be members, that was to remove tariffs on paper and pulp products opening
up the British domestic market to the larger Scandinavian operators.
178 Establishing a
paper-pulp mill with sufficient output in the UK would be one way of creating a
bulwark against the entry of the Scandinavian paper companies with their economies
of scale and subsequently cheaper paper into the UK market.
Upon learning of the Scottish Pulp (Development) Ltd. consortium’s interest in
early 1959, the Scottish Secretary of State Jack Maclay directed his officials in the
Scottish Office to assess the employment potential of the project and to meet with
Frankel.
179 The meeting then took place between Frankel and Maclay on the 7
th May
1959 where the discussion centred on the company’s plans for the mill. Frankel
intimated that he envisaged that when in full production the mill would use 10m
hoppus feet of timber per year, employing approximately 400 people. Further,
Frankel was of the mind that the company preferred the area in and around Fort
William as a location and had already made arrangements with British Aluminium
Co. to reuse the water it used in its nearby smelter operation that would normally be
flushed straight into Loch Linnhe. Frankel also said that if a better location were to be
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found the company would be open to the suggestion and made his appreciation of the
efforts  of  the  SC(DI)  clear  to  Maclay.
180 The supply of water from British
Aluminium’s Fort William smelter was an important consideration for the mill due to
it requiring 50m gallons of water a day for its proposed operations.
181 However,
locating at Fort William, in particular the Corpach site at Annat Point that was
identified by the company as the desired site, was problematic as the water would
need to be pumped for 3.5 miles to the site, an expensive, as well as logistically
difficult, undertaking. Further, the need for a deepwater jetty for the supplies of wood
from abroad to reach the mill would be required, meaning yet more capital outlay.
182
Two days later the Glasgow Herald ran a story with the headline ‘Highlands
May Have Wood Pulp Mill’ detailing how government departments were studying
‘intensively’ the idea that a pulp mill should be located in the area, ‘if private industry
can be persuaded to build it.’ It stated further ‘Unless effluent could be discharged to
a fast flowing river or to the sea, an extensive treatment plant would be required,
adding considerably to capital costs.’
183 The Corpach site satisfied this requirement -
Loch Linnhe is a coastal loch with sea tides that would be able to take the discharged
effluent out to sea. Avoiding the requirement for an expensive treatment plant would
be thus possible by locating at Corpach. Also, with the available water from the
British Aluminium smelter, government support through the area’s development area
status and the proximity to the forest plantations in the Highlands, the Corpach site
was the most suitable. There was no mention of the company in the article, but the
suggestion that ‘if private industry could be persuaded to build it’ was enough of an
implication that there was governmental support for the scheme. This is not surprising
when it is considered that the British Aluminium smelter at Fort William was
experiencing operational difficulties in the February before the meeting between
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Frankel and Maclay and the article’s publication. At a meeting of the Highlands and
Islands District Committee of the Scottish Board for Industry the Fort William
representative, JA MacKenzie, expressed ‘considerable concern at conditions in the
area.’ The BACo smelter was operating only 75 furnaces when the normal working
number for that time of year was around the 140 mark. Further, the company had
been unable to use any other of its normal supplies of water and had been draining the
loch, a ‘most unusual’ occurrence for the time of year. MacKenzie then went on to
ask if the Board of Trade could possibly find alternative industry for the area.
184 It is
likely that Maclay was aware of the situation in the area; its over-reliance on the
aluminium smelters that were experiencing operational difficulties coupled with the
interest of a consortium of pulp and paper makers operating in international markets
in  locating  a  mill  there  made  for  ample  opportunity  to  progress  Highland
development.
In  August  1959  Scottish  Pulp  (Development)  Ltd.  announced  at  a  press
conference its intention to look into the possibility of building a large pulp mill in
Fort William. The conference was a joint event organised by Lord Polwarth, the
chairman of the Scottish Council (Development and Industry), with Scottish Pulp
(Development) Ltd. Polwarth would later become an increasingly important figure in
the discussions regarding governmental support for the establishment of the mill in
the area. The company stated that only a ‘really large’ mill would have a chance of
economic survival in Scotland and that as a result the prospective mill would use 12-
15m cubic feet of pulpwood per year. Frankel said,
At present there is not enough wood in Scotland for such a mill to operate but
there is an increasingly large supply. A major problem however will be to
obtain raw material at a price that will allow us to compete with the extremely
efficient mills in Scandinavia… If we can build as efficient a mill as the modern
Scandinavian plants, we will be very happy. What we have to do is cut the cost
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from standing tree to the mill. Scotland’s forests are, in comparison with
Sweden and North America, small and well dispersed, and we must bring wood
from the forests as economically as possible… Unless we can compete with
other countries at that stage of the project we will not be able to operate.
185
Polwarth, perhaps mindful of the House of Lords debate on the paper industry noted
above, went on to state ‘Now is it most welcome that four of the leading papermakers
in Britain are prepared to put down not only cash, but the services of their experts to
carry on the investigation.’
186 A pulp mill at Corpach was now a realistic possibility.
Private industry had expressed an interest and had gained the support of the Scottish
Council (Development and Industry), giving the project a real chance of going ahead.
It is not that surprising that the Scottish Council had expressed support for the venture
- ten years previously it had set up a wood pulp group to study the feasibility of a mill
as well as provided information for the OECD survey that had been published.
187 The
following November Maclay met with Frankel again. Maclay was briefed that the
Fort William area’s average rate of unemployment over the previous 12 months, 2.8%
or 141 persons wholly unemployed, would likely not in itself qualify the area for
recognition for assistance under the existing legislation or the forthcoming Bill on
Local Employment
188 or for that matter provide sufficient labour for the prospective
pulp mill. Maclay was further briefed on Frankel’s discussions with the Board of
Trade and the Forestry Commission regarding the possibility of exemption of certain
kinds of pulp wood from import duty in respect of the company’s need, should the
mill get the go ahead and required funding, to import wood initially until the
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maturation of Highland forests. The wood was to be imported in small amounts of a
few hundred tonnes at a time by boat before being moved on to the mill by rail, then
from the mill by road to markets.
189 The company’s intention at this point was not to
import the wood from the EFTA - it is not clear why - and was seeking assurances
from the Board of Trade regarding it. Maclay was briefed to refrain from commenting
on the matter but was informed that the Board of trade was ‘not unsympathetic’ to
Frankel’s request, demonstrating some support from London for the establishment of
a mill in the Highlands.
190 However, before it could become reality, the company
wanted guarantees of financial support from the government. This was to prove
somewhat problematic.
The analysis of the situation in official terms was in stark contrast to the
analysis of the situation in the area in the Aberdeen Press & Journal which described
Fort William as ‘once an aluminium boom-town, now facing serious unemployment
and depression’ and as a place where ‘ample labour is available’.
191 This is in many
ways indicative of the problems facing officials charged with the task of Highland
development: popular perception was influenced directly by media representations,
whereas official perception was influenced by government statistics, sometimes
accurate, sometimes not. The two were and are often very different and Civil Servants
had to weigh them both up before briefing ministers, taking into consideration the
political, economic, environmental and social considerations of the preferred course
of action. The Press and Journal ended its article on the matter with the statement ‘It
is widely felt too that here is an opportunity for the authorities to prove the sincerity
of their concern for the Highlands’
192, a sentiment that was to later characterise much
of the attitudes of both the media and the Scottish Office towards tendering for large-
scale industrial development in the Highlands.
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Scottish officials and the mill: Highland development
On the 18
th December 1959 Scottish Pulp (Development) Ltd. were issued an
Industrial Development Certificate (IDC) for a factory space of 250,000 sq. ft. at
Corpach that was to prospectively employ 350 men and 30 women.
193 The issuing of
this certificate was the first real physical sign from the government that it was
supportive of the venture. Haddow commented in a note the following May that,
The Board of Trade’s view about the industrial aspect of the wood pulp
development  has  already  been  expressed  by  the  issue  of  the  industrial
development  certificate.  We  can,  however,  stress  the  importance  of  this
development for the Highlands and that our over-riding interest in this matter is
that this project should be secured for the Highlands.
194
At  a  meeting  between  the  consortium  and  officials  from  the  Scottish  Home
Department and the Department of Health for Scotland (both departments shared
planning duties for Scotland at the national level at this time before the creation of the
Scottish Development Department in 1962), the firm indicated to the Scottish Office
officials that its Canadian consultants had told them that the site would have ‘special
difficulties’ in relation to the water supplies and access for shipping at Fort William
and would make the project ‘uneconomic’. This was especially the case in relation to
pulp mills constructed in Sweden where they were generally built at the mouth of a
river and had ready access to both fresh water and the sea for discharge of effluent.
The company maintained that a grant would be required to offset the capital cost of
the necessary installations of a pipeline measuring 3.5 miles to the BACo plant for
water and a deep-water jetty into Loch Linnhe for the project to go ahead. The jetty
was required for outgoing products from the mill, in contrast to another pulping
operation  owned  by  another  Wiggins  Teape  company  (the  only  other  pulping
operation in Britain at the time) in Sudbrook, Monmouthshire where no timber was
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brought in by sea and pulp was supplied by road to paper manufacturers within a
radius of thirty miles.
195 Scottish Home Department officials minuted on the above
meeting that as a result of the special difficulties mentioned, the proposal to site the
mill at Annat Point would make the project ‘likely to be abnormally costly by
comparison with the Scandinavian mills’ and that the company would ‘seek direct
financial assistance towards the capital cost of the water supply installation and the
jetty’ on these grounds.
196 The location of the mill in the Highlands was proving to be
problematic before it had even been constructed, and that is without considering that
the Scandinavian mills were already well-established operators.
Inverness County Council’s Planning Committee approved the consortium’s
application in principle on 19
th January 1960. Frankel commented that the company
was trying to put forward a ‘sound scheme in the national and industrial interests.’
197
This would later be a tactic for securing government support for the other large-scale
industrial ventures in the Highlands. Indeed, government support in one form or
another was recognised almost as a pre-requisite for industrial development in official
circles with a Scottish Board for Industry note on the Fort William project stating ‘It
is virtually impossible to get any industrialists to go to Fort William without special
reason.’
198 British Aluminium had gone as a result of the cheap electricity provided by
the hydro plants, and Scottish Pulp (Development) Ltd. were going with thoughts of a
government loan in mind. The area was and still is, remote from centres of population
and markets, sparsely populated, industrially weak and lacking in infrastructure. The
Annat Point site was chosen essentially because of the ability to utilise the water from
the  BACo  plant  and  due  to  its  proximity  to  Highland  forest  plantations.  The
possibility of government backing for the venture was arguably the most crucial
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factor in the likelihood of the consortium locating the mill in Fort William however as
the consortium made clear that without such backing there was little chance of the
venture going ahead at all, let alone in the area.
The acceptance of the application in principle by Fort William council for the
mill gave the consortium the signal it wanted to go ahead with the formulation of its
plans for the mill and the area. Frankel commented in The  Scotsman after the
application’s success that ‘a building of pleasing appearance, in harmony with the
countryside, would be provided’
199 by the consortium. An artist’s impression of the
site can be seen below:
Figure 2.1 Artist impression of Corpach mill
Source: Promotional pamphlet: Scottish Pulp and Paper Mills, ‘Scotland’s Pulp and
Paper Mill: A £20 Million Enterprise’. Published by Wiggins, Teape & Co., Ltd. No
date.
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It took the consortium some time to work out its plans for the mill, including detailed
costings for the receipt of government support for the project. There was some
concern on the part of government over the smell emitted by the proposed mill, one of
a similar scent to ‘cooking cabbage’ or ‘silage’ according to Frankel as a result of the
pulping process and its effect on Fort William. These fears were allayed however by
meteorological advice received by the Scottish Office on the matter that advised the
town would be affected by the smell only one day in ten at worst in the summer and
scarcely in the winter months at all.
200 No objections were lodged in response to the
consortium’s application for development, although there were notes of official
concerns over the potential for pollution of the Loch from the effluent discharged and
pollution of the air from the mill. These concerns were passed to the Secretary of
State, John Maclay, who was made aware that they might be raised again in response
to a full application (with complete plans for the mill) being made for planning
consent. In response, Maclay made it clear he was
…most anxious that this project should materialise. It may founder on technical
Board of Trade Monopolies Commission complications, on the price of timber,
or the cost to the company or the Government. But it would be tragic if all these
difficulties are overcome and we then have an outburst of local trouble… The
importance of the project to the North West of Scotland goes far beyond the
visible 400 employees. In a minor scale it is of the same growth and breeder
potential as the strip mill [at Ravenscraig in Lanarkshire].
201
Maclay’s continued support for the mill was crucial to its chances of being built
since, as Secretary of State for Scotland, ultimate planning responsibility lay with his
signature. Further, he made it clear in discussions with Sir Arthur Gosling of the
Forestry Commission that if there were any problems in the price of timber for the
new mill from the Forestry Commission, he would not be averse to ‘bridging any gap
by a subsidy on social grounds if the scheme would otherwise founder’ so as to
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ensure the Commission received a fair price and the mill obtained timber at a
competitive price.
202
Maclay’s endeavours to secure the possibility of the pulp mill being located in
the Highlands came from his awareness of the importance of industrial development
in Scotland. He later commented, ‘Scottish Secretaries were now being judged by the
performance of the Scottish Economy’.
203 His predecessor James Stuart had placed
little emphasis on industry, but the growing clamour for government action in the
press and the Scottish covenant movement headed by MacCormick meant Maclay
effectively had little choice in focusing on industrial investment if he was to avoid
large-scale criticism, or worse. Maclay stressed the importance of locating the mill in
the Highlands as a means of attracting more industry to the area. He followed up his
comment in his meeting with Gosling with a further note two months later again
stressing his support stating, ‘I repeat I am most anxious that this project should go
ahead and don’t want to convey any other impression.’
204 The intention then was to
attract other industrialists by showcasing the potential of the area to host industry
successfully with the pulp mill being the first such instance of this. Cairncross’ report
had been published in 1952 and revealed an archaic economic structure in Scotland
suffering  from  under-investment.  There  was  belief  that  the  economy  needed
government intervention and planning in order to offset the over-reliance on the
Staple Industries through renewal and diversification.
205 Ravenscraig was renewal;
Fort William was diversification, although not just in a Scottish sense, but a Highland
one too.
During  1961  the  consortium  spent  much  of  the  period  formulating  and
amending its plans for the mill. Towards the end of the year the decision was taken, in
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respect of the necessity of importing wood, that to take advantage of economies of
scale it would be prudent to include a paper mill, intended to produce 40,000 tonnes
per year of educational paper and medium to heavy weight printing grades
206, in the
immediate plans for the venture, with a further paper mill being introduced at a later
stage. The idea of simply building a pulp mill was thought to be too uneconomic
without adding a paper mill to the development due to the existing Scandinavian pulp
manufacturers’ dominant market position. It was known that a pulp mill alone simply
couldn’t compete in providing pulp to paper manufacturers.
207 As a result, this
eventually led to Bowater and Reed both leaving the consortium as their primary
interest was in the pulp side of things, with both already operating a number of paper
mills elsewhere.
208
By the time Maclay met with Frankel again to discuss the plans in August
1961, the remaining members of the consortium, Wiggins, Teape and Thames Board
had decided on a Swedish process of pulp manufacture, the Stora process, that ‘had
not so far been used on a large scale’. This led to Thames Board formally dropping
out of the consortium in September 1962
209 although this wasn’t announced publicly
until the 27
th December the same year.
210 Thames Board withdrew on the further basis
that the market acceptance of the duplex board instead of bleached folding box-board
for packaging such items as frozen food meant that a mill making paper and pulp, as
well as the kind of board the market required would have been unfeasible. As a result
Thames Board decided to look into the possibility of constructing a new pulp and
box-board mill based on a new groundwood process elsewhere in Scotland, with the
Borders considered the most likely area.
211 They believed that with the advent of the
Common Market they could not hope to sell their board product in Europe and the
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domestic market was unlikely to offer a ‘satisfactory outlet’.
212 They eventually built
a wood pulp plant at Workington in Cumbernauld supplied by both English and
Scottish forests.
213
The choice of process to be used was a critical juncture for the mill - the Stora
process had not been well used and was based on a sulphite pulping process. The
more commonly used process on the other hand was the Kraft process, based on
sulphate pulping and used by mills worldwide. However, the Kraft process produces
an obnoxious smell and brings with it a large timber requirement that would have
stretched  Highland  resources  to  the  limit.  These  two  factors,  although  not
insurmountable, persuaded the company to change to the Stora process at the behest
of the local authorities, who would not accept the alternative in order to preserve
Highland amenity. Thus, the alternative of using a relatively untried process was
necessary.
214 Denuding the Highlands of attractive forests and wildlife and producing
unpleasant smells would hardly add to the amenity of the area after all. Consequently,
Thames Board dropped out, leaving Wiggins Teape as the only remaining interested
party in establishing a mill.
215 Scottish Pulp (Development) Ltd. also changed its
name at this point to Scottish Pulp and Paper Mills to reflect the newly envisaged
mill’s operations.
The new plans for the mill did not affect the amount of wood required, but did
result in increased costs, as well as increased direct and indirect job creation of 870
and 1750 respectively.
216 This led officials in the Scottish Home Department to advise
Maclay that,
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Although the Chancellor of the Exchequer has said more than once in public
that the recent Ministerial decision to apply stricter criteria to applications by
private industry for Government financial aid will not affect the operation of the
Local Employment Act, the Treasury may well prove difficult about Exchequer
assistance for this large and expensive project. They may insist for instance that
the Board of Trade (even if the latter are sympathetic) should take a strict view
of the cost per job ratio and they may also argue that the rate of unemployment
in the Fort William area does not justify Exchequer assistance at all (there were
only 47 unemployed in the area mid-September, representing 0.9%, and at the
inter peak in February the figure was only 181 or 3.5%). The importance of this
project is, of course, to the Highlands as a whole and moreover it would add to
the strength of Fort William as a centre of stability and as is required in all rural
areas to assist in stemming depopulation.
217
The opinion of the Scottish official responsible for the above note would later ring
true. The Board of Trade was limited in its scope for reviewing applications for
funding on the basis of only being able to consider direct job creation, although from
the point of view of the Scottish Office it was indirect job creation that was the main
concern. The fact that the mill project was more capital intensive than labour
intensive meant the Local Employment Act was unlikely to cover the government
sufficiently to grant support on the scale required. Fort William was not suffering
unduly from unemployment at this point (an anomaly in relation to the Highlands
generally during this period), although depopulation was a concern as was the belief
in the over-reliance on the aluminium industry, making the indirect job creation in the
area of even more importance to Scottish officials. The main crux of the matter here
was the decision on the part of the then consortium, then later Scottish Pulp and Paper
Mills, to locate in Fort William to be near a steady supply of water, as well as timber,
and easy access for imports of wood (by sea, rail or road), as well as the availability
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of a site.
218 The Scottish Office were thus faced with the task of gaining support for
the venture from Whitehall (the Treasury and Board of Trade most importantly) for
an industrial venture located in an area that arguably didn’t need it and couldn’t
supply the numbers of staff needed for it, but which was expected to be important to
the surrounding areas. Special treatment of the area would be required in order to
push through the project and circumvent existing policy at the UK national level to
achieve this.
By the beginning of 1962 discussions had reached the stage where officials
from all levels of government - from Scottish Office departments, Inverness County
Council, Scottish Council (Development and Industry), Ministry of Labour and the
Board of Trade  - and the new company Scottish Paper and Pulp Mills, met to discuss
taking the project forward. Tom Lister, a Scottish Office official with the Department
of Health for Scotland
219, was designated as the lead Civil Servant on the project and
discussions took place regarding recruitment of workers for the venture. Due to the
lack of available labour in Fort William, it was estimated that about 200-250 skilled
paper trade workers might come from existing mills, 50-80 skilled tradesmen such as
electricians, engineers, plumbers and so on would be required that were envisaged to
come from the Glasgow area. The remaining unskilled workers would be recruited
mainly from the West and North of Scotland, outwith daily travelling distance of Fort
William.
220 The requirement to ‘import’ labour into the area had a knock-on effect of
then requiring more houses to be built to house the influx of people as well as
improving amenities for the new residents, not including the need to improve the road
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network to cope with the increased traffic serving and coming from the mill. As a
result a working party, consisting of members of the Scottish Home Department and
the Department of Health for Scotland, was set up, holding its first meeting a month
after the earlier cross-departmental meeting with Scottish Paper and Pulp Mills. In a
note of the first meeting of the new working party, it was stated that
[The new mill] was potentially one of the most important developments in the
Highlands economy for many years; the uncertainty which still attended it was
likely to be removed soon; it merited, therefore, ranking as immediately urgent
and work should proceed on the footing that everything was to be prepared
short of committing physical operations.
221
Scottish officials were keen for the project to get off the ground and receive financial
backing from the government, but their support for the project was not fully reflected
in Whitehall.
By the second half of 1962 the new company had applied to the Board of
Trade for a loan of £6m, but were informed that it was unlikely that it would receive
more than £3m. However, by the end of July the Board of Trade had reconsidered its
position and made it clear to Frankel and his company that it was prepared to regard
the original submission of £6m for the project as eligible for consideration by the
Board of Trade Advisory Committee, the body who were responsible for making the
decisions on who was to receive support or not,
222 although the Board later made clear
that it felt that the financial demands made by Wiggins Teape were ‘very heavy’ but
that  ‘the  project  has  raised  such  high  hopes  in  Scotland  that  there  might  be
considerable political difficulties if it did not go ahead’.
223 Lister wrote to Fort
William’s Town Clerk, Robert Dow, enquiring about the possibility of the Town
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Council contributing to the housing needs of the new mill. Dow wrote back that the
council had agreed in principle to build 200 houses for workers of the mill on the
understanding that the houses would attract the industrial overspill subsidy of £32 per
house and that the company and the newly created Scottish Development Department
would  secure  tenants  from  areas  with  which  the  Town  Council  had  overspill
agreements.
224 The intention was to build houses fairly close to the mill so that skilled
workers could be called out in the middle of the night to attend any urgent work
needing attention.
225 After some discussion, Inverness County Council also agreed to
supply 350 houses for the project to house the expected incoming 600 families to the
area; a point reported by The Scotsman in relation to the difficulties in Bathgate
experienced by the British Motor Corporation in housing provision there. The
Scotsman reported, under the headline ‘Bathgate Cannot Supply BMC Housing
Needs’, how Bathgate Town Council could only offer 30 houses for the BMC plant
instead of the 500 it had originally promised, claiming the original proposal was too
expensive. It went on to state ‘Firm wants 550 Houses: Needed for workers in pulp
mill, Annat Project’
226, the implication being that the Fort William and Inverness
Councils, at the town and county levels, were more accommodating to industry’s
needs than Bathgate. Of course, the lack of large-scale industry in the Highlands
during this period perhaps influenced this.
The uncertainty surrounding the project’s finances was confined not only to
the financial aspect - the Scottish Office wished to ensure that the afforestation policy
of the Forestry Commission would continue to safeguard the long term future of the
mill. A Scottish Development Department official wrote to another official in the
Agriculture and Forestry Group to make clear the importance of the continued
afforestation of the country. In the letter the official detailed the project’s expected
operational needs as well as its importance to the Highlands, stating that it would
require 2000 tons of timber per day when in full production and that
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…if the intention to use only Highland forest sources is to be realised, any steps
to slow down forestry planting could only be detrimental to the economic and
social benefits which the mill will bestow… The essential point is that as it is
based on a full and steady supply of timber from Highland forest sources that
supply must be ensured if the mill is to materialise. Any reduction in the
programme could adversely affect the economics of the project and endanger its
establishment in the first place or its viability at a later stage.
227
The Scottish Development Department was trying to ensure that the afforestation
programme on which the future of the mill depended would continue unabated,
providing  an  element  of  security  to  its  operations.  As  mentioned  above,  the
afforestation policy continued resulting in 12% of the Highlands area being covered
by the 1980s. Indeed, the area’s woodland coverage almost doubled between the
1940s and 1970s from 1038 km sq. (4%) to 1861 km sq. (8%) then grew by half again
to reach the 12% figure quoted.
228 It seemed that a future supply of wood would not
be a concern to the mill.
Financing the mill: a Noble endeavour?
By November it was fairly clear that a pulp mill was almost certainly going to
be located at Fort William, but the question of how to finance it still remained. After
Thames Board’s official withdrawal from the consortium in September Scottish Pulp
changed its request to an £8m loan from the Board of Trade, arguing that it could
only realistically raise £6m of private funding for the project, estimated at this point
to cost around £14m
229 and that it expected to earn not more than 7% on its
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investment for the first 15 years.
230 The Board of Trade made a provisional offer to
the company of £6m under the Local Employment Act by this stage, but in light of
Thames Board’s withdrawal from the consortium and with it its proposed £6m
investment, the company made it clear that it would require even more support for the
project if it was to go ahead, to the tune of £10m, taking into account the increase in
the cost of the project to £18m (including the future installation of the second paper
machine costing £4m). The company wanted the £10m in two instalments of £8m for
the first phase of completion of the project and a further £2m for the second phase, to
be  completed  in  two  to  three years time from the original submission.
231 Lord
Polwarth wrote to the Prime Minister confirming this (at the Prime Minister’s
invitation), as well as stressing again the importance of the project to the Highlands,
stating
I only want to reinforce what I know Michael Noble has told you, namely the
vital importance of this project for the future of the Highlands. There is no other
comparable growth point that can be foreseen for this area, and I sincerely hope
that the government’s contribution will be related not merely to the number of
jobs provided (though these are not eligible) but to the far wider importance for
the economy of the Highlands as a whole. It is also important that a decision be
taken as quickly as possible, as I know the company are beginning to feel they
cannot delay matters any longer.
 232
The rising costs of the mill and the fact that 3 of the original 4 interested private
companies had bailed out of the project did not seem to ring any alarm bells in
Scottish Office circles, indeed, these factors only seemed to increase the will of the
Scottish officials to win backing for the mill. Indeed, Wiggins Teape were only
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interested if a substantial sum towards constructing the mill could be provided by
government.
The Board of Trade were understandably cautious of the rising costs of the
project and made it clear that it was prepared only to countenance an outside limit of
no more that £7.5m being made available for it based on commercial risk as well as
the high ‘cost per job’ figure such support would entail. The cost per job issue was
one that affected proposed government support for all industrial ventures and was a
particularly difficult concern for Scottish officials to address in relation to Highland
development. The mill project under the company’s application for £10m from the
government would result in a cost per job of £3500, compared to £2500 under the
outside limit of £7.5m under the Board of Trade’s maximum figure for support. The
Board did however privately concede that there would ‘clearly be no point in
certifying for a sum less that £10m’ but that to do so would require a ‘radical change
in the criteria which have previously been applied.’
233
In a memorandum for the new Scottish Secretary of State Michael Noble, the
Scottish Development Department noted that ‘These are admittedly very high figures,
but Scottish Ministers will not feel able to accept the argument that, for this reason,
the loan needed to enable the project to go ahead must be refused.’
234 Why? Scottish
Ministers felt that the project was of such importance to the Highlands - industrially,
economically and socially - that it justified special treatment. The memorandum
provided a very detailed account of the Board of Trade, the Scottish Office and the
company’s respective positions in relation to the mill and what each wanted in respect
of action. The numbers were fairly definitive, based on what were at that point the
most up to date figures available from the company. If Noble had any misgivings
about locating the mill in Fort William or its cost, he would have had some trouble
convincing the Scottish Development Department otherwise. The mill’s importance
to the area had already entered the consciousness of the Scottish Office. Given that
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Noble was the Unionist MP for Argyllshire, it would have been unlikely that he
would have held any misgivings as the mill would have some residual effects on his
own constituency through its prospected utilisation of some Argyllshire forestry
plantations. The details of the Scottish Office and Board of Trade’s calculations for
the employment and cost per job can be seen below in Table 2.2:
Table 2.2 Scottish Office calculations of proposed mill employment
Categories allowed by the Board of Trade for calculating of loan.
Original
Scheme
Original
Scheme Total
Present
Scheme
Present
Scheme Total
Direct
Employment
907
Stage 1 N/A  725
Stage 2 907  400     1125
Indirect
Employment
(Forestry)*
Woods 1330 1330
Transport 265 300**
Others 100  100      1730
Total 2602 2855***
* Indirect employment will not materially be affected; what influence there is will be
towards an increase.
** The Company’s lorry drivers are now included in this figure instead of in the
figure of direct employment. This is not therefore a true increase from 265 to 300 but
an adjustment to balance the subtraction from the Stage 1 figures of the Company’s
35 lorry drivers, ie, the reduction of Stage 1 direct employment from 907 to 750
includes not only the reduction due to changed plans but the converse of this increase.
*** There are some differences between our figures and the Board of Trade’s. Ours
we believe are more up to date and perhaps more accurate. At the most they would
add about £90,000 to the sum offered; which does not affect the issues materially. We
are advising [Board of] Trade separately.
Source: Pulp Mill State of Play - Memorandum for Secretary of State for Scotland by
Scottish Development Department, 08/11/1962, NAS DD12/2946.85
The Board of Trade’s cost per job calculations were thus based, more or less, on the
above figures. The following table demonstrates the various scenarios played out by
the Scottish Office in its calculations, seen below in Table 2.3:
Table 2.3 Board of Trade calculations of proposed mill employment
Total
Cost (a)
£m
Employment
(b)
Board of Trade
Loan (c) £m
Approx. cost per
job: (c)/ (b)= (d) £
1.Original
Proposal
17.5 2600 6.0 2300
2. Revised
Project
1
st Mill only
(a) (Board of
Trade
proposal)
14.0 2455 6.0 2420
(b)
(Company’s
request)
14.0 2455 8.0 3225
1
st and 2
nd Mill
(a) (Board of
Trade
proposal)
18.0 2855 7.5 2640
(b)
(Company’s
request)
18.0 2855 10.0 3500
Source: Source: Pulp Mill State of Play - Memorandum for Secretary of State for
Scotland by Scottish Development Department, 08/11/1962, NAS DD12/2946.
The above shows quite clearly the difference in the cost per job between the money
requested from the Board of Trade and what the Board was prepared to provide.
Moreover, all figures include indirect job creation, indicating that the Scottish
Development Department were anticipating a departure from normal Board of Trade
policy where applications for support were judged on the basis of direct jobs created
only, allowing for an ‘easily demonstrable and understandable test against political or86
Public Accounts Committee criticism.’
235 Indeed, if only direct job creation was
factored, the cost per job would have been in the region of £10,000 per job.
236 If
Board of Trade support was to be secured, a precedent would have to be set with the
Board shelling out substantially more than it normally did in relation to job creation.
The Scottish Office had briefed the Secretary of State on the mill several
times,  making  it  clear  each  time  how  it  viewed  the  mill’s  importance  to  the
regeneration of the area. Scottish officials had come to view the potential of the mill
as a means of going some way to remedying the problems of depopulation and
unemployment  in  the  Highlands.  The  Scottish  Development  Department’s
memorandum for the Secretary of State on the ‘State of Play’ of the mill made clear
that it considered even the indirect job creation numbers it had produced in the table
above as ‘wholly inadequate’ arguing that ‘The number of people who will be in jobs
if it starts and not in jobs if it does not is much more than that.’
237 The pulpwood
needed, from forestry thinnings, would inevitably lead to the felling of larger timber
along with it, with the department estimating a further 350 people being employed by
this. It was believed that the supply of larger timber from the Highland forests would
stimulate the promotion of further mills and drying kilns, a well as integrating with
the efforts of the Highlands and Islands Advisory Panel’s Development Group to
encourage the building trade to use more home-grown timber. In terms of further
industries created by building the mill, they believed that service industries such as
shops,  telephone  exchanges,  teaching  and  short-term  builders  for  immediate
infrastructural improvements (sewers, road improvements, house building and so on)
would all contribute to the economy in the area. It was expected that included in the
building of the mill and the improvements in housing and so on would be millions of
pounds worth of contracts for Scottish companies. Frankel had also met with Richard
Beeching, who at that point was determining his plans for his report on the railways
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in Britain and had been assured that ‘the establishment of the pulp mill might be a
major factor in determining the ultimate future of the line, which employs about
400.’
238 The department believed that the mill’s establishment was vital for the social
impact it could have on the area more than anything else and was clearly prepared to
countenance the cost required to do so, even if the Board of Trade and Treasury were
not. It had been convinced by residual benefits of the mill and its ‘potential’ for
attracting industry rather than the actual direct job creation issue, which was the main
issue that the London departments were agreed on but was hindering its progress. Job
creation was also of course the basis of the existing legislation.
One saving grace for the proposal was the Board’s condition that a scheme for
job creation costing above £3000 per job must have a ‘very special justification’, as
well as the fact that the Rootes car plant at Linwood received government support for
its  venture  costing  £3000  per  job  created.
239 The depopulation problem in the
Highlands was, in Scottish circles at least, considered a very special justification.
Indeed, Scottish Development Department officials wrote a note on the matter
entitled ‘The Significance of the Pulp Mill in the context of Highland Depopulation’
detailing the department’s attitudes to the problem of depopulation in the Highlands
and what was to be done to address it. It listed three ‘essential requirements’ for a
stable and balanced population, based on the findings of the Highland Panel’s
Norway Group and research by its own officials. The three requirements were:
i)  Opportunities for an appreciable number of jobs in manufacturing
industry and supporting services
ii)  An accessible urban centre of population capable of providing the
modern range of services and amenities; and
                                                
238 Pulp Mill State of Play - Memorandum for Secretary of State for Scotland by Scottish Development
Department, 08/11/1962, NAS DD12/2946.
239 Pulp Mill State of Play - Memorandum for Secretary of State for Scotland by Scottish Development
Department, 08/11/1962, NAS DD12/2946.88
iii)  A stimulus to forestry, the main source of income and employment
(other  than  tourism  which  is  capable  of  growth  over  widely
scattered communities.)
240
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the note also concluded that the mill would be able to satisfy
all three requirements. If Noble was in any doubt about the Scottish Development
Department’s support for the project, in respect of the Board of Trade’s position, the
following piece of advice to him would have allayed any such doubts,
The project is soundly based on natural resources and will provide a substantial
growing point in the particularly intractable area of the Highlands. Indeed the
project is an essential compliment to the heavy public investment in forestry in
the area that has been and still is being undertaken, without this project or
something very like it, there will be much greater difficulty in finding economic
outlets  for  forestry  production  in  years  to  come…  In  a  situation  where
industries are relatively easy to come by, or where there is a good industrial
background already so that a new project adds relatively less, the importance of
not losing a promising project might not be so great. Here it is critical; this is a
unique opportunity of turning the whole area at the southern end of the Great
Glen into one that is no longer a steady drain on the Exchequer, as almost all
Highland areas are. The project provides a basis for integrated economic
planning.
241
There are two things of importance in the above quote - first, the influence of the
Toothill Report in can be clearly seen from the first sentence, indeed it can be clearly
seen throughout the whole quote. Second, the use of the phrase ‘integrated economic
planning’ clearly predates Labour’s 1964 election. The desire on the part of the
Scottish Office to secure support for the mill marks the beginning of the policy of
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‘growth points’ in the Highlands. It is clear that the belief was that if the mill could be
secured for the area, there was the possibility of turning the Highlands into a self-
sufficient area, all by government hand. Noble agreed with the analysis and agreed to
put a paper to Cabinet if the Board of Trade’s response ‘did not show good progress
towards a favourable decision.’
242
The Board of Trade remained somewhat unconvinced of the merits of the
proposed project. However, it had undertaken to consult with the new Scottish
Secretary before making a final decision as well as being obligated to provide the
Prime Minister with a reply to Lord Polwarth’s letter of the 8
th November that
stressed the importance of the project to the Highlands and pressing for a favourable
and quick decision. The Scottish Office had put together the proposal with the
intention that a decision, favourable or unfavourable, on the mill would not be
reached ‘without consideration at the highest level’.
243 Noble’s support for the matter
ensured that, as did Polwarth’s intervention on behalf of the SC(DI). In between Lord
Polwarth’s letter and his reply, officials in the Scottish Development Department had
researched the capital value of the forest estate in the prospective supply area for the
mill. They identified a total of 375,000 acres (about 60% of the total Forestry
Commission Estate in Scotland), of which 255,000 acres were in the Highland
Counties, for the supply area, covering the whole of the Highland Counties as well as
Moray and Nairn, Banff, Stirling, Dumbarton and part of Aberdeenshire.
244 The
capital value of these stocks was £45m, of which the trees represented over £40m of
the value themselves. The officials found that only a quarter of the Estate was in
production at that moment representing an increasing capital value of £1m per
annum. The Forestry Commission also indicated to them that if the mill did not
materialise it would ‘be a major disaster and will probably eliminate any further
interest the paper industry will have in wood supplies from them.’
245 This served only
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to strengthen the belief of the Scottish officials in the project. Lord Polwarth got his
reply on 20
th November where the Prime Minister stated that the project raised
financial issues that would need much further consideration but that the matter was
being treated with ‘great urgency’.
246 Further, upon signing the letter the Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan intimated to the Board of Trade and the Scottish Office
that  the  project  ‘must  not  fail  merely  because  of  lack  of  agreement  between
Departments, and added that it must if necessary come to the Cabinet.’
247 Macmillan’s
actions here had precedent - he intervened in the siting of a new steel strip mill at
Ravenscraig, insisting that the area receive the steel mill in spite of recommendations
to the contrary. Macmillan’s personal intervention in the Ravenscraig project, the
‘judgement of Solomon’ as he called it
248, was very similar to his intervention in the
Corpach project. The Board of Trade had deep misgivings about it, but Macmillan
had been influenced by the arguments put forward by the Scottish Office. With the
Prime Minister on board along with the Secretary of State for Scotland, building the
mill was no longer a case of if, but how and when.
With the Prime Minister’s support for the project clear, an interdepartmental
meeting was arranged by the Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade, Sir Richard
Powell between officials from the Scottish Office, Ministry of Labour, the Treasury,
the Forestry Commission and the Board of Trade for 22
nd November. At the meeting,
the Board of Trade made clear its difficulties with the application before agreeing to
prepare a paper for discussion by Ministers within a fortnight.
249 The aforesaid paper
did not arrive with the Scottish Office until 12
th December however, causing some
consternation amongst Scottish officials who had pressed for an urgent solution.
250
During the meeting the Board of Trade, along with the Treasury, made it clear that
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they were not convinced that any financial support could be made for the project
under the Local Employment Act and intimated that special legislation would be
required, in respect of the precedent that would be created if support through
conventional means were to be provided. In response to this, Sir William Murcie of
the Scottish Office replied that the
Scottish Office did indeed regard the project as essential to the Highlands and
urged that it was  such a special case that if previous rules (which were
conventional not legal) were ignored no inconvenient precedent would be
created: there was a sentimental feeling for the Highlands that meant that public
opinion was prepared to see that area of Scotland treated specially. If the project
fell through it would have serious repercussions on the Forestry Commission.
The decline in demand for pit props was such that unless this extra use for the
trees was forthcoming the Forestry Commission would have to employ tractors
to cut down extensive tracts of forest because they could no longer afford to
maintain them, and put the rest of their forest on a care and maintenance basis.
This would involve a drop in employment in the Fort William area of about
600.
251
The idea of sentimentality for the Highlands was later to become a bargaining tool on
the part of Scottish representations to the Board of Trade and Treasury for funding for
future industrial projects. As it was, the Treasury voiced its concern over encouraging
over-reliance on one factory in the Highlands, especially in light of the fact it would
be initially reliant on imports. This was a pertinent point as one of the main concerns
over Fort William’s economic position was that it was over reliant on the aluminium
industry, therefore encouraging a larger area’s reliance on one factory was contrary to
one of the justifications in siting the mill at Fort William in the first place. The main
concerns the Board of Trade and Treasury had however were the costs. Neither could
see the project as value for money and moreover, if support was to be offered under
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the Local Employment Act there would be a strong, and in their eyes justified,
pressure on the Board to do something for areas that were suffering from higher
unemployment than the Highlands using the example of West Hartlepool where
unemployment at the time was just under 13% and rising. A further concern was that
even if the Board of Trade was to accept the application, the Board of Trade Advisory
Committee could well turn it down anyway, wasting everyone’s time. The Scots were
opposed to special legislation on the basis that it ‘would take too long, and would be
too public and open to criticism.’
252 The fact that the Scots were aware that special
legislation would provide such problems indicates that they were not convinced of the
economics of the project, but such was the concern over Scottish sentiment and the
need to be seen to be doing something about the growing problems in the Highlands,
the  social  impact  the  project  could  have  outweighed  any  concerns  over  due
democratic process.
At a meeting later the same day with the Secretary of State, Scottish officials
informed him that the Board of Trade had considered that assistance on the level
sought  would  be  open  to  criticism  as  ‘extravagant  and  imprudent,  though  not
illegal’.
253 The Scottish officials also informed Noble that the Board of Trade had
agreed to formulate a paper for discussion amongst Ministers, but the Secretary of
State decided that the best course of action would be to first submit a paper to the
Population and Employment Committee (PEC), arguing that direct reference to the
Cabinet may well see Ministers ask that the PEC consider the matter first anyway.
254
The paper submitted was a joint effort between Board of Trade and Scottish Office
officials, with Scottish officials determined to ensure that their support for the project
and its importance to the Highlands was clear. The paper stressed the Scottish
Office’s concerns over public opinion becoming
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…more and more critical of a Government policy which is alleged to
consist of grants and loans so dispersed as to be calculated to allow the
economy to drift even though the aggregate sum is substantial. Failure to
back this first single injection of capital into a massive project for the
Highlands would be taken as confirmation that Government policy is to
allow, at least cost, a continued run down of the Scottish economy and
Highland economy in particular. Any delay might well prejudice the
project and again would be regarded as Government dilatoriness or at
least unreadiness, when opportunity knocks, to step in immediately with
much needed employment in a depressed area, which requires just such
long-term, large scale assistance.
255
The worry over the criticisms of the dispersed nature of the loans and grants made in
Scotland and their effect stung the Scottish Office into fighting harder in the future
for Scottish interests, especially in industrial development terms - going some way
towards contributing to support for the establishment of a planning board for the
Highlands. The future developments in the Highlands and further south in Scotland
were  a  product  of  a  concerted  effort  on  the  part  of  Scottish  departments  at
encouraging governmental planning and intervention in the Scottish economy, with
the Fort William mill as the first such example in the Highlands. The mill had become
a symbol of the need and potential of Highland regeneration before it had even been
built.
The sticking point of the London departments’ intransigence was problematic for
the project and Scottish officials. For the mill to have any chance of being built,
agreement from London was necessary. Macmillan had already made clear that the
mill  was  not  to  fall  down  on  inter-departmental  issues  and  so  there  was  a
commonality of purpose - the mill was almost certainly to be built, but a way of
agreement on financing needed to be found. The President of the Board of Trade,
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Freddie Errol, presented his paper to the Population and Employment Committee and
agreed that the mill project was ‘crucial to the Highland economy’ and would be
‘taken to be the acid test of the Government’s concern for the Highlands’, following
the lead of the Scottish Office.
256 In a note on the memorandum for the mill’s official
file, Scottish officials again emphasised the importance of the mill in relation to the
depopulation issue in the Highlands, stating that
…in this kind of scheme it is the indirect effects, including those which cannot
be precisely measured, which are of vital importance - the stabilising factor of
the scheme on depopulation, the additional employment which will be provided
over a wide area by the spending power of the workers to be employed both in
the plant itself and throughout the forest areas, the effect on educational and
further employment opportunities over a long term in the higher classes of
technical skill which a major industrial plant of this kind can provide.
257
The mill’s importance to the wider issues in the Highlands was beginning to become
accepted by the London departments, but there was still the concern that awarding
any support under existing legislation would set an unhealthy precedent due to the
costs involved. By 17
th December Scottish officials were coming round to the idea of
special legislation being utilised as a way of ensuring the project’s go ahead, with
Douglas Haddow, the new head of the Scottish Development Department, remarking
in a note to one of his officials that he still doubted the usefulness of special
legislation but that there might be a ‘real gain’ in going down that route as there was
no guarantee of a favourable decision if they took the path of referring to the Board of
Trade’s Advisory Committee for support.
258
Perhaps  more  revealingly  in  the  above  note  was  the  strategy  Haddow
recommended the Secretary of State adopt if questioned on the policy of relying on
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major  centres  of  growth,  as  per  the  suggestion  and  adoption  of  Toothill’s
recommendations. Haddow remarked that any argument stating that if government
policy was going to rely on major centres of growth, then ‘subsidiary’ projects like
the pulp mill at Fort William were no longer needed should be ‘stamped on hard.’
Haddow’s reasoning for this was that the Central Belt was inevitably going to get the
major growth point centres (this was already the case with the Ravenscraig and
Bathgate ventures already under way) but there would be a need for smaller ‘holding
points’ in other areas of the country to minimise the drain on the population of these
areas.  Haddow  believed  the  Fort  William  project  satisfied  this  requirement
‘ideally’.
259 Haddow was clearly aware of the importance of ensuring that the
Highlands received some sort of industrial support from the government that would
stem growing public clamour in light of the 1961 census’ findings on depopulation
and unemployment in the area, as well as ‘Scottish sentiment’ for the area.
In early January the following year, Noble met with Macmillan and the
Chancellor, Selwyn Lloyd, where he agreed with Macmillan’s point that it would not
be appropriate that the government support required for the project, now set officially
at £10m, to go ahead under the provisions of the Local Employment Act. Macmillan
preferred instead that special legislation be introduced authorising the provision of the
funding required.
260 It was thus agreed to proceed on the principle of getting an act
through Parliament that would allow for financial support in the form of a loan to
Scottish Pulp by the government to be made for constructing the mill with other
necessary improvements to the area in housing and so forth to be taken on by local
government. Wiggins, Teape during this period were developing a new paper product
in America with National Cash Registers (NCR) that required considerable research
input,  distracting  the  company  from  keeping  an  eye  on  the  developments  in
Scotland.
261 Frankel, having spent the time drawing up further plans for the
development, was thus effectively in charge of solving the logistics of the project and
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met with Beeching in January also where he secured agreement that the Glasgow-Fort
William-Mallaig line on which the mill was to sit would remain open, prompting
press coverage on the matter. The Times reported that the mill had been ‘designed
specially to be served by rail transport’ and quoted Scottish Pulp as stating that ‘It has
been in the air many times that this line was in danger, but the advent of Scottish Pulp
has removed that danger.’
262 In a Scottish Development Department note on the mill,
officials commented that the favourable reportage on the line being kept open was a
‘vivid example that the mill will convert an uneconomic line, particularly the Fort
William/Mallaig section, into a worthwhile one. This in turn will have an enormous
effect on the morale of the area giving confidence in the future.’
263 Timber from the
south of Fort William would be put on to trains at Crianlarich making keeping the
line from there to Fort William open also.
264 With the press onside the officials
believed that the guarantee of traffic on the line for the next twenty years with the
agreement between Scottish Pulp and British Railway
265 could be a boon to tourism in
the area as well as a factor in encouraging other industries to locate there.
266
However, there was a note of concern from one official that the mill could have
a negative effect on tourism in the area in relation to Frankel’s suggestion of the
company buying a hotel to put up its workers. The official, AC Sheldrake (formerly a
planning official with the Department of Health Scotland), stated:
What concerns us is that the tourist industry is increasing and is an important
foreign exchange earner. We know that hotel accommodation in general in the
tourist season, which everyone is trying to extend by the way, is limited and a
reduction in the Fort William area is not one which we would be pleased to see,
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appreciative as we are of the more continuing and substantial benefit to the area
which the Pulp Mill will provide. 
267
Sheldrake also went on record a week later disputing a sum of £0.7m that was to be
paid out to expedite housing expenditure for the mill from the Scottish Office on the
basis that those housed would leave the Highlands and have to be housed elsewhere if
no mill was built. This brought a sharp response from another official in an internal
communiqué that stated
Frankly I should be inclined to let the Treasury ‘have’ the £0.7m rather than get
involved in arguing whether a Highlander paying an economic rent and making
cars in Coventry would contribute more to the GNP than if he stayed at home to
make pulp and paper.
268
The plans for constructing the mill were more or less set but the special legislation,
which the Board of Trade and Scottish Office departments had been working on
jointly, had yet to be presented to Parliament for its approval. This was Sheldrake’s
point essentially - he was concerned the Scottish Office was ‘wasting’ money by
giving it back to London, lending credence to the idea of the Scottish Office being
focused on ‘winning’ things from Whitehall. Indeed, in a later note on a telex
between the Edinburgh and London offices of the Scottish Office after the mill was
built, Sheldrake commented that ‘If it had been left to the Board of Trade then there
would have been no pulp mill!’
269
With the possibility of building the mill becoming closer and the social
possibilities well documented, the SDD focused its attentions on the economic impact
the mill would likely have. The department produced a detailed estimate of the
minimum wages expected at the mill which were slightly below the wages being paid
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at the British Aluminium smelters, as part of an agreement Frankel made with the
company so as not to upset the company or workforce there. The following figures
were produced:
Table 2.4 Detailed estimate of wages in Pulp Mill
1.) 1170 directly employed in Mill
No. of employees.
Males:
Job
Position
Weekly wage
per employee. £
Total Weekly wage. £
40 Executive 25 1000
56 Foreman 16 900
150 Skilled 14 2100
390 Unskilled
and semi-
skilled
10 3900
9 Office staff 10 90
17 Labouring
Staff
5 85
35 Drivers 10 350
Total Male
employment:     697
Total weekly
male wages:        £9425
No. of employees.
Females:
152 8 1216
45 Office
Staff
7 315
5 Labouring
Staff
4 20
Total Female
employment:     202
Total weekly female
wages:
£1551
Total number
employed:
                         899
Total wages estimate:
£10,976
For 1170 workers, in proportion,
weekly wages estimate:
£14,286
For 1170 workers, in proportion,
yearly wages estimate:
£742,97299
2) 1600 indirect: approx: £950,000 per
year (of which £350,000
would be new income)
3) Up to 1000 consumer services and distributive trades       approx: £500,000 per
year
Source: Scottish Development Department Note on Pulp Mill, 18/01/1963, NAS
DD12/2946.
There was a disclaimer in the note stating that although Frankel had agreed not to
match or top the wages being paid to British Aluminium employees, there was no
such guarantee once the mill was an established employer in the area, although no
exact timescale was put on this. Table 2.4 indicates the level of impact the mill was
projected to have on the area quite clearly. The population of Fort William and
surrounding area in 1961 was 6150
270, thus the combined projected extra employment
of 3770 would see an increase of more than 50% in employment and population
numbers. Fort William at this point however did not have a particularly difficult
employment problem, or indeed a large economy. Moreover, its dependence on the
aluminium  smelters  meant  the  introduction  of  a  new  large-scale  development
bringing people into the area as well as a massive injection of money into the
economy would likely see a considerable improvement in the area overall.
It was expected by Ministry of Labour officials that 90% of the labour force
required for the mill would come from development districts, of which they hoped
75% of that sum would come from the Highlands and North East Scotland (this was
the preference of Scottish Pulp also), with the remaining labour coming from the
Central Clydeside area. They also believed that the fact many Glaswegians during
this period were from the West Highlands could prove to be an inducement to
workers to locate in the area and work at the mill. The Ministry of Labour were also
apparently convinced of the ‘breeder potential’ of the mill stating in a note to the
Scottish Office:
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…the location of the mill at Fort William and the consequent employment in
forestry would have a generating effect of employment in the Highlands and
North East of Scotland. If the Dounreay project at Thurso is any guide, we
might expect the services (excluding construction) in Fort William to expand by
400 and 500. If the viability of the pulp mill can be assured we could scarcely
look for a better shot in the arm for the Highlands.
271
The Scottish Development Department were already convinced of this of course and
had argued strongly for it on this basis as well as the basis that it would become a
magnet for other industries to locate in the Highlands, removing the area away from
being a ‘drain on the Exchequer’ into one of self-sufficiency. This was to be the main
line of argument for government financing of each of the future large-scale industrial
developments in the Highlands, including the second reactor at Dounreay.
Bringing new opportunities to the Highlands: the Bill and the
Mills
On 3
rd April 1963, Reginald Maudling announced in his Budget that the
government had ‘agreed to make a loan to Wiggins Teape to finance the construction
of an integrated pulp and paper mill at Fort William. The mill will provide a most
valuable complement to the work of the Forestry Commission in the area and I am
confident that it will help with the establishment of a thriving community there.’
272 A
week later the Fort William Pulp and Paper Mills Bill was presented for its second
reading in Parliament.
273 During the  three hour debate on the merits of the bill,
various questions were inevitably raised over the government’s decision to support
the project. Willie Ross, as shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, questioned the
wisdom of supporting the establishment of the mill from the point of view that
establishing the mill in Fort William would lead to the denudation not of trees in the
Highlands but people. Ross’ point was that creating an industrial venture that required
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thousands of workers would inevitably lead to people leaving their indigenous areas
to head for work in Fort William, creating a larger problem for the authorities to deal
with in relation to depopulation than there was before.
274 This was a fairly facetious
point however. If industry was to be located in the Highlands on a large scale on the
premise of giving jobs to the Highlanders and attracting people back to the area, then
inevitably there would have to be some kind of population movement as there were
very few places in the Highlands with the levels of population and unemployment
that could sustain a venture such as the mill. Moreover, this line of argument certainly
didn’t stop Ross from pursuing the very same policy with such vigour only a few
years later. The argument concerning ‘centralisation’ of population in the Highlands
into certain areas and the negative effects of it was one that was made by the SC(DI)
in its survey of the Lochaber area 10 years previously. In that survey, discussed
earlier, the SC(DI) stated
The best information available is that while the population of Invernessshire as
a whole has risen, the increase is more than accounted for by the growth of the
town of Inverness alone. In other words, the rest of the County shows a fall. Yet
we know that Fort William and its environs have also grown. Thus, it is clear
that depopulation in the rural parts continues unchecked. There is ample reason
to believe that throughout the Highlands this centralizing tendency prevails, that
the towns and larger villages are filling and the peninsulas of settlement
emptying. That this process in extreme form is bad few Scotsmen doubt. It
leads to a loss of that independent viewpoint and adaptability which are such
prized characteristics of all hill peoples, and it makes the depopulated parts
more uneconomic than ever. This process is at work in the Survey area and its
surroundings; in this the district is characteristic of the Highlands.
275
There was some concern amongst politicians and officials that creating growth points
such as the Fort William mill would not stem the depopulation from rural areas to the
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south, but would create a similar problem of depopulation of rural areas into the
newly created growth centres in the Highlands. This informed the desire to locate
several ‘holding points’ of industrial concentration around the Highlands (latterly in
the Spey Valley, Invergordon and building on the existing population in Sutherland
courtesy of the atomic station), a point also alluded to several years after the SC(DI)’s
survey by Haddow in a departmental note.
276 What this demonstrates is that there was
a tension between the issues of development and concern over centralisation of
industry that were eventually discarded in favour of the belief that they could be
married successfully if the developments were big enough.
The discussion of the Bill in the House also centred on the effect the mill
could have on the UK national balance of trade. Simon Wingfield Digby, MP for
Dorset West, remarked on the need for an outlet for the timber being produced by the
country and the trade deficit Britain had with Canada (£154m), Finland (£33m) and
Russia (£26m) - all from whom Britain imported timber and finished timber products
(as well as Sweden). Digby’s point was that the four countries mentioned provided
Britain with £141m worth of timber and timber products, a figure he described as ‘a
considerable  sum  at  a  time  when  we  are  always  considering  our  balance  of
payments.’
277 Digby also believed that the situation in respect of timber and timber
products imports would become worse with the coming of the EFTA agreement.
Digby’s final point was that the Bill did not take wide enough powers for the
establishment of further mills all over the country and that the Fort William mill
should be the first of many to go some way to relieving the imbalance, a point
supported by other MPs in their speeches on the matter.
278 The bill provided for no
further inducements for business to establish further mills anywhere else in the
country. Indeed, the other paper operations that were interested in the project initially
had looked into the possibility of siting pulp mills in the UK but decided to stick with
their established operations elsewhere. Bowaters during this period found itself with a
surplus of American made pulp from its operations there that it had no use for,
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meaning it had to sell it on. Meanwhile Scandinavian prices of pulp were falling,
meaning a surplus of pulp was entering the market as well as falling prices.
279 The
Fort William mill was entering a buyer’s market suffering from excess capacity and
falling prices aware that it would have to operate at maximum capacity itself just to
survive let alone become profitable. This then leads to the question of whether or not
the pulp mill was about economic considerations or about relieving social problems in
the Highlands whilst giving the UK government a bargaining tool for timber and
timber products imports should the major producers or the market raise prices.
Scottish Pulp was convinced of the merits of the project as long as sufficient
financing was available from government.
The House passed the Bill without any real objections being lodged or
amendments being suggested. Scottish MPs were in the majority in favour of the
project and MPs from other areas agreed it was a desirable project in the main. In his
closing remarks on the Bill, Noble addressed the concerns Ross had made about the
denudation of people from other parts of the Highlands through the pulling power of
the mill at Fort William, agreeing that it must ‘always be a worry’ but stressing that
MPs should not become ‘over-obsessed’ by it by stating that the nature of the industry
was such that any dangers of over-concentration would be avoided by the need for the
growing areas for the timber and the people there to extract it.
280 Noble argued that
the project would be
…an encouragement to other industries to come to Fort William and round
about and will encourage other industrialists to think that the Highlands are not
an impossible place in which to develop… I think it will play a most significant
part in the psychological effect it will have in the Highlands where people will
think  something  really  important  has  come  which  will  provide  lasting
employment there.
281
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Noble and the Scottish Office’s endeavours had finally reached fruition. The Bill had
been passed with the government committing itself to providing a loan of up to £10m,
as well as grants of not more than £1.3m under the Board Of Trade’s auspices in
relief on interest on the loan, to Wiggins, Teape & Co. (the parent company of
Scottish Pulp and Paper Mills). The interest on the loan was set at 5.5% (compared a
rate of up to 6.25% had the money been raised in the city) with the company due to
commence repayments three years after the initial instalment of £8m was made for
the first phase of construction.
282 Repayments would be made in ten equal instalments
and last for a period of ten years.
283
The construction of the mill was the biggest industrial project to be introduced
into the Highlands at that point since the Second World War - bigger in terms of
employment than the Dounreay Fast Reactor (DFR) in Sutherland which employed
around 2000 people in the construction period, but fewer in the actual operation of the
plant and far fewer in terms of indirect employment. Lord Polwarth cut the first sod in
July 1963 with the building contract for the mills (paper and pulp), employing about
700 people, going to Duncan Logan (Contractors) Ltd. - a Highland firm and
expected to be finished by 1965.
284 The same day Lord Polwarth was quoted as saying
that it was ‘a great day for the Highlands. For the first time in 250 years we shall have
repopulation, not depopulation.’
285 The firm also secured the contract to build the
pipeline from British Aluminium’s factory outside Fort William as well as contracts
to build houses for mill workers from the company and contracts from the local
authorities to build 450 houses and new schools for the incoming workers, totalling
£9.5m.
286 Two dolphins, the technical term for the man made islands used for docking
in Loch Linnhe, were constructed to allow ships of up to 16000 tonnes to berth and
unload cargoes of hardwood chips from Canada were also built. On these dolphins
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were two cranes with electro-hydraulic grabs that could lift two tonnes of woodchips
at a time before dropping them into a 22 inch diameter, 1500ft long pipeline and then
blown by a 1000 horsepower fan to the mill. This was apparently the largest system
of its kind in the world.
287 The mill and islands (with the railway line running from the
middle left to bottom middle of the picture), not quite finished, can be seen in the
image below:
Figure 2.2 Construction phase of the Corpach mill development
Source: http://www.scran.ac.uk accessed 26/06/2006.
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British Aluminium also played a further role in the construction of the mill, supplying
aluminium sheets for the cladding for the mill itself as well as roofing for the houses
for staff members constructed overlooking the loch on the hill above Fort William.
288
When finished, the pulp mill measured 400ft long, the paper mill 540 ft long, the
finishing end 530 ft long and the power house for the mills stood 170 ft high
289,
providing a distinctive landmark in the area and, along with the development at
Dounreay, a visual marker of the government’s intent to industrialise the Highlands.
For a company such as Wiggins, Teape it was a measure of its aspiration for its own
growth. By early 1965 the company had increased its exports by 70% over the
previous four years with its 1964 exports totalling £8m, more than a quarter of the
industry’s total exports.
290 The new mill project was to help it improve further on this
and strengthen both itself and the mill as international operators.
Wiggins Teape’s Honorary President LW Farrow officially opened the mills
on the 15
th September 1966. The ceremony for the opening of the mill was an austere
affair because the company, in light of the ‘stringent economic situation confronting
the country’ had decided a glitzy affair would be open to criticism in the press.
291 The
July crisis and subsequent wage freeze obviously contributed to this state of affairs. In
attendance at the opening were Professor Robert Grieve, Chairman of the newly
created Highlands and Islands Development Board and Willie Ross, the Labour
Secretary of State for Scotland (clearly having lost his previous misgivings about the
project). Both men were impressed with the new mill and would later be heavily
involved in the creation of the further large-scale industrial projects in the Highlands.
Grieve said that he viewed the opening of the mill as a great occasion for not only the
Highlands but also for the United Kingdom, a view espoused in response to all
Highland development during the period by several others, most notably Willie Ross.
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Ross remarked that the mill’s opening was a historic development and a point of
return to the Highlands where for too long the roads had been ways out.
292 In a six
page special in The Scotsman on the opening of the mill, Frankel is quoted as saying
‘When we built Scottish Pulp [the mill] we were thinking in terms of an industrial
project and suddenly we found a social revolution on our hands.’ The Scotsman itself
described the new development as having ‘a profound impact on the Highland
economy’
293 The Highland economy wasn’t the only economy it was to benefit
though - GBC Johnson the managing director of Wiggins, Teape wrote in the
Financial Times Annual Review that the mills ‘will help the balance of payments
position by millions of pounds annually [and] have come about as a direct result of
the foresight of foresters who planted before the war’.
294 The synthesis between
national,  industrial  and  local  benefit  was  clear.  Frankel  and  Wiggins  Teape
approached the project from a commercial point of view, but were drawn into the
government’s idea of the social purposes of the mill in order to secure government
support for it, without which of course the mill would not have gone ahead. Ross and
Grieve would later use the same formula to some effect with the other developments
in the Highlands. Indeed, large-scale industrial manufacturing development would
later become a central feature of the HIDB’s strategy in attempting to develop the
Highlands  industrially,  in  particular  at  Dounreay  for  the  second  reactor  and
Invergordon for the smelter.
Once the mill was opened, the government stepped back and left the company
to its own devices. However, immediately from the beginning the mill experienced
major problems. During the first year of operation it lost £1.6m. During the second
year of operation it lost around the same figure again. In a warning given by Mark
Norman, the chairman of Wiggins Teape, he stated
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We are making good progress with the technical problems at Fort William,
which is moving steadily towards its planned output. But the economics of pulp
production in the Highlands, with intense international competition and high
wood costs, are not yet clear.
295
The mill was experiencing higher operating costs than projected due to higher wood
costs and lower paper prices in light of fierce domestic and international competition
from the low cost integrated mills in Canada and Scandinavia. Further, government
had made it clear to industry that it was unwilling (and unable) to protect any industry
by quotas.
296 By late 1968 the pulp mill was producing only 60,000 tonnes annually.
Part of this problem of higher operating costs was attributed to the removal of EFTA
tariffs at the end of 1966 and the economic situation in the country generally. Further,
the company were also paying more to the Forestry Commission for raw timber than
its Scandinavian competitors were able to get from their suppliers.
297 The mill also
suffered from technical problems with the process chosen for the pulping operations.
The two-stage sulphite process (the Stora process) proved temperamental with
corrosion problems in the chemicals recovery plant and secondary boilers. Further the
pulp produced was not of sufficient strength meaning the company had to import
stronger  pulps  as  admixture  to  the  paper  finish,  resulting  in  increased  costs.
Moreover, and crucially to the future of the plant, there were changes in the structure
of the international paper market which saw demand move towards lighter weight and
higher specification papers for which the sulphite process the Fort William mill used
was not particularly suitable, exacerbating the existing problems at the plant. The
intention to invest in the second paper machine to make the mill take full advantage
of the projected economies of scale was therefore unable to be justified on this basis.
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Accordingly, the company applied to the government to delay the repayment process
on the loan for three years, starting at the end of 1971.
298
The  company  was  also  experiencing  further  problems  operationally.
Disposing of the bark was proving difficult, as there was no known use for it. As a
result the company took to burning the leftover bark causing complaints from locals.
Training of apprentices was also proving difficult. For the day release courses
necessary in training,, apprentices had to travel to Inverness. This put many off the
idea of training resulting in requests for transfer into the productive side of the plant
where, initially at least, they could earn more money, leaving a shortfall in trainee
apprentices at the factory. Recruitment of female labour for incoming industry was
also problematic. This was due to the seasonal tourist industry in the area where many
females preferred to provide bed and breakfast facilities in their own houses, where
possible, as a more ‘profitable and congenial’ form of employment than regular
employment.
299 Further, in 1969 the Wiggins, Teape in-house newspaper for workers
at the Scottish mill, The Digest, described it as ‘a relatively high cost producer of pulp
and cannot therefore be regarded as an ideal Market Pulp Mill. We must therefore,
scrape every possible advantage from integration to use maximum pulp output at Fort
William for our own papers.’
300 Hardly reassuring stuff.  The experience of the mill
wasn’t all bad however - the population and economy of Fort William had boomed
with an increase in population of 60% from 6150 in 1961 to 10250 in 1971 serving
one of the aims of the project. The problem with this was that the social infrastructure
in  the  area  was  under  severe  strain  for  a  number  of  years  until  the  gradual
improvements were undertaken.
301
The 1960s was a period of growth for the paper industry when Wiggins,
Teape, Thames Board Mills, Bowater and Mardon Packaging International all bought
or constructed new mills. The development of home resources such as waste paper
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and the maturation of forests contributed markedly to this.
302 The intention of the
industry’s expansion was to strengthen domestic production in light of the increasing
demand at home. In order to achieve this the companies had to build pulp mills to
supply their paper mills and protect themselves against foreign price increases from
the Scandinavian mills. Scandinavian mills were responsible for 75% of wood pulp
imported into the UK in 1960.
303 Thus, with increasing demand at home for paper and
the reliance on wood pulp from abroad the industry felt it was exposed to potential
fluctuations and increases in pulp prices if it didn’t address the issue. The increase in
demand for paper at home and the paper companies’ response through production
increases can be seen more clearly in Table 2.5:
Table 2.5 British domestic paper consumption, production and imports, 1955-70
Year Apparent Consumption
‘000 tonnes
Production
‘000 tonnes
Imports
‘000 tonnes
1955 4140 3297 1105
1960 5312 4064 1426
1965 6112 4537 1723
1970 7179 4903 2506
Source:  Hills,  RC, Papermaking  in  Great  Britain,  1488-1988, (Athlone Press,
London, 1988), pg. 186.
As the table shows, the fifteen years between 1955 and 1970 saw a 48% increase in
domestic production compared to a 73% increase in apparent consumption. Imports
also increased 127% during the same period. It is clear that the industry was reliant on
foreign paper coming into the country but the widespread fears in the British paper
industry about British entry into the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), and
the  subsequent  opening  of  the  British  market  to  the  established  Scandinavian
operators, relaxed somewhat with the increasing domestic demand for paper during
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the 1960s.
304 This is a point GBC Scott related to an upturn in British economic
fortunes towards the end of the 1960s.
305 The increase in domestic demand for paper
is attributed by Hills to increased competition as a result of cheaper production
methods being introduced from the Scandinavians
306 through the use of the kind of
integrated mills that Fort William was intended to emulate. However, the greater
economies of scale in timber supplies utilised by the Scandinavian producers meant
that their ability to produce pulp was considerably cheaper than the UK producers. As
a result this inured them against the economic downturn that followed in the 1970s.
The 1970s was a very different experience for the UK-wide industry from the
previous decade. In 1971-72 the industry experienced a sharp decline in production
due to a fall in newsprint production. Jensen-Eriksen attributes this to the industry’s
incompetitiveness through delayed modernisation and late adjustment to the open
international environment.
307 The Fort William mill did not escape these problems
and its operational difficulties were exacerbated by the further contraction the
industry encountered as a result of the oil shocks of 1974. The subsequent increase in
inflation, decline in consumer confidence and deceleration of industrial production
led the paper industry to experience an economic downturn that was to continue until
the late 1980s.
308 Although consumption grew, it was only a modest increase whereas
production  decreased  from  the  highs  of  the  1960s  and  British  papermakers’
international competitors increased their imports to the UK. This is seen more clearly
in Table 2.6:
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Table 2.6 British domestic paper consumption, production and imports, 1975-86
Year Apparent Consumption
‘000 tonnes
Production
‘000 tonnes
Imports
‘000 tonnes
1975 6017       3616      2645
1980 6837 3793.4 3509.7
1981 6986 3379.7 3908.9
1982 6750 3197.6 3951.4
1983 7159 3297.7 4284.8
1984 7595       3591 4527.9
1985 7711 3681.2 4604.1
1986 8068 3941.2 4757.1
Source:  Hills,  RC, Papermaking  in  Great  Britain,  1488-1988, (Athlone Press,
London, 1988), pg. 186.
The effect this had on the British paper industry’s labour, mill and machine numbers
is clearer when Table 2.7 is considered:
Table 2.7 British paper industry annual numbers
Year Mills Machines Manpower
1972 146 410 63038
1973 144 396 62415
1974 143 398 64741
1975 140 402 62116
1976 138 358 57418
1977 139 335 58812
1978 135 342 59293
1979 132 325 56074
1980 123 293 49290
Source: Hills, RC, Papermaking in Great Britain, pg. 185.
The depressed demand had the obvious effect of decreasing labour numbers over the
period. This combined with higher production costs meant the Fort William project
experienced severe difficulties and operating at a reduced capacity. Given that it was113
made clear at the outset of the venture that the mills needed to be working at full or
nearly full capacity in order to be viable this led to considerable problems for the
development and the growing realisation that the pulp mill was uneconomic to run.
By 1980, with the company employing about 950 people at the plant, only
40% of the paper mill’s requirements were being satisfied from the pulp mill and 75%
of the pulp was being sent to other UK mills. Hood & Young assert that the pulp mill
had essentially become a market operation and had lost most of the advantages of
integration with paper-making.
309 The need for the mills to operate at full capacity in
order to be competitive was not being met and put their future into serious jeopardy.
The pulp mill’s process for producing pulp and costliness meant it couldn’t compete
with the other mills in production around the world.
310 One of the major problems
faced by the mill was the cost of timber haulage, often of distances of up to 300km,
although the average distance for Forestry Commission woodlands was 150km and
for private estates 200km.
311 This can be seen more clearly from Figure 2.3 below:
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Figure 2.3 Timber supply to Fort William pulp mill 1971-72
Source: Turnock, D, Scotland’s Highlands and Islands, (OUP, London, 1974), pg. 14
As the illustration shows, timber brought to the mill from north of Fort William came
direct via truck and timber from the south by train via Crianlarich (a factor in
Beeching’s decision not to close the Glasgow-Fort William-Mallaig line). Both
methods were and still are time consuming and expensive to move large stocks of
wood through. The increased price of oil in light of the 1974 shocks meant that the
mill was faced with a much higher transport cost for the necessary timber than
anticipated. This, coupled with the disappointing performance of the mill, meant that
the plant faced higher timber costs per tonne of pulp produced than was viable.
Higher costs before the timber reached the mill compared to higher costs after the
pulp had been processed and sent on to other mills meant the company experienced115
problems on a dual front. The mill had annual losses in excess of £2m per year by the
late 1970s and was faced with the prospect of having to invest a further £10m in
replacing damaged parts of the chemical recovery system.
312 The world recession and
the oil-fired strength of sterling meant imports were becoming cheaper and the slump
in world paper sales meant the company was faced with an operation that was losing
money, needed considerable investment in outmoded technology and had little chance
of succeeding in a declining market, as well as having to deal with higher than
expected timber and pulp production and haulage costs. The choice then was to
continue operations in the hope the market picked up sufficiently for the mill finally
to move into profit, in the knowledge there would be no government support, or to
close it down. It was not much of a choice at all - the company announced it was
pulling out of the pulp operations of the plant in April 1979 and that the pulp mill was
closing in November 1980. The area went from having a shortage of labour in the
1950s before the mill was built to an unemployment rate of 18.3% in 1983 after the
pulp mill closed and the paper mill reduced employment numbers.
313 Wiggins, Teape
repaid the government loan in full to the Board of Trade upon the closure of the pulp
mill.
314 The paper mill continued, running at a much-reduced capacity, until it was
announced in September 2005 that it was closing at the end of the month with the loss
of 126 jobs.
315 The site has now been cleared for a new sawmill development by BSW
Timber costing £25m and intended to create 45 direct jobs and a further 100 indirect
jobs.
316
Conclusion
The Fort William pulp mill was borne of social considerations, economic
necessity and political pragmatism, as were the other major industrial developments
in the Highlands. Successive governments had committed substantial public funds to
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afforestation programmes in Scotland for so long that when it became apparent
private industry was interested in utilising the substantial resources accumulated, it
was difficult and indeed counter productive to argue otherwise. British dependency
on timber and timber product imports was such that a venture such as the pulp and
paper mills in Fort William presented a desirable project that would go some way to
saving  on  the  balance  of  payments  problem  that  was  becoming  increasingly
concerning to politicians - Wiggins Teape stated that it would save Britain £8m per
year.
317 Further, the growing clamour for Highland development and the fact that no
other site was suitable to take advantage of the forests planted for use in a pulp mill
meant Fort William was the only logical choice available. The need for a tidal
location with ample water supply as well as the possibility of government support led
the company to conclude Fort William was its best option for constructing a mill
without exposing itself too much to substantial capital outlay.
The fact that there were concerns over the economic viability of locating and
constructing a mill in the area in the first place had little bearing on the Scottish
Office’s unwavering support for the project. The fact that it was known the mill
would have to operate at full or near full capacity from the outset just to survive, as
well as the known transport costs, were indicators that the margin for error was so
remote as to make the project, from a purely economic point of view, hazardous. The
desire to demonstrate that the mill project could be a ‘test case for industry in the
Highlands’ overrode these concerns however. As a result this exposed the project to
the unforgiving nature of the international economy - the oil shocks had a direct
impact on transport costs as well as operational costs for the mill, not least to say the
established and effective production techniques used Scandinavian operators. The
Scottish Office’s concern with developing the Highlands and currying favour with the
Scottish populace meant that the economic concerns over the plant’s viability and
ability to operate at full capacity were discarded in favour of a grand gesture of
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demonstrating to the public and business that the government was committed to
developing the economic capabilities of the Highlands.
Of course, the Scottish Office wasn’t operating on a purely economic basis
and the political and social conditions at the time took precedence. Fort William
couldn’t support the labour numbers needed for the mills and it was an anomaly in
relation  to  the  wider  Highland  situation  in  that  it  did  not  suffer  from  high
unemployment. Its claimed over-reliance on the aluminium industry was viewed as a
reasonable justification for looking for other industries to locate there, but special
treatment of the project in the form of passing the bill was required to achieve this.
This was a short-term strategy for getting the project financed by government and in
many respects presaged the lengths which the Scottish Office would later go to get
support for other large-scale industrial developments in the Highlands in pursuit of a
long-term strategy for growth. The idea of creating a ‘growth centre’ in the area by
building on the existing aluminium industry and creating a new industry was a direct
result of the Scottish Office’s adoption of the thrust of Toothill’s recommendations. If
the  Fort  William  area  could  be  shown  to  house  a  major  industrial  venture
successfully, so went the argument, then others would see the area as somewhere they
could locate. This of course was a driving factor in the decisions to locate the further
developments the Highlands received. The fact that the Fort William satisfied the
requirements necessary for the mill’s location there was fortuitous in that respect, but
the problems the area experienced when the mill closed made the initial fortune seem
like a poisoned chalice - from having a shortage of labour before the mill to the jump
to almost one in five people being unemployed was a difficult burden and continued
throughout the 1980s.
Wiggins Teape approached the project from a commercial point of view - it
was interested in making money out of the mill and believed it could do so, albeit
with the help of government support at the outset. The government's view however
was more encompassing. The Fort William project represented the opportunity for the
government to realise several aims at once - regional development in the Highlands to118
stem social concerns, import reduction and forestry policy. The afforestation policies
had finally come to fruition, the Highlands could be developed industrially to no
longer be a strain on the Treasury and the country’s reliance on imports of timber and
timber products could be reduced. The idea of locating industry in the Highlands so
that it would no longer be a strain on the Treasury through continued economic
underperformance would permeate into future Scottish Office policy with respect to
later developments in the area with similar consequences for all but one.119
Chapter  Three.  Aviemore  and  the  Cairngorms:
Government Planning and Intervention
Source: University of Glasgow Business Archives, UGD HF101/3/1.120
Development of Aviemore and The Cairngorms
The small town of Aviemore, located on the two main arterial transport links
to the Highlands, the Perth-Inverness rail link and the A9 road North, found itself the
subject of considerable attention from government in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
It was seen as a potential growth centre for the establishment of a hotel and winter
sports leisure complex aimed at attracting tourists to the area in what was to be ‘a
pleasant place of all festivity’ - Hugh Fraser’s description of a purpose built facility
for conferences, tourists and winter sports enthusiasts alike to visit and spend their
money at.
318 The town’s proximity to the Cairngorms mountain range meant it was
well placed for the development of a resort aimed at catering towards this end. The
Aviemore and Cairngorm development was on the face of it intended to extend the
tourist season from its traditional summer 2 months to a more profitable 10 months,
bringing increased tourist revenue and more permanent employment to the area
through the development of winter sports facilities. More generally, the project fitted
with the ongoing approach towards Highland development conditioning thinking at
Scottish  Office  level  towards  establishing  a  tourist  centre  in  the  Highlands  to
showcase the potential of the industry to help the area.
The government approached Hugh Fraser, then chairman of Harrods and
House of Fraser, to direct the project. As a result, the construction of several new
hotels, tourist and sports facilities and infrastructural development all took place,
giving rise to the idea that Aviemore could compete as the Scottish St Moritz.
319 This
idea was one that caught the imagination of the Scottish press during the construction
phase with the Glasgow Herald describing it as a ‘landmark’.
320 However, the reality
of the project was a concrete morass that soon became dated and subsequently has
been subject to considerable criticism since its creation for scarring the landscape,
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with one commentator suggesting the development should be ‘nuked’.
321 Further, the
political scandal that developed in the early 1970s surrounding the development
involving George Pottinger, the lead civil servant on the project, and John Poulson,
the lead architect, both of whom were jailed for corruption, tainted the project.
However, Aviemore was very much a forerunner to the realisation on the part of
government and others that tourism could become a major industry, not just in the
Highlands but also in Scotland as a whole later in the century. Tourism during the
1960s was still regarded by some as the ‘soft option’
322 in consideration of the
potential industries for solving Highland problems - the belief being that it was a
seasonal pursuit incapable of providing stable, all year round, full time employment
on a large scale. Aviemore was then an attempt at redressing this attitude and
demonstrating that tourism could be an all-year round industry in the region.
This case study differs somewhat from the other three in my work in that it is
not about government locating heavy industry in the Highlands, but was more of an
attempt by government at facilitating the growth of an existing, albeit arguably more
appropriate, industry for the area. Tourism in the area was and is based largely on
selling the idea of the natural, unspoilt assets of the area, of which there are plenty.
However, in order for this to be achieved, facilities needed to be put in place or
developed further, including accommodation, road development and recreational
amenities. In a sense then, the government was facilitating the growth of the industry
in  the  Highlands  in  attempting  to  develop  Aviemore,  rather  than  prescribing
industries for the area.
323 The Aviemore development further differs from the other
case studies in the sense that whilst it was a governmental proposition and backed by
governmental money and expertise, it was portrayed as a private venture from the
outset so as not to be seen as an imposition on the area from London or Edinburgh. In
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doing this the logic was that if a high-profile private development was taking place in
the area then others would be more inclined to follow. The government was keen to
give  the  impression  that  the  Highlands  could  be  an  attractive  area  for  certain
industries to locate in of their own accord; specifically industries such as paper,
forestry, aluminium (to take advantage of the Hydro power available) and leisure
facilities. If necessary, and it more often than not was, government was prepared to
offer incentives to industries looking to locate in the Highlands, as well as to put
pressure on certain industries to locate there (the Invergordon smelter and Dounreay
reactor are both examples of this). Aviemore is another such example. Building grants
were offered for hotel and other leisure facility construction and discussions took
place at Cabinet level on how best to help the area and project move forward. Various
government  agencies,  Hugh  Fraser,  Scottish  &  Newcastle  Brewers,  Tennents
Caledonian Brewers, the Scottish Tourist Board, the Scottish Council (Development
and Industry) and a great many other organisations all worked together on making the
project a success. The ultimate aim of these relationships was to make Aviemore a
viable and attractive alternative to the continental European ski resorts for winter
tourists,  thus  improving  the  tourist  revenue  in  the  area  and  providing  both
employment (albeit not in less numbers as the other developments) and self-sufficient
growth. It would now be useful, by way of providing some context for discussion of
the Aviemore development, to detail briefly the development of post-war tourism in
Scotland and the Highlands.
Background to post-war tourism in Scotland and the Highlands
Between 1938 and 1958 the tourist industry’s earnings in Scotland roughly
doubled in size to about £50m.
324 Between 1950 and 1959 the numbers of visitors to
the country increased from 2.7m to over 5m. Of note in these figures is that of the 5m
visitors to the country, over 3.5m of them came from other parts of Great Britain and
fewer than 1m were from abroad, meaning the tourist industry was very much home-
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based as opposed to cosmopolitan.
325 The tourist industry’s growth was directly
linked with increasing prosperity and leisure in the UK more generally.
326 The
intention of the Aviemore development was thus to take advantage of this and build
on it. The problem in the Highlands was that most hotels were limited in size and
were fully booked in the season with visitors from the UK. As a result, hoteliers had
no reason to look abroad for further custom. Further, they had no interest in paying
the commission necessary to travel agents who would not do business if they were
unable to reserve space in these hotels in advance and were not receiving their
commission. The result of this was that the overseas tourist trade in Scotland during
this period was largely confined to Turnberry, Gleneagles and Edinburgh meaning it
was not making as much of a contribution to the national economy as the government
would have liked.
327 As can be seen from Figure 3.1 below, the Highlands was not
best served with hotel accommodation:
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Figure 3.1 Hotel accommodation in Scotland, 1957
Source: O’Dell, AC & Walton, K, The Highlands and Islands of Scotland, (Thomas
Nelson & Sons, Edinburgh, 1963), pg. 236.
As Figure 3.1 illustrates, the majority of hotel accommodation in Scotland was
situated south of the Highlands. For tourism to play any real part in the revival of the
Highlands  would  necessitate  an  increase  in  hotel  accommodation  in  the  area.125
Moreover, it would also involve an improvement in existing facilities. Aviemore was
intended to go some way to achieving both of these aims in order to take advantage of
the increasing tourist spending in the country, in particular from ‘dollar tourists’,
based on providing hotel and conference facilities and easy access to winter sports in
one integrated development. In 1959 alone, the overseas expenditure in Scotland was
£14.4m (with £7.29m from the dollar area). It was believed in the Scottish Office that
this number could be increased with a higher rate of capital investment in the industry
on the part of government.
328 The development of improved facilities at Aviemore,
coming only a few years after the installation of a permanent ski lift at Glencoe and
ski tows at Ben Lawers, Glen Clunie and Glenshee in the 1950s
329, was further
demonstration of the realisation of the potential for tourism as an industry of
substance in the Highlands that could also contribute to the UK national economy, as
well as diversifying the tourist centres in Scotland away from the central belt. The
intention was to go some way towards helping establish Scotland, and in particular
the Highlands, as a destination for both foreign and domestic tourists. The explosion
in visitors to Britain after the Second World War helped the industry highlight the
potential for tourism to create employment and wealth.
330 The theory was that if mass
tourism could be harnessed and brought to the Highlands then economic development
could be achieved with very little outlay other than on facilities.
The  creation  of  the  Scottish  Tourist  Board  in  1946  as  an  independent
commercial enterprise operating outwith governmental control was a clear indication
that tourism was beginning to achieve recognition in Scotland as an industry in itself,
although perhaps not necessarily in the eyes of the government. The new Scottish
Tourist Board was a voluntary body, financed by subscriptions from commercial
tourist concerns and donations from local authorities, who’s remit was to promote
Scotland as a desirable tourist centre home and abroad using information pamphlets,
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books and advertising.
331 It was not until 1959 that government recognised the
potential of tourism and the new body’s work, bringing it under its own auspices and
funding it to the tune of £15,000 per annum for the period 1959-61, which was spent
on administering development schemes in the Highlands.
332 This was not without
problems however. In a move that was to characterise subsequent relations between
the service industry and the governmental agencies charged with planning and
administering tourism in Scotland in the post-war period, the Exchequer suggested in
the draft Countryside (Scotland) Bill of 1961 that it would be prepared to offer
financial assistance to projects that were intended to conserve or enhance rural
facilities in Scotland, but with the introduction of an advisory council (another tier of
management) to administer such funding. The local authorities did not agree and
vetoed the idea, preferring instead to deal with the Secretary of State directly and
were afraid of the power that the new advisory council might be given. As a result the
bill never saw the light of day.
333
Following  local  authorities’  refusal  to  accept  this  funding  from  the
government, the Secretary of State for Scotland, Michael Noble, again tried in 1963
to introduce a new bill, entitled the Countryside and Tourist Amenities (Scotland) Bill
that contained provisions for the creation of a Scottish Tourist Fund (STF) and
Scottish Tourist Amenities Council (STAC) that would administer the new fund.
Again the new proposals were met with opposition, but this time from the British
Hotels and Restaurants Association (BHRA). The problem with the proposed new bill
for the BHRA was that the new bill contained a clause that provided for a levy to be
imposed on the nation’s hotel industry in order to fully subsidise the new fund. When
it became clear that the BHRA was in no way prepared to pay for the new fund, the
options for creating these new structures became severely limited. The government
was not prepared to pay for the new fund as it saw tourism simply as a means to help
solve its balance of payments problem and was not prepared to contribute money
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towards it that could be used for other purposes.
334 This was an unfortunate set of
circumstances as the new bill contained a number of proposals that would have
provided local authorities in Scotland with the ability to preserve and enhance the
natural beauty of their areas and to advertise the facilities within these areas. This
would have been achieved through the awarding of loans and grants from the new
fund through the new council for the repair, improvement or provision of tourist
facilities in Scotland. However, the hotel industry disagreed and the government was
not prepared to contribute further funds. Further, the local authorities were against the
creation of a new intermediate tier (the STF and STAC) with responsibility for
amenities as, again, they felt it would interpose between themselves and the Secretary
of State. As Feggans writes, ‘Thus, in spite of the emerging appreciation of the need
to plan for tourism, no comprehensive machinery had yet been produced to this
end.’
335 It was against this backdrop that the hotel developments in Aviemore and the
Cairngorms were to take shape.
Planning Aviemore and the Cairngorms
Jack Maclay, the Secretary of State for Scotland, agreed in July 1958 that
Scottish officials should review Highland policy in view of a forthcoming ministerial
discussion concerning a White Paper on its future intentions. The original plan was to
push for improvements to the area’s physical infrastructure in the form of roads,
ferries, harbours and piers to improve communications
336, but also, crucially to this
story,  to  attract  more  tourists.  In  light  of  this  suggestion,  the  under-secretary
responsible for regional policy in the Scottish Office, Ronald Johnson, wrote:
I think we must continually keep in view that the object must be not simply to
attract more holiday-makers to the Highlands but to secure that more persons
are employed in the Highlands in entertaining visitors and preparing for their
reception.  That  is  why  I  am  cautious,  or  even  sceptical,  about  road
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improvements in the tourist interest alone. It would be possible for hundreds of
parties to travel thousands of miles in the Highlands, carrying their own tents
and tinned food, buying only a few Cairngorm brooches made in Birmingham
and providing employment for county roadmen and garbage collectors. To
create more employment in the tourist industry no doubt requires capital, and in
this it may be necessary for the Government to help; I think it also needs
ingenuity in finding means of involving the Highlander in the entertainment of
visitors, and this seems to call for increased activities by local associations.
337
Johnson’s view demonstrates the difficulties facing Scottish officials in their
attempts at developing the Highlands. Limited by statute, any funding provided for
the improvement of infrastructure in the Highlands by the Treasury was to be linked
to direct job creation (a point which would concern further attempts at getting the
Treasury to release more money to the project later in the period). Infrastructural
development would provide only impermanent job creation in most cases, specifically
in  the  construction  of  the  improvements.  Johnson’s  concern  was  to  ensure
employment in the Highlands in the longer term. In this sense, his point about
involving Highlanders in the entertainment of visitors was a precursor to the creation
of the Aviemore development. Building roads for people to get to the Highlands, he
argued, was all fair and well, but the key was to keep people there and have them use
services  provided  that  created  jobs  for  the  local  population.  The  Aviemore
development, if successful, would ensure this was the case. Johnson continued:
If it is agreed after further discussions that, over and above the improvement of
roads, water and so on, more must be done to make the Highlands a more
hospitable  place,  or,  if  you  prefer,  a  place  where  the  tourist  has  more
opportunities for buying services and local produce, it may be decided that the
Secretary of State will have to put funds into this too.
338
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Johnson’s ideas were met with some favour amongst Scottish ministers and the Prime
Minister. Maclay wrote to the Chancellor of the Exchequer about the matter, stating
‘The Highlands could have a great attraction for dollar visitors and the improvement
of facilities for the reception of tourists in the North and West of Scotland is closely
connected  with  the  general  enquiry  that  David  Eccles  has  in  hand  into  the
development of the tourist trade, especially with America.’
339 The kind of approach to
the Treasury shown in Maclay’s letter characterises how much of the development in
the Highlands and in particular the other case studies proceeded - any attempt at
procuring funds for development in the area was couched in the UK national context
and  would  be  claimed  to  be  of  immediate,  or  near  immediate,  effect.  Thus,
infrastructural improvements were of secondary concern as the belief was that the
likelihood of securing financial support for them was slim - job creation took
precedence. This would contribute in no small way to the problems the other three
developments with which this thesis is concerned had in attempting to become growth
centres.  Johnson’s  argument  predated  the  Toothill  report,  but  is  crucial  in
understanding  the  attitude  of  the  Scottish  Office  to  Highland  infrastructural
development and the failure of growth centre focused policy in the region.
During a Cabinet meeting on Employment on 22
nd December 1958, there was
a discussion on the best course of action for alleviating unemployment. It was argued
that investment in reducing unemployment could not be increased, lest it provoke a
‘revival of inflationary pressure’ by committing the government to an investment
programme that could possibly exceed the savings available to finance it. As a result,
the argument was made that if Scotland was to receive any additional investment then
it would need to be offset by ‘corresponding reductions in England and Wales’. This
idea was met with disagreement however with the argument being made that a
‘relatively modest acceleration in the pace of development in the remoter areas of
Scotland (and Wales) would not of itself provoke a recurrence of inflationary
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pressures in the country at large.’
340 This was a strong argument that was met with
some agreement in the meeting. As a result, the Cabinet decided on an acceleration of
the programme of developing the basic infrastructure in the Highlands (principally
roads and water supplies) and agreed to explore the possibility of appointing a
‘prominent figure in Scottish public life’ to promote Highland development through
the development of tourist possibilities in the area. The Scottish Secretary was then
asked to circulate a memorandum on measures to popularise tourism in Scotland
around the various departments of the Scottish Office. The outcome of the meeting
was then the first real example of top-down direction of the development of the
tourist industry in the Highlands in the post-war period.
After the meeting, Maclay discussed with Macmillan what kind of person
would  be  suitable  for  the  project.  The  proposal  by  the  Scottish  Development
Department that Maclay presented to the Prime Minister suggested a committee to
oversee the development of the area, but Macmillan met this with some reluctance
primarily on the basis that he believed that ‘committees take the punch out of life.’
Macmillan prompted Maclay to ‘go for a man’
341, based on the success of a similar
policy he had pursued as Minister for Housing when he appointed Sir Percy Mills to
be a special advisor in accelerating the housing programme.
342 Macmillan’s belief was
that if the Highlands were to have a prosperous future then tourism not limited to just
upper class grouse shooters must play a role. In order for that to occur there was a
need to popularise sport all the while making the area more hospitable to more
visitors. As a grouse shooting landholder in the Highlands, Macmillan was amenable
to the idea that the Cairngorms could be developed whilst still retaining much of their
natural splendour, stemming from his doubts ‘that the great forests and grouse moors
can last much longer.’ Further, he made the point to Maclay that tourism should play
a wider role in the development of the Highlands and that building ‘simple but
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comfortable hotels for this class of people’ would help achieve this aim.
343 The class
of people - primarily the working and middle classes - was growing and experiencing
greater prosperity and could thus be harnessed for UK national gain and Highland
economic benefit; Aviemore was about encouragement of mass tourism.  Maclay had
already settled on the idea of a man and had been in discussion with Hugh Fraser,
suggesting his name to the Prime Minister as a possible candidate. Macmillan was
receptive to Maclay’s idea and the decision was taken to approach him. The idea was
to move the appeal of the Highlands from the grouse moors and shooting parties to a
wider, more sustainable and profitable audience. Not just individual day-trippers, but
tourists willing to stay longer and spend their money over a longer period. The theory
was that if this could be achieved then tourism could have a substantial role to play in
the regeneration of the area. There was little quantification of what this role would be,
but suffice to say tourism wasn’t viewed as a soft option although it was still
criticised. In early 1959, Sir David Eccles provided a parliamentary answer to a
question posed by Sir David Robertson MP for Dounreay stating that the best hope
for the North Highlands was tourism. He was met with Robertson’s response that it
was ‘the most pitiful [answer] I have ever heard from a Minister in this House’.
344
Robertson’s opinion of tourism demonstrates the low esteem in which the industry
was held as means to solving Highland problems. Having played a role in securing
Dounreay as the location for the first fast reactor, Robertson believed industrial
development should focus on heavy industry. Aviemore was not heavy industry, but a
relatively new approach to Highland development.  First of all however, a figurehead
was needed to drum up interest in the area.
Hugh  Fraser  was  a  high-profile  choice  with  impeccable  Scottish  Tory
credentials. Fraser was Chairman of the House of Fraser, owner of Harrods in
London, former Chairman and Honorary Treasurer of the Automobile Association
345,
member of the Scottish Tourist Board, Treasurer of the Conservative party in
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Scotland and a high-profile businessman. In short, he was exactly the kind of man
Macmillan and Maclay had in mind. Only, according to George Pottinger, he didn’t
have any experience of the tourist industry or developing it, save for his membership
of the Scottish Tourist Board and the fact he had owned hotels at various times.
346
Quite what experience Pottinger believed was necessary he didn’t make clear. Fraser
had previously rebuffed the Scottish Tourist Board’s approach to head a scheme
aimed at developing tourism in the Highlands. He believed it to be inappropriate for
him to be head the scheme and was unprepared to serve in a committee under the
management  of  the  Scottish  Tourist  Board’s  then  manager,  WA  Nicholson  (a
condition he later made as  part of  his  acceptance of  the government's second
approach).
347 Moreover, Fraser was ‘appalled at [the thought of] being made
responsible for a series of Highland flings.’
348 However, during a meeting with an
official from the Scottish Home Department, after a request from Maclay, Fraser was
presented with a more detailed and ambitious set of plans for the tourism industry in
the Highlands that he met with more favour, promising to give them his ‘earnest
consideration’ on holiday.
349 Upon further pressure exerted by the Earl of Roseberry,
the then chairman of the Scottish Tourist Board, Fraser eventually agreed to the
proposition of heading a committee that was to promote the tourist industry in the
Highland area. Fraser’s position was referred to as a ‘gauleiter’
350 - a reference to the
expectation that he would be the keystone of the project and would oversee the many
different facets of the developments.
The plans presented to Fraser were based on Scottish Office conclusions that
the problems faced by the tourist industry in the Highlands could be separated into
three headings: communications, accommodation and organisation. The plans stated
that the issue of organisation had two problems; the need to encourage people to
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provide and improve accommodation - through for example private houses - and the
need to ensure that those arriving in the Highlands would have their ‘recreation
readily available’, calling for ‘the education of the local people in what tourists have a
right to expect and the organisation to provide it.’
351 Officials also identified the
common difficulty of a lack of risk capital for both issues of communications and
accommodation. This was based on the evidence that neither offered a sufficient
return on the outlay necessary for them to be attractive to potential investors. The
problem then was how to attract these investors. One avenue proposed by Scottish
officials was through the Board of Trade. However, Scottish officials believed that
the Board of Trade was likely to limit its interest to dollar earning tourists, thus
excluding the Highlands
352 (based on the earlier point about the majority of overseas
tourists coming to Scotland going to the Central Belt region). As a result, they found
themselves in a Catch-22 situation - Board of Trade help probably wouldn’t be
forthcoming until the Highlands was attracting dollar area tourists, but there was no
provision for it to do so without further help unless an alternative could be found. If
the Scottish Office could convince the Board of Trade of the merits of the scheme and
its benefit to the UK national economic situation then it would have a chance of
securing funding - if the scheme had a high-profile businessman heading it up and
extolling its virtues, then all the better. Thus, Fraser became the obvious way forward,
as well as the cheapest given that he was not paid for his endeavours. Further,
utilising Fraser’s expertise satisfied the desire on the part of government not to be
seen as imposing anything on the area, a point stressed time and again in discussions
between officials and ministers.
353 The plan then was for Fraser to present the plans as
his ‘own’ and to lead development of the industry as a result, with some Scottish
Office backing.
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Fraser’s first reading of the plans led him to conclude that they promised ‘too
much too soon’
354, prompting him to revise them slightly, making them promise less,
before their presentation to the media. Concurrently, Fraser created the Highland
Tourist Development Company Ltd. in October 1959 to enact the plans with the
company's remit as following:
Clause III.
1.  To promote the well-being and develop the resources of, and in particular
to assist and encourage the tourist industry in, the Highlands of Scotland.
2.  To  assist  and  encourage  in  the  Highlands  of  Scotland  or  elsewhere
throughout the establishment, carrying on and development of trades and
businesses of all kinds which in the opinion of the Directors are calculated
directly or indirectly to further the object set out in Clause III 1 hereof and
to assist and encourage all persons, firms, companies and others engaged
or proposing to engage therein.
3. To  carry  on  any  business  or  businesses  (whether  manufacturing  or
otherwise) in the Highlands of Scotland or elsewhere throughout the world
which may seem to the Company capable of being conveniently carried on
in the object set out in Clause III 1 hereof or in the opinion of the
Directors calculated directly or indirectly to benefit the Company or
enhance the value of or render profitable any of the property or rights of
the Company.
355
Five Scottish banks - The Royal Bank of Scotland, Bank of Scotland, The British
Linen Bank, National Commercial Bank of Scotland Limited and Clydesdale & North
of Scotland Bank Limited - backed Fraser’s new company with plans for a modest
hotel expansion in the Highlands. Fraser was chairman of the new company, with the
other directors being Sir William McEwen-Younger (who was Chairman of the
Scottish  Conservative  Party),  Mr  WRC  Elliot,  Managing  Director  of  United
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Caledonian Breweries and Mr AW Hardie of Shell and BP Scotland Ltd.
356 Further,
£100,000 worth of shares were issued
357, of which Fraser’s own company, House of
Fraser, took up a third.
358 The creation of the company was part of Fraser’s plan for
developing tourism in the Highlands as well as demonstration of his own commitment
to the project. Fraser’s rationale behind this was twofold - he believed there was
potential for growth in the area that as a businessman he could benefit from, as well
as believing that if he was seen to be committed to the area then others would see the
potential as well, helping the area develop further. Fraser’s company was able to
administer loans up to twice the company’s share value, backed by the banks, in two
areas - Badenoch and Bonar Bridge. In making these facilities available Fraser was
effectively investing in the creation of confidence in the area amongst the business
community. There was no discussion of what Fraser stood to gain from the venture,
nor  was  there  any  discussion  of  a  possible  conflict  of  interest  between  his
government-sponsored position and the setting up of the company. By and large, the
Scottish Office was just grateful to have him on board for its project. Turning this
kind of blind eye would later lead to one of the biggest Scottish political scandals in
the twentieth century.
Several  months  before  Fraser  set  up  his  company,  the  Scottish  Office
seconded to his service an up and coming civil servant to help him with his project to
improve the tourist industry in the Highlands. The civil servant appointed, George
Pottinger, would later go on to become Fraser’s official biographer. Perhaps more
famously however, he would also go on to be jailed for a corruption scandal with the
lead architect in the Aviemore project.
359 Pottinger was the assistant secretary for the
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local government division. However, he was considered to be of insufficient seniority
for the task by Fraser (as well as Pottinger who was not keen on the placement lest it
affect his future chances of progress in the civil service) so was eventually promoted
to under-secretary as part of his secondment.
360 Once promoted, Pottinger was tasked
with helping Fraser come up with a plan of action for the area. As a result, activity in
relation to the development of the area began to increase and intensify.
Pottinger and Fraser worked together on plans for developing tourist facilities
in the Highlands, with Fraser visiting St Moritz in Switzerland to familiarise himself
with a successful ski resort and its operation.
361 As a result of his visit, Fraser
identified the kurtax or taxe de séjour in operation in St Moritz as a potential policy
for the development of facilities in the Highlands for tourism (ice rinks, cafes, après
ski restaurants, entertainment programmes etc). The kurtax or taxe de séjour was a
levy imposed in many Continental countries, but the Swiss model in particular caught
Fraser’s eye. In Switzerland, the levy was charged on each bed that was occupied in
hotels in the region depending on the class of the hotel each night. The local
Kurverein fixed the rates and all monies collected were spent within the region.
Fraser’s study of St Moritz saw him come to the conclusion that a similar system
could work in the Highlands. The kurtax in St Moritz was charged at a level varying
from 1s. 9d. to around 2s. 9d per bed per night; raising around £60,000 and £80,000
per annum.
362 Fraser felt a self-raised sum such as this would prove useful in
supporting the tourist industry in the Highlands, especially given that at this point the
government was contributing substantially less than this each year to the tourist
industry as a whole in Scotland. Further, the kind of facilities envisioned by Fraser
were not immediately attractive to entrepreneurs as they would not be commercially
viable until people started to come to the area, thus it would be necessary to find a
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way of financing their creation in another fashion. The idea of taxing tourists was one
such way. At no juncture did it appear to occur to him that tourists perhaps wouldn’t
be so keen to pay such a tax.
Fraser’s sojourn to St Moritz yielded more than a simple ‘tourist-tax’ idea, it
also played some role in his eventual production of the ‘Fraser Plan’ covered by the
Scottish media and viewed positively within government. Fraser’s plan was put
forward in a very general sense - he believed that general facilities should be
improved, more specifically sports facilities, accommodation and service standards;
that two pilot schemes enacting these ideas should begin in the Badenoch area and
south-east Caithness and finally that the government should provide the finance and
some of the personnel needed to administer the plan for the first three years in the
form of administrative staff and loans.
363 With his business contacts and expertise he
was  able  to  drum  up  some  backing  for  the  idea  (including  the  important
aforementioned  pledges  of  financial  support  of  the  banks).  Fraser’s  plan  was
discussed extensively and received further support from the Minister of State for
Scotland, Lord Craigton, as well as Maclay. At a Cabinet Committee on Tourism
meeting, Craigton presented Fraser’s proposals for the establishment of a Tourist
(Scotland) Fund. Fraser proposed that government present a Bill to be passed calling
for the registration and inspection of Scottish hotels and boarding houses; and for
contributions by hoteliers in Scotland to a fund from which developments in the
tourist  industry  would  be  financed
364 (based on the  taxe de séjour/kurtax  in
Switzerland). By this point the government had already committed to spending
£15,000 per year in grant form to the STB, to be spent in administering the Scottish
Tourist Board’s campaign under Fraser. The Cabinet committee concerned was
uneasy in particular with tourism in the context of dollar saving. As a result, Fraser
made it clear that his proposals were to the benefit of the tourist industry as a whole
in the UK and Scotland and not just the Highlands, concluding that ‘the more we can
attract tourists generally the more foreign tourists we will get; furthermore, with the
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funds made available, a direct effort could be made to bring accommodation to
Scottish hotels, and local amenities generally, up to the standards expected by tourists
from abroad, especially Americans.’
365 Dollar-tourists were very much at the forefront
of government thinking in developing the tourist industry. The ability to earn dollars
was a boon to the tourist industry and to its chances of receiving governmental
financial support. Indeed, the need and desire for increased dollar revenues played a
definitive role in the construction of the Aviemore project with Fraser’s proposals to
the Cabinet, backed up by Scottish Office statistics, stating ‘the need for capital
investment in the tourist industry in Scotland if it is to maintain its place against
competition from elsewhere and to make an increased contribution to our balance of
payments.’
366
In light of the recommendations made by Fraser to the government, the Scottish
Tourist Board drew up a memorandum stating the case for further governmental
support for the tourist industry that focused in part on the Highlands. Specifically, it
stated the case for government assistance as follows:
a)  The tourist industry in nearly all other countries receives some form of
Government help; apart from Continental precedents, the Government of Eire
has spent approximately £3m in developing their tourist industry with good
results;
b)  The foreign currency which tourism can earn makes it of national importance;
c)  Government expenditure on communications, which is essential for tourist
purpose, also serves the national interest;
d)  Tourism represents a combination of many industries, e.g. road and bridge
construction, building, the furniture and furnishing trade, and consumable and
licensed goods and services of all kinds. The benefits of a prosperous tourist
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industry would not be confined to one channel, but would permeate the whole
national economy.
e)  The Government has already agreed publicly that tourism can be one of the
main  elements  in  bringing  new  prosperity  to  areas  like  the  Highlands,
Galloway, etc.
367
The STB’s memorandum was designed to build on Fraser’s proposals and impart
further  pressure  on  government  to  agree  to  contribute  more  to  the  industry’s
development. Maclay supported the motivations behind the STB’s proposals, but felt
that a new scheme was needed. Moreover, the STB’s recommendations were very
similar to the discussions ongoing in the Scottish Home Department about how to
develop the industry anyway. Fraser’s plans on the other hand were welcomed, but it
was also recognised that in order for them to be implemented in any real form a single
location for the new development was needed. Lord Craigton, Minister of State, and
John Maclay as Secretary of State, met the following February after Fraser and the
STB’s  proposals  were  made  and  agreed  to  move  forward  with  the  respective
proposals. However, both were very keen that the government was not to be seen as
instigators in making the proposals happen, to the extent that they even minuted about
the notepaper, form of words and venue that should be used so as to avoid any
criticism over their role.
368
At this point the Scottish Council (Development and Industry) published the
Toothill Report, promoting a new regional policy in Scotland focused on growth
centres. The Aviemore plans were already well on the way however, but the ideas
were similar. In the Highlands, it was apparent that the Spey area and the Cairngorms
surrounding it was the most obvious choice for Fraser’s plans if any kind of financial
viability was to be maintained. The intention was to construct hotels and other tourist
facilities in one area. The Aviemore area was an obvious choice as a result of its
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winter sports potential (skiing for example) as well as its summer activities (rafting,
pony-trekking, walking and so on). The Cairngorm Winter Sports Development
Board had been in operation since 1957, focusing on attracting visitors to the area for
skiing activities. Indeed, the board had implemented the use of a chair lift on
Cairngorm from the end of December 1961 that had proved popular. The chair lift
transported skiers a distance of 1000 yards up 1000ft of elevation from 2500ft up to
3500ft up
369, taking them to the previously inaccessible snowfields on the mountain
range and extending the ski season as a result. With the summer and its warmer
climes approaching, snow would lie further up the mountains meaning a chair lift
would  help  with  access  to  it.  The  inclement  weather  was  unpredictable  so
guaranteeing access to available snowfields for skiers was an important part in
ensuring the attraction of the area to visitors. Further, the chair lift would not be
operable in high winds due to dangers present to skiers taking the lift, whereas a ski
tow would be.
370 The board’s formation as a non-profit distributing company was with
the intention of establishing and developing ‘as a National Winter Sports Area the
Cairngorms and the adjoining districts of Strathspey and Badenoch.’ It was comprised
of 51 members, predominantly local, and was financed by subscriptions, loans
guaranteed by local hoteliers and grants totalling £9000 (around 9% of total funds)
from the Scottish Education Department under the Physical Training and Recreation
Acts 1938-47.
371 The board’s activities in building these tourist facilities had laid the
foundations for the further development of the areas as well as demonstrating an
impressive local attitude towards bringing prosperity to the area through its own
means. Moreover, it was a clear indication to the government that something could be
done in the area with regard to tourist development and bringing growth to the
Highlands. The area was already attracting visitors and this could provide a platform
for government and the Fraser consortium to build upon; it had helped the existing
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hotels and accommodation situation by providing extra incentives for visitors to come
to the area over a longer timeframe and ensured a greater degree of permanence in
terms of employment in what was still considered by and large as a seasonal industry.
In short, the Aviemore and Cairngorms area was a growth centre of sorts already, but
in  need  of  further  development,  in  accommodation  and  facilities,  or  as  the
government termed it, amenity, to cement its position.
Developing the area was at first a question of local authority support, as in the
other case studies, as planning responsibilities were under the auspices of the local
councils. However, it was also about improving existing facilities. The county
council, Inverness, was very much in favour of developing the tourist potential of the
area, having already contributed towards the construction of the first chair lift in the
Cairngorms as well as constructing a three mile road to give access to the project and
a car park, paid for in part by donations of £500 from local businessmen
372 and
supported the government’s plans for the area. An application from the Cairngorm
Winter Sports Development Board to the Board of Trade to develop further its ski lift
provision through the Local Employment Act (a result of Treasury advice
373 and with
Lord Craigton’s support
374) was rejected on the basis that the money applied for,
£147,000
375, was to be spent on constructing further lifts and improving provisions,
resulting in very little direct job creation (fewer than a dozen).
376 As a result, the
Board of Trade felt the cost per job was too high to justify awarding a grant on this
premise. The Cairngorm board’s non-profit status and the fact its assets were built
irretrievably into the mountains meant it held little or no appeal for private backing
also. Without an increase in the existing number of chair lifts and tow bars, as well as
usable snowfields, the area would be in danger of losing its appeal to skiers. Queues
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were  becoming  more  commonplace  and  the  lack  of  facilities  becoming  more
problematic as the number visiting increased. Craigton in particular was concerned
with this, as it would jeopardise Fraser’s project if people lost interest in the area and
the idea of a ‘winter playground.’
Iain  Duncan  of  the  Scottish  Development  Department  wrote  to  the
Development Commission after the Board of Trade’s decision stating:
There has been a very considerable multiplier effect on employment in the
service trades within the area extending 20 miles or so west, north and east of
the actual skiing slopes. More than this, I think the whole project has awakened
many people to the very large tourist potential in the Highlands which properly
developed, could go a long way towards arresting depopulation and creating
‘anchorage points’… Our immediate problem is to maintain the impetus which
the Board’s initial success has given to tourism in the Aviemore area and the
Highlands generally. We feel that this project stands in the same relation to
Highland tourism as the [Fort William] pulp mill does to Highland industry. It
has the full support of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on the Highland
and Islands. We are very conscious that an application such as is proposed is
quite out of the ordinary run, but we do feel that the future of this rural area -
the largest ‘town’ is Grantown-on-Spey with a population of 1541! - is likely to
depend more on the creation of an all-round the year tourist trade by developing
its winter sports potential to supplement its well-known attractions for summer
visitors than on pipe dreams of factory chimneys.
377
Duncan’s view was very much ensconced in the Scottish Office’s then attitude
towards  Highland  development  -  developing  ‘anchorage  points’  was  crucial  if
depopulation was to be halted and employment issues addressed within a framework
of wider Highland development. Whitehall’s input into this was marginal - the Scots
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would approach London with plans in place and seek to secure financial support for
them, as was the case for the other developments discussed, although Whitehall’s
response to the Aviemore project was sceptical in terms of the cost per job figures
quoted. Duncan’s assertion of ‘the very large tourist potential in the Highlands’ has
been borne out. Thus, whilst he may have been indulging in rhetoric, it would seem
that it was more a case of genuine belief in the merits of the project. This wasn’t a
public pronouncement but a letter between departments - any hyperbolic rhetoric
would have been dealt with in the immediate response to the letter or tempered in
further discussions. As it was, it wasn’t. The case Duncan put forward was built on
and pursued with some vigour.
Aviemore  was  considered  as  a  potential  growth  centre  but  not  in  the
conventional sense of the phrase in that it did not have a large pool of population and
therefore potential labour force, but it did have potential as a growth centre, or as
Duncan calls it an ‘anchorage point’, in developing its tourist potential. The Secretary
of State’s Highlands and Islands Advisory Panel had identified the area on the back of
its chairlift and ancillary projects as ‘one of the selected growing points for tourist
development’ in Scotland.
378 Lochaber, Caithness and Moray Firth however were the
main centres of population in the Highlands during this period and were later
identified by the Highlands and Islands Development Board as being ripe for (heavy)
industrial development. The Scottish Office was very much focused on developing
industry in the Highlands specific to the needs and potentialities of certain areas.
Aviemore wasn’t suitable for heavy industrial development, but was certainly suitable
for tourist development. Thus, whilst it wasn’t on par with Corpach for example, in
terms  of  providing  large-scale  employment,  its  predicted  effect  on  industrial
expansion in the area makes it a worthwhile comparison for the purposes of this
thesis. Both projects were believed to have the potential for acting as a boon to their
respective industries at local and national levels as well as attracting other industries
to the area in which they were located.
                                                
378 Glasgow Herald, 19/03/1963, page unknown, NAS SEP12/281.144
The failure of the board’s application brought with it dismay not just within
government, but also in other circles. The Earl of Roseberry wrote to the Secretary of
State, Michael Noble, expressing the disappointment of the Scottish Tourist Board at
the Cairngorm board’s failure to win support from the Board of Trade, pointing out
that ‘We feel that the proposals for an extension of the chairlift and for the provision
of a major town in Coire Cas are immediate essentials in the development of this area
and the refusal of support by the Board of Trade Advisory Committee could be a
major setback to one of the outstanding developments in Highland tourism.’
379 The
Glasgow Herald accused the government of a ‘lack of vision’ and argued that the
‘vision of a proper winter sports centre in Scotland is in danger of vanishing as
rapidly as the snow on the hills for the sake of no more that £150,000.’
380 The
subsequent  press  attention  on  the  failure  of  the  Cairngorm  Winter  Sports
Development Board’s application did little to dissuade Hugh Fraser of the area’s
potential however. Undaunted by the negative reporting by The Glasgow Herald and
apparent lack of support from London, Fraser had continued to pursue his belief in
the development potential of the area. His original plan for the Highlands had been
accepted by government, secured by the approval of the House of Commons as a
result of a motion by Ian McArthur MP for Perth and East Perthshire.
381 Fraser’s plan
had also gained cross-party support from Labour and Conservative MPs who formed
a voluntary committee that visited the Highlands and came out in favour of his plan
for a levy. However, as welcome as Fraser’s plan was made to be in Cabinet, the idea
of a levy was met with some resistance in other quarters. The new Conservative
Secretary of State, Michael Noble, had managed to persuade the Treasury to back the
proposal for the levy in spite of its opposition to hypothecating taxation for a
specified purpose (the proceeds of the tax were to be spent on providing facilities or
amenities that were not likely to be provided commercially), by pointing out the
precedent set by the betting levy. When the plans were made public he faced
opposition, perhaps unsurprisingly, from hoteliers but more surprisingly from The
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National Trust who were irked at their proposal for a countryside commission to be
set up not being included in the new bill, the aforementioned Countryside and Tourist
Amenities (Scotland) Bill.
382 The Scottish Tourist Board were concerned at their own
position being arrogated by the council that would be implemented to administer the
levy  and  the  British  Hotels  and  Restaurants  Association  were  resentful  at  the
possibility of a similar Bill being enacted in England and Wales. As a result of the
public criticism of the Bill and the possibility of an early election Noble was
prompted to announce on February 19
th 1964 that the bill would not proceed in its
present  form,  effectively  abandoning  the  scheme.
383 According to Pottinger,
descriptions of the levy as a ‘tax on sunshine’ ‘milching the tourists’ and ‘a tax to
keep people away from Scotland’ did little to help Noble’s cause.
384 One important
part of Fraser’s plan however remained intact - the desire to initiate his plans into
‘bricks and mortar’ where ‘the best guarantee of continuing success is a rapid and if
possible spectacular development in one or two areas which other parts of the
Highlands will be eager to emulate.’
385
The Scottish St Moritz
Between July 1959 and October 1962, Fraser and Pottinger had scoured the
Highlands for a suitable location for their tourist development plan before submitting
their intentions to the Scottish Tourist Board and the Secretary of State at the end of
1962. The acceptance of Fraser’s plan to construct somewhere where all the needs of
a holidaymaker would be met at one place led to the Aviemore site with its requisite
characteristics  -  proximity  to  transport  routes,  mountainous  areas  and  other
countryside access. Fraser’s plan had noted the lack of hotel accommodation as well
as the dearth of evening entertainment for visitors in the Highlands and his Highland
Tourist Company was intended to facilitate the growth of such facilities. However,
Fraser and others in government believed the area needed a shot in the arm in the
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form  of  a  bespoke  development  that  could  crystallise  the  ambitions  held  for
developing the tourist industry in the Highlands and act as a showcase to others.
Aviemore, with its transport links through the A9 trunk road and the railway line
north,  satisfied  one  important  component  of  the  requirements  for  the  new
development and the tourist traffic enjoyed by the Badenoch and Strathspey region
led Fraser to conclude it was the most suitable area for such a project. Having decided
on a site he then began to pursue other potential investors in the development. In
order to achieve this Fraser formed another company Highland Tourist (Cairngorm
Development) Ltd. to administer the project in 1964. The new company retained the
same directors as the old company, but changed its focus from Highland-wide
development to the Cairngorm area only.
386 The new company was to build and
operate the entertainment facilities around which the new hotels were to be built.
Also, it would be responsible for buying and then leasing the ground to the companies
that were to operate the hotels. By the time Pottinger left secondment Fraser had not
secured any other support but remained undaunted by the task ahead. Fraser was
rebuffed in his approach to Grand Metro Hotels, owners of the Washington Hotel in
London, to operate in his planned development. They wrote to Pottinger (who
although no longer on secondment to Fraser was still very much involved in the
project and whose advice was sought by officials in the Scottish Office on many
matters pertaining to Aviemore and its development
387) in response to his enquiry
about their interest in operating a hotel in the development stating:
This has been given very careful consideration and although the scheme itself
appears reasonable with no obvious disadvantages, my co-directors and I are
unable to envisage a great skiing resort ever being successful in Scotland which
can never have the lure of an established continental resort.
388
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The most obvious established continental resort was of course St Moritz; as it was,
establishing the ‘Scottish St Moritz’ was proving more difficult than had been
imagined with businessmen in the tourist trade such as Joseph of the Washington
Hotel making it clear that he did not hold much hope for the project.
 Fraser’s plan, announced in the Savoy Hotel in London to the press on the 9
th
June 1964, was for the Aviemore centre to comprise of up to ten hotels, an ‘amenity
complex’ that would house a heated swimming pool, skating and curling rinks, an all-
purpose hall for use as a cinema or conference centre, shopping facilities and a golf
driving range.
389 It was to look like the following:
Figure 3.2 Model of the Aviemore development
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Source: UGD/HF101/2/2, JGL Poulson (architect) photograph of model for Aviemore
Centre, 05/06/1964.
John  Poulson  was  to  be  the  architect of  the  new  development, chosen  on  the
recommendation of the managing director of the Bovis construction firm - their
managing director insisted that Poulson was the only architect with the ‘vision’ and
technical ability to work on the project.
390 The building at the top of the picture was to
be the Strathspey Hotel - one of the so-called landmark developments (for landmark
read high-rise) intended to showcase the new development, to be operated by Scottish
& Newcastle Breweries. The centre of the image shows the all-purpose conference
hall/cinema and the leisure and shopping facilities envisaged by Fraser with the
surrounding buildings making up the remaining hotel chalet space planned. The
building at the bottom right of the image was to be the Badenoch Hotel, to be
operated by Tennents Caledonian, and the road and railway links can be located at the
very top of the picture. At this point the development was estimated to cost £3.5m
and was to be built in phases. The first phase of the development was to include three
hotels and most of the amenity complex. By the time of Fraser’s announcement,
Scottish  &  Newcastle  Breweries  and  United  Caledonian  Breweries  had  firmly
committed to the project, whilst talks were ongoing with British Transport Hotels for
operating the third hotel. Pottinger believed that the best way to pursue Highland
tourist development in relation to the project was ‘to attract one of the largest
organisations such as the Hilton’
391 to site their operations in the Highlands. British
Transport Hotels was certainly one such organisation, but by no means the only
company Fraser pursued as he was also actively holding talks with both the Sheraton
and Hilton hotel groups at the same time.
392
The interest in having British Transport Hotels on board came from its
dominant position in the Scottish tourist industry and the role it could play in
‘leading’ Scottish hoteliers to Aviemore and the project. It owned the largest hotels in
                                                
390 Levitt, I, ‘’Too deeply committed’’, pg. 41.
391 Letter from Pottinger to Law, Department Agriculture and Fisheries Scotland, 14/01/1963, NAS
SEP12/519.
392 Letter from Pottinger to Law, DAFS, 14/01/1963, NAS SEP 12/238.149
Scotland at the time
393, including the North British and Caledonian in Edinburgh and
Gleneagles and its obvious linkages with the railways (its parent was the Railways
Board) meant it was a very attractive prospective partner for attracting tourists from
the south. Further, as the nationalised element in the tourist industry it was felt
important in Scottish circles that the group should be involved in the venture as a
show of faith. In more cynical terms, the potential threat of rail closures in the
Highlands under Beeching’s recommendations was seen as something which could be
turned to British Rail’s advantage if it recommended that its hotels arm take part in
the Aviemore project, helping to improve its public image in Scotland.
394 Thus,
British Transport Hotels was seen as a key component in the development.
Fraser’s announcement to the press was met with a very positive reaction on
most sides. In Scotland the Glasgow Herald described it as a ‘bold plan’
395, at the UK
level The Guardian said it was ‘ambitious’
396 and The Daily Telegraph described the
project as ‘winter sports on a scale not previously known in Britain’.
397 The Glasgow
Herald’s  article  ‘Highland  Fling’  was  particularly  supportive  of  the  venture,
describing it as the ‘greatest tourist advance since Victoria and Albert fell in love with
Balmoral.’ It went further, arguing that:
…there can be no disputing the contribution which investment on this scale
makes to the general welfare of the Highlands. There are now two great growth
points - and prosperity points - far beyond the Highland line. In the West the
Fort  William  pulp  mill  provides  one  of  Scotland’s  biggest  industrial
developments.  Now  Speyside  is  surging  ahead…  the  repopulation  of  the
Highlands is no longer an idle dream…
398
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The Glasgow Herald article was correct in its assertion that the Aviemore project was
an important step for the Highlands, but it could also have mentioned the Dounreay
reactor project in Caithness given that it was employing more than the Aviemore
project and the Fort William project combined at this point in time. Also of note in
the press attention is the insistence that it was a private venture, supported by
government. Nowhere was it mentioned that the Scottish Office had had a guiding
hand in the creation of the idea or would play an active role in the realisation of, or
paying for, it. Fraser and his consortium were portrayed as the instigators and main
administrators of the project also. Each article on the new project made comparisons
with the continental resorts, making the point that the Aviemore project was to better
the facilities on offer abroad as well as acting as a means of attracting other similar
developments  all  over  the  Highlands.  One  such  development  was  the  Rank
Organisation’s project at Coylumbridge, approximately two miles east of Aviemore
and at the foot of the Cairngorms, which was being developed around the same time
as Fraser’s plan for Aviemore.
Colonel Iain Grant, a member of the Scottish Tourist Board as well as Nature
Conservancy, had owned the Coylumbridge-Rothiemurchus estate that was viewed as
a possible site for Fraser’s group. Grant had intended on selling part of his land for
tourist development to help the area. However, he was concerned at a loss of his
amenity (the view from his house in other words) in doing this and wanted sufficient
compensation for doing so. Fraser had been in negotiations with Grant for some time
until late 1963 when it transpired that Grant had also been in negotiations with the
Rank Organisation who were interested in locating a separate development from the
Aviemore project. Grant had been dragging his heels in his dealings with Fraser’s
consortium for purchase of his land for development, demanding a ‘really substantial
sum to compensate him for the loss of amenity, particularly if the development was at
the gate of his residence’ as well as limits on the size and scale of development.
Fraser’s consortium offered Grant £10,000 for between 40 and 60 acres of his land
(actual surveys hadn’t been carried out on the amount of land needed and indeed
suitable at this point), whereas Grant wanted £1000 per acre, or around £40,000 in all.151
The upshot of this was that Grant was effectively trying to hold the consortium to
ransom, threatening that ‘unless a really attractive offer was received he might prefer
not to allow the development proceed and thereby retain the amenity of his estate.
Alternatively, he had had some approaches from other possible developers.’
399 The
‘other possible developers’ were of course the Rank Organisation. Grant was playing
the two against each other in order to achieve the highest possible price. The end
result of this carry on was that Grant got the price he wanted from the Rank
Organisation after Fraser refused to match their bid, fearing that paying such a sum
would cripple the whole development.
400
Grant’s role and refusal to cooperate was to some degree foretold by an article
in the New Statesman entitled ‘The Highlands: The Devil Was A Tourist’ on 29
th
March 1963 that highlighted the difficulties the project and tourism in the Highlands
in general faced stating, ‘Attack by the landlords is more subtle. Found mainly in the
north-west and ‘Royal’ Deeside, it is obvious that lairds are anxious to frustrate the
work of the STB and the government’s SDD.’ The article also detailed the role of the
Free Church of Scotland (the Wee Frees) in its opposition to the project on religious
grounds, quoting one minister as saying:
Parties  of  young  people  go  to  the  Cairngorms  on  Sundays,  and  I  was
disappointed to hear that the Prince of Wales is one of them. When I mention
His Royal Highness I do not want to be misunderstood. I am a true lover of the
British throne and monarchy, but this is something higher which concerns a
Higher King and a Higher Authority and it is under peril that we interfere.
401
His father Prince Philip obviously wasn’t concerned about offending a Higher King
either when he came to open the new Coylumbridge Hotel on the 25
th November
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1965
402 and having a tour of the surrounding area, predating the Aviemore
development by a month. The point being here that development in the Highlands
wasn’t  always  just  a  case  of  satisfying  legal  requirements  and  persuading
government, there were other factors such as the embedded religious establishments
in the area (Invergordon had similar problems with Aviemore when it came to
Sundays, only its problem was working on a Sunday and not enjoying themselves)
and the idiosyncrasies and natural desire of landowners to get the best possible deal
for themselves when it came to selling their land (again, Dounreay had problems
when it came to purchasing land for its construction, paying way over the odds for
land so as not to sour relations with the locals). Thus, acquiring and developing land
in the Highlands was a multi-layered task that needed some degree of patience.
Fraser was unperturbed by the failure to secure Grant’s land and instead
acquired 60 acres of the old Aviemore hotel’s ground and adjoining land on the
Aviemore golf course through his Highland Tourist (Cairngorm) Development Ltd
company. Fraser and Lord Craigton did not view the Rank Organisation’s project as
of any real concern to the likelihood of the new Aviemore Centre succeeding, with
this being made clear in a meeting between Craigton and Mr Davis, chairman of the
Rank Organisation.
403 Of more immediate concern to the Aviemore project was
getting the British Transport Hotels or some such large hotel group involved in the
project. However, this wasn’t without problems as well, as an objection had been
received from the existing hoteliers in the area, concerned that their businesses could
be adversely affected by the new developments at Aviemore and Coylumbridge
meaning that Rank did matter. An organisation of hoteliers calling themselves the
Grantown-On-Spey Hotels Association wrote to the Secretary of State with their
concerns arguing:
It is not only unfair but most alarming, that a concern such as this should step in
to reap a crop that was planted by local sweat and money. Hoteliers are not the
                                                
402 Hotel & Catering Times, 02/12/1965, page unknown, from NAS SEP12/238..
403 Aviemore. Note for Minister’s meeting with Dr Beeching, 27/07/1964. Composed 24/07/1964, NAS
SEP12/237.153
only people who would suffer, but the very livelihood of entire villages is at
stake… The Cairngorm Winter Sports Development Board applied to the
Government for aid, without success, and Sir Hugh Fraser, during his three
years in office with the Scottish Tourist Board did absolutely nothing to help
tourism and skiing facilities in the area.
404
Fraser was aggrieved at these attacks and felt their severity was both unfair and
contradictory given the general belief in the growth centre strategy that the Aviemore
Centre would attract more people to the area generally, resulting in increased custom
for all hotels in the area.
405 What this indicates then is the differing views on tourism
held by Fraser et al on one side and existing hoteliers on the other. The hoteliers were
happy as they were filling beds but viewed the Aviemore project as a threat to their
existence. Fraser et al on the other hand felt that the industry could be further
enhanced by a new development. The Secretary of State responded to the criticisms
of the projects in a letter to Gordon Campbell the MP for Moray and Nairn (and
latterly a Secretary of State for Scotland himself) stating, ‘I hope that the growing
prosperity of the hotel industry in Speyside will continue and I see no reason why it
should be in any way impaired by the proposed development at Aviemore.’
406 Given
that one of the strategies for convincing the British Transport Hotels group to come
on board was the lure of a positive press in the Highlands any opposition would make
that approach less and less convincing. The Railways Board was under some pressure
from Scottish newspapers amidst talk of imminent closures of numerous Highland
lines in the forthcoming Beeching Report. In the end, Beeching and the Railways
Board were unconvinced of the proposal to site one of its operations at the Aviemore
project and decided against joining the venture. Beeching, in respect of the various
line closures he suggested in the Highlands, was proving to be no friend of the region,
although he had earlier been convinced by Frankel of Scottish Pulp to at least keep
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the Glasgow-Fort William-Mallaig line open for timber shipments to the mill at
Corpach.
The companies that were on board for the project, Scottish & Newcastle
Breweries and United Caledonian Breweries, were able to apply to the Board of
Trade for a 25% building grant under the new Local Employment Act, introduced
under the 1963 budget to replace the old Board of Trade loans. The new arrangements
allowed for applications for grants of up to 25% compared to the previous maximum
of 17% of building costs in development areas, of which almost the entirety of
Scotland was considered, but were liable to rapid change if employment fell.
407 This
then made the Aviemore project all the more appealing to potential investors and the
then President of the Board of Trade, Freddie Errol, made it clear that the department
would consider individual applications relating to Aviemore in view of the project as
a whole, meaning that expenditure on basic services like roads would be eligible for
Board of Trade assistance, removing one of the major obstacles that faced the
Cairngorm board’s previous applications for support.
408 As a result, Scottish &
Newcastle applied for a grant to cover 25% of its building costs, which they pitched
at £425,000, and employing 90 full time and 17 part time workers. The company was
informed in November 1965 that it had been successful in its application.
409 United
Caledonian Breweries applied for a similar grant to the Board of Trade for 25% of its
costs in early 1965 that it estimated at £235,000 employing 45 people, including 10
part time jobs. When referred to the Treasury, it was rejected on the basis that the cost
per job of £1306 in relation to the grant was too high and it was made clear that the
application would only be given approval if it could be shown that the project would
not go ahead without the grant. The Board of Trade then wrote to the Treasury asking
it to reconsider its decision in light of the fact that the development was taking place
in the centre of the Highlands and Islands Development District where the only
‘practical solution to the employment problem was the development of the tourist
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industry.’
410 However, the Board of Trade also noted that there had been an increase
in the costing for the project and the cost per job had subsequently increased to
£1492. The Treasury gave approval in late 1965, but the costing changed again when
Tennent Caledonian Breweries (the new company formed as a result of the merger
between Tennents and United Caledonian in 1966
411) took over the management of
the project and a new figure of £1376 per job and the creation of 54.5 jobs was
estimated, before being revised up to 62 jobs, reducing the cost per job to £1359. The
new estimates were approved and a grant awarded on this basis.
412
Whilst the haggling over grants was going on, construction started on the
development with Bovis Ltd. as the main contractors implementing Poulson’s plans.
The new development was built mainly in concrete and on time within the projected
22-month period. The decision to build the development in concrete was one that
would later come back to haunt the centre. The steel frameworks for the buildings
were constructed in Bristol by Advanced Engineering (Bristol) Ltd. and were shipped
the 600 miles up to Aviemore for erection on the prepared foundation. The buildings
were clad externally with pre-cast concrete panels or a special decorative treatment
where blockwork has been used.
413 This can be seen more clearly from figures 3.3 and
3.4.
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Figure 3.3 Aviemore construction
The beginning stages of construction of the Strathspey Hotel.
Source: Glasgow Herald, 18/06/1965.157
Figure 3.4 Aviemore Strathspey Hotel construction
Middle stages of completion of the Strathspey Hotel - the Glasgow Herald described
it as a ‘landmark’ in the caption alongside this picture.
Source: Glasgow Herald, 26/11/1965, page unknown, from UGD/HF101/2/2.
Construction of the centre did not go entirely without hitch though. The sewage plant
for the project was too small for the needs of the centre when constructed, leading to
Inverness County Council refusing to contribute their agreed sum of £10,000;
Poulson got into dispute with Sir William McEwen Younger over the swimming pool
design resulting in the withholding of part of Poulson’s fee. Poulson’s plan for a
central building housing all the heating for the new centre came under severe attack158
resulting in Shell refusing to pay Poulson any more than their proposal of £102,000
compared to Poulson’s bill of £169,000 citing overcharging.
414 As a result, relations
between Poulson and the board soured considerably. On a more successful note, the
construction phase employed an average of 200 men
415 rising to 400 men at its peak,
with almost the entirety sourced in Scotland, although not Aviemore itself due to a
lack of population, and all housed within the old Aviemore Hotel and an adjacent
caravan  park.
416 Prospective workers from the Spey Valley area were given
preference over outside workers where possible on the Aviemore development.
417 The
lack of population in the immediate Aviemore area was in contrast to the other
developments with which this thesis is concerned. Each of the other projects attracted
considerable labour from other areas, but had reasonable local untapped labour pools
and employed from within these pools. The developments were intended as growth
centres and were successful in bringing people back to the areas they were located in
for construction and operation in the initial stages. Aviemore lacked a local labour
pool from which to draw workers, but in attracting people to the area acted as a
growth centre as planned.
The creation of the Highlands and Islands Development Board in 1965
brought with it a renewed interest in the further development of skiing facilities in the
area to serve the new hotel and chalet accommodation being built. The HIDB took up
25% of the Cairngorm Winter Sports Development Board’s new commercial venture,
the Cairngorm Winter Sports Development Ltd. (formed in March 1966), with its
chairman Professor  Robert Grieve representing the HIDB  on  the board of  the
company. The new company issued share capital of £100,000 in ordinary shares (all
of which were held by the parent board) and raised £100,000 by the issue of 7.5%
debentures. Sir William McEwen Younger took up £50,000 and a further £17,000
was converted from existing debts of CWSDB. The loan was used to finance and
extend existing operations in developing sports facilities in the Cairngorms, including
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the  chairlift  and  a  further  two  T-Bar  tows  for  skiers.  The  HIDB  gave  further
assistance to the new company in its efforts to develop the facilities that were needed
to retain interest in the project for tourists with a building grant of £11,600 and a
Plant and Equipment Loan of £13,400 in mid-1967. This was used to extend the
White Lady Shieling snowfield and to build three more T-bar tows increasing the
number on the Cairngorms to five tows and a two-stage chairlift. In November 1967
the HIDB then reduced from 7.5% to 5% the interest charged on the loan of £38,400
(i.e. the £25,000 debentures and the Plant and Equipment Loan of £13,400). These
moves illustrate the support the HIDB gave to the project at a time when the Scottish
Office was retreating from the project in general, having provided its share of
support.
418 The new facilities helped the Cairngorm Board attract a substantial
increase in skiers visiting the area due to good weather conditions (i.e. lots of snow),
with a tenfold increase in skiers during the first three seasons of its operation between
1962/3 to 1964/5, although this increase brought with it increased frequency of
queuing for the slopes. However, it should be noted that Ministers were aware when
making the decision to support the project, as a result of MET office statistics, that
there was no way of guaranteeing good snow conditions for more than 2 months of
the year.
419 The construction of the Aviemore Centre and the Coylumbridge Hotel and
the subsequent increased accommodation available led to calls for more development
of piste facilities lest the queuing situation become intolerable.
420
The new Aviemore Centre opened in late 1966, although its most ardent
supporter, Sir Hugh Fraser, died before seeing the completion of the project. The new
centre on the eve of opening can be seen in figure 3.5:
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Figure 3.5 Completed Aviemore centre
Source: Pottinger, G, The Winning Counter, pg. 96.
The new centre’s opening was warmly welcomed in the press, probably as a result of
the hospitality lavished upon the reporters sent to cover the opening. However, the
centre’s warm welcome from the press was short-lived as questions began to be asked
about its appropriateness to the area and the government’s role in it. Pottinger states,
A lot of nonsense has been talked about Aviemore. It was carried out as a
private, commercial undertaking, not as a government enterprise. The State’s
contribution was a grant under the Local Employment Act, which would have
been available to anyone who satisfied the statutory conditions, and some
expenditure on basic services which again would have provided for any large
scale development. The Government naturally hoped that Aviemore would
succeed, both for the facilities it offered and as an example to existing hoteliers161
modernise their own establishments, but that was the extent of the official
involvement.
421
Of course, the official involvement in Aviemore was far more pronounced than
Pottinger argues, but Fraser’s role in the creation of the centre would be difficult to
overplay, although Pottinger certainly gave it a bash in his biography of Fraser (not
perhaps all that surprising when it is learned that Fraser paid Pottinger £2500 plus
royalties to do so
422). Fraser’s company and plans for the area did much to bring the
project to fruition. His idea of placing his ideas into something in ‘bricks and mortar’
was manifested in the new centre and the facilities it offered. When completed, the
Aviemore Centre offered accommodation for 400 people, a 700 seat cinema theatre,
exhibition hall, conference-cum-dance hall, restaurants for 250, snack bars, municipal
sized swimming pool, Britain's second largest indoor skating and curling rink, a nine-
pin bowling alley, a dry ski slope and numerous shops. A staff of more than 100
serviced the central amenities complex to look after guests.
423 The plan for an all-year,
all-weather centre for all types of holidaymakers of different sporting interests was
realised in the opening of the centre. The conference facility was a particularly
important part of the complex with six major conferences held in the first year of the
centre’s operation. Also in the first year, 650,000 people visited, it won the British
Travel Association annual award, it increased the total number of chalet beds to 290,
visitors from abroad accounted for 4% of total in 1967, plans were afoot to expand to
1000 residential beds
424 and a tenfold increase in tourist jobs from 50 to 500
occurred.
425 Aviemore was proving to be a success, much the way it was envisioned
by its main supporter.
The initial success of the development prompted a governmental report in the
form of the Cairngorm Area: Report of the Technical Group on the Cairngorm Area
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of the Eastern Highlands of Scotland in 1968, published under the auspices of the
Scottish Development Department, but put together as a joint group comprising the
Scottish Development Department and the planning and/or development officers of
the county councils of Aberdeen, Banff, Inverness, Moray & Nairn and Perth &
Kinross. The report detailed the economic and social position of the Cairngorm area
and made a series of recommendations, although crucially it did not commit the
government to implementation of these recommendations. The report found its
origins in a Scottish Development Department circular in June 1962 that covered the
‘definition of areas of great landscape value and the provisions which should be made
to meet tourist demand over the years ahead.’
426 The circular invited local planning
authorities in all districts where there were areas considered as being of outstanding
natural beauty including the Highlands. The report was recognition of the issue of
development in consideration of the need to ensure the natural beauty of the area
remained intact, an issue of some contention in Aviemore’s development that still
exists today. Increased numbers of skiers and visitors have led to an inevitable
erosion of the landscape through enlarged volumes of human traffic and the problems
this brings. The report was basically a survey of the Cairngorm area designed to
showcase  the  potential  of  the  area  as  an  attractive  region  for  further  tourist
development. It called for further development in the area stating that the report
‘demonstrates the need for the various interests operating in the Area to join together
with mutual benefit to achieve fulfilment in the many aspects of future development
and to preserve the more intangible assets such as remoteness which are so easily
destroyed.’
427 A noble idea certainly, but given that the report was particularly clear
about it not committing government to any of its recommendations, it lacked any real
substance as a result. It made clear that its conception of the tourist industry was that
it  was  something  that  should  be  developed  by  private  industry  and  not  by
government. Given the government’s heavy involvement in establishing Aviemore
and its initial success at the time of writing, it was an odd position to take.
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Conclusion
If the first few years of Aviemore’s operations were a success, the furore
surrounding two of the main figures involved that engulfed the project in the early
1970s, after government involvement had effectively ceased, was to temper the joy
somewhat. During the planning and construction phase, Pottinger and Poulson had
become close friends to the extent that Poulson was paying to take Pottinger on
holidays, building him a house, buying him a car, suits, overcoats and gifting him
money - a sum totalling £30,000 in all between the period 1963-69.
428 In many ways it
would be superfluous to discuss this episode in this case study in any great detail
given its recent treatment by Ian Levitt, the book released by Gillard & Tompkinson
on the matter and the considerable press attention the episode received at the time.
However, the episode is important to the Aviemore story for the reason that the
relationship between Pottinger and Poulson cast serious aspersions on not just each
individual’s character, but on the efficacy of the project as a whole and the wider
issue of the government’s role in the Highlands. Mistrust of the Scottish Office in the
Highlands
429 was already an issue to such an extent that Ministers and other civil
servants were keen not to be seen as instigators in the Aviemore developments so as
not to be seen as imposing it upon the area. Local landowners and hoteliers were
unhappy at the actions of the government and Hugh Fraser in siting their operations in
Aviemore and the construction of the site in concrete, a hitherto foreign material in
Highland accommodation buildings, and on such a grand scale was further grist to
their mill. Further, the environmental concerns felt were outweighed by the economic
benefit and prosperity the development brought, but have remained latent throughout
the centre’s history, coming to the fore on several occasions.
430
The Scottish Office was effectively immune to all these concerns however,
operating in what Levitt calls the Dundas mould - ‘massaging if not manipulating
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Scottish opinion in favour of Unionism’ through its wielding of administrative power
and the various planning agencies it controlled hidden from public view.
431 Pottinger
felt immune to the usual conventions of senior civil servants in accepting the gifts
from Poulson in spite of the obvious risks in doing so, probably as a result of his own
vanity. However, the processes by which Pottinger and the Scottish Office were able
to set up the Aviemore project without any real difficulty and without any great
degree of public scrutiny to the extent that it was able to hide its own input from the
public until Pottinger and Poulson’s trial are of more concern. Levitt continues:
The principal purpose of the Scottish Development Department, created in June
1962, was to attract a greater level of inward investment and manage the
planning process accordingly. The fact that Scottish institutions acquiesced in
the strategy, despite reservations on the siting of such projects as the Fort
William pulp mill and the Invergordon aluminium smelter, as well as the
usefulness  of  the  new  towns,  serves  to  highlight  the  Scottish  Office’s
predominant position in steering the domestic agenda.
432
The  Scottish  Office’s  administrative  leadership  in  driving  Scottish  economic
development is clear to see in relation to not just Aviemore, but the other three
developments discussed in this thesis also. Highland development was approached
with  the  mindset  of  what  it  could  immediately  contribute  to  the  UK  national
economic context and in this sense Aviemore was no different. It relates directly to
the other case studies in that it was a concerted effort on the part of the Scottish
Office at Highland development that was approached from the perspective of what it
could contribute to the UK national economic problems of the time i.e. the balance of
payments. However, it differs from the others in that it is still in full operation today
and has actually enjoyed a degree of success in attracting visitors to the area. Tourism
is now one of the most important industries in the Scottish economy. Aviemore is a
fairly successful holiday destination for winter sports enthusiasts from within and
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outwith Scotland as well as an international conference venue and has undergone an
£80m regeneration in the last five years.
433 In that respect then, Aviemore is an
example of successful governmental intervention in the Highland economy. It is the
only fully operational concern of the four developments this thesis discusses and is
part of a thriving industry. The same simply cannot be said for the other three
developments.
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Chapter Four. Dounreay: Bringing High-technology To
The Highlands
Source: http://www.scran.ac.uk The Prototype Fast Reactor is the building on the left.
The Dounreay Fast Reactor is the spherical building on the right.167
Introduction
The attempts of the Duke of Sutherland in 1873 to make his land profitable
utilising the newfound technology of the Industrial Revolution, in particular the
advent of the steam-powered tractor, heralded the beginning stages of a policy in the
Highlands that reached its apogee in the post-war period. The Duke’s desire to turn
his estate into a profit-making venture came about as a result of his frustration at his
land being unfit for crofting. As a result, he spent a great deal of money on acquiring
several expensive steam powered tractors to solve his problem, only to end in failure
by losing more money than he made.
434 Successive governments since the Second
World War have embarked upon similar ventures with the same consequences. One
such venture was the Dounreay nuclear power facility, situated 8 miles west of
Thurso. Dounreay was a ‘high-technology’ venture on the part of government
intended to demonstrate nuclear power’s potential for electricity production with the
added attraction of going some way to solving the problems afflicting the area and the
Highlands at large. The Dounreay nuclear power facility was initially an experimental
establishment charged with the task of utilising the new technology of Fast Breeder
Reactors to explore the possibilities of harnessing the new technology for commercial
electricity production. As a result of the success of the initial experimental reactor,
the decision was taken to build a further reactor at Dounreay with the intention that it
would provide electricity to the National Grid in time, whilst still carrying out
experimental work with the intention of exporting the technology abroad. The second
development was heralded as a new start for the Highlands, capable of producing
cheap electricity to be utilised in the area, act as a growth centre and attract new
industries to the most northerly part of the UK mainland. After only fourteen years of
fitful operation the announcement was made that the plant was to close.
This  case  study  discusses  the  creation,  operation  and  eventual
decommissioning of the Dounreay nuclear power facility and seeks to understand the
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reasons for its failure to resolve properly the problems for which it was designed. The
intention of the case study is to explore the nature of the relationships between the
national government in Westminster and the other agencies charged with the various
tasks of creating, administering and operating the Dounreay nuclear power station
within the context of the development of the nuclear power industry in the UK and
the administration of national and regional economic policy in respect of the issue of
Highland development. In doing this, the study seeks to understand the reasons
behind the failure of the Dounreay nuclear power facility to address the problems in
the area and the development of the project as a whole. It proposes that the project
was initially a success in achieving its stated aims in relation to the first reactor, but
subsequently failed to address fully during its operational lifetime the problems that
the second reactor was proposed to solve as a result of political decisions made by
government that were taken on the basis of short-term concerns rather than long-term
appropriateness, contravening the stated aims, both publicly and privately, of the
second stage of the facility.
435
Creation
The announcement of the Minister of Works, Sir David Eccles, on 1
st March
1954 that there was to be a new experimental nuclear power station situated at
Dounreay was the culmination of a series of events that find their beginnings as early
as the end of the nineteenth century. The discovery of the electron in 1897 by JJ
Thompson at the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge
436 was the first stage of a long
process that eventually led to the creation of the Dounreay Fast Reactor (DFR) and
then the Dounreay Prototype Fast Reactor (PFR), the second stage of the facility. The
production of the Maud Report in 1941 argued that there was the potential for nuclear
energy to be used in an explosive capacity as well as for the production of electricity
for domestic usage, putting Britain in the lead in the nuclear technology race for a
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brief time.
437 This idea directly informed, through the conveying of the report to the
United States Government, the subsequent experiments at the University of Chicago
under the supervision of Enrico Fermi.
438 These experiments led to the first controlled
nuclear chain reaction under the university’s athletics stadium, as part of the wider
American military nuclear technology project codenamed the Manhattan Project.
During the period up until the end of the Second World War, there was an exchange
of ideas between the US and the UK in an attempt to develop the military and civilian
aspects of the new technology, including bomb research as well as building reactors
for domestic power research and around 40 of the top British scientists went to work
on the bomb project in North America.
439 The experience of working in the USA on
these projects gave British scientists the knowledge and technological expertise
needed for the construction of reactors at home.
440 The introduction of the US Atomic
Energy Act in 1946, also known as the McMahon Act, put a stop to the exchange of
information between both sides of the Atlantic, but crucially gave the UK government
the impetus to create and control its own nuclear technology. This much is clear from
the following communication between EH Peck of the Foreign Office and a British
representative in the USA, EH Tompkins on 25/02/1954:
The whole operation will clearly have an important bearing on our prestige in
the atomic world and on our uranium supply position. As you know, from our
point of view there was one thing at least to be said for the McMahon act - it
gave us an advantage over the Americans in that we could use our technical
knowledge abroad to obtain a special relationship with countries hoping to
develop power programmes. If the McMahon Act is to be amended and our
knowledge to be no longer such a valuable asset abroad, it seems all the more
important for us to keep as far ahead of the Americans as we can in the quality
                                                
437 Gowing, M., Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-45, (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001), pp 78 & 84.
438 http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/spcl/chain.html accessed 21/02/2005.
439 Historian’s Office, The development of atomic energy: a chronology of events 1939-1978,
(UKAEA, Harwell, 1979), pg. 3.
440 HMSO, Nuclear Energy in Britain, (HMSO, London, 1976 sixth edition,), pg. 2.170
of our research. We cannot hope to compete with the quantity of their potential
atomic production.
441
As a result, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was passed giving the government
powers to control the development and use of atomic energy.
442
The passing of the 1946 Atomic Energy Act in the UK resulted in the
construction of the Atomic Energy Research Establishment (AERE) at Harwell and
the facility at Risley for the production of fissile material.
443 Until the passing of the
McMahon Act in the US, the British atomic energy programme had stalled due to the
flow of expertise across the Atlantic. As a result, almost no progress had been made
by the time of the passing of the 1946 Atomic Energy Act in Britain.
444 The Atomic
Energy Act placed the responsibilities of nuclear development and its uses in the
hands of the Ministry of Supply (Atomic Division), whereas it had formerly been in
the control of Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. The Act provided the
Minister of Supply with the:
‘general duty… to promote and control the development of atomic energy’ and
gave him wide powers to ‘produce, use and dispose of atomic energy and carry
out research into any matters connected therewith’. The Act also provided for
the enforcement of strict secrecy.
445
The reasons for these were twofold; the Ministry had considerable experience
of wartime ‘quasi-industrial’ problems and also as a result of the war being over, had
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spare capacity.
446 As a result, the Attlee government felt that the development of the
industry  would  be  best  served  within  a  governmental  framework  as  it  was  of
importance militarily as well as in a civil capacity. It was at Harwell that the idea of a
fast reactor began to gain ground. Scientists at Harwell were interested in the idea of
fast reactor technology due to the possibilities presented by it and the shortage of
uranium. As a result they approached the problem with two main objectives in mind:
to utilise nuclear fuel (uranium 235) most efficiently and to produce a high outlet
temperature from the fission in order to convert it into electric power. It was thought
that, if successful, fast reactor technology could be the answer to Britain’s energy
needs. Margaret Gowing writes,
The prospect of a reactor that would utilise fuel efficiently and also produced
additional plutonium was extremely attractive at a time when proved uranium
resources were small. The whole of the United Kingdom’s electric power
consumption might be supplied from 80 tons a year. Indeed, without fast
breeder reactors an industrial programme might be impossible.
447
Thus, the production of a fast reactor was a primarily economic pursuit for the British
government, based on the scarcity of uranium. There was however no promise of
cheap power arising from the development of the new technology at Harwell that was
to characterise the later pronouncements about developments in the nuclear energy
sector. Although of course the Maud Committee had ventured the idea of the
possibilities of domestic use as had Sir Christopher Hinton, Chief Engineer of Atomic
Power at the Ministry of Supply.
448 There was the idea though that Britain would be
able to satisfy its energy needs from nuclear power based on fast breeder technology
and that it would be of considerable importance to its future industrial plans as a
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result. However, Tomlinson argues, ‘In the nuclear industry, the British programme,
launched under Attlee, was dominated by military and political concerns, rather than
economic’
449 stating further that  ‘economic considerations seemed to have been little
in evidence’.
450 This is true in the sense that there was a desire to see Britain emerge
as an atomic power on the world stage through the design and construction of an
atomic bomb, but the civil aspects of the programme should not be understated. The
genesis of the nuclear programme was certainly militaristic and political, but the civil
applications of the new industry became apparent very quickly to the government
after the Harwell scientists expounded the idea that a fast reactor could produce more
fuel (plutonium from uranium 235), and by definition potential energy, than it used.
This  had  undoubted  economic  benefits  that  did  not  escape  the  notice  of  the
government.  During  the  period  1946-51  the  government  spent  £100m  on  the
development of the industry
451, a not inconsiderable sum given the economic situation
of the country at the time. Margaret Gowing states, ‘Indeed one of the outstanding
features of the enterprise in this period is that so much was achieved with so little
resources.’
452 By contrast the Americans spent $7500m during the same period.
453 The
economic implications of the new industry were not lost on the government, ‘There
was a race against the progress of other countries, and its stakes were thought to be
national security and industrial development. Undelayed success in the latter field,
said the Minister of Supply, might well prove to be a necessity for Britain’s economic
survival.’
454 In a secret memo from the Foreign Office to a representative in the
British Embassy in Washington in the USA, EH Peck stated, ‘In view of the present
difficulties over obtaining the uranium we need for industrial purposes, the breeder if
successful will go a long way towards solving our supply problem.’
455 If the new
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technology could be harnessed for both militaristic and industrial purposes, Britain
would find itself in a strong position politically as well as economically.
The two research centres at Harwell and Risley were at the centre of Britain’s
atomic development. There was also a discussion in the House of Lords in 1945
concerning the development of Hydro-power in the Highlands that was given ‘a new
slant’
456 by the advocacy of atomic power by some speakers. The Earl of Roseberry in
particular was sceptical of the usefulness of the Hydro-development in the Highlands
due to the development of the atomic industry, a view that was shared by many in the
House of Lords at the time, but one that was tempered by Lord Westwood, the leader
of the House, pointing out that the development of atomic energy as a source of
power was still some way off.
457 However, the economic potential of the atomic
energy for industrial use was the catalyst for the growing support of the House of
Lords for the development of atomic energy.
Due to the growing potential of the importance of nuclear technology to
industry,  it  was  decided  in  principle  that  the  government  would  transfer  the
responsibility  for  the  new  industry  to  a  non-departmental  organisation  under
Governmental control. This was to serve the purpose of satisfying the need for closer
contact and co-operation with industry. The idea stemmed from Winston Churchill’s
personal friend and scientific adviser, Lord Cherwell (Professor Lindemann) who put
down a motion in the House of Lords regretting the ‘slow progress… in developing
atomic energy for peaceful and warlike purposes’ and demanding the creation of a
new body outside of government that was passed in July 1951.
458 The election of the
Conservatives later in 1951 saw Lord Cherwell become Paymaster General and put
his ideas about the creation of a new agency designed specifically to deal with the
development of the new industry into action. Cherwell advised Churchill that the
creation of an independent body would encourage the development of the new
technology for industrial use by involving industry and would free it from Treasury
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control.
459 As a result, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) was
formed in 1954 under the provisions laid out by the Atomic Energy Authority Act of
1954,  assuming  responsibility  for  the  industry  in  August  of  the  same  year.
460
Although the new organisation was ‘non-departmental’, it did not have any input
from  private  industry.  Indeed,  unlike  the  American  model,  the  early  British
development of the nuclear industry was completely detached from private industry
and entirely funded at the public expense.
461 A civil nuclear programme geared
towards energy production was announced in A Programme of Nuclear Power in
1955, closely followed the creation of UKAEA.
462
The Minister of Supply took the decision to undertake a programme of nuclear
power development in August 1952 and a proposal was put to the Official Committee
on Atomic Energy in June 1953 for the construction of a fast reactor to operate a
gross output of 200MW (thermal) with a useful power output of 50MW (electrical)
on the basis that the knowledge of fast reactors could only be advanced by the
building of a large scale reactor.
463 Ministerial approval to the suggestion was given
on the 17
th February 1954 after it was agreed that the reactor should be scaled down in
its gross output to 60MW (thermal)
464 with a useful output of 14MW (electrical).
465
Having gained ministerial approval, the search for a suitable site began. Due to
the unpredictable nature of fast breeder reactor research (this was to be the first large
scale plant dedicated to fast breeder research in the world), it was decided that the
facility should be sited far away from major centres of population in case of an
accident. There was considerable concern amongst scientists and politicians over the
stability of the reactor. As a result, the phrase ‘China Syndrome’ was coined to
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describe  the  consequences  if  the  chain  reaction  inside  the  reactor  became
uncontrollable. The argument was that if the reactor burned up and became out of
control the core would reach such a high temperature that it would melt through its
protective casing and ‘probably end up in China’.
466 This uncertainty characterised the
early development of the fast reactor technology. It almost every way, Fast Reactor
research was very much a step into the unknown on the part of the government. As a
result, the site of the new reactor was to satisfy a number of different conditions. The
site needed to be on flat land, away from centres of population but close enough to a
small town for amenities for those working at the facility, as well as labour supplies,
it needed to be on the coastline for a plentiful supply of water (used in the cooling
process) and for discharged effluent into the sea
467, it was to be sited no more that 50
feet above sea level (for pumping purposes), on 400 acres on a rock foundation and
needed plentiful supplies of fresh water of high purity (for the ancillary chemical
plant planned, necessary for generating steam for heating the liquid sodium and
sodium/potassium  coolant  and  was  also  to  be  used  for  normal  factory
requirements).
468
Originally only a fast reactor was envisaged for the site, but upon further
discussion it was decided later on that fuel manufacturing and fuel reprocessing
would also be required for the site.
469 Dounreay satisfied these requirements almost
perfectly. Concurrent with this was the lobbying of the local MP for Caithness, Sir
David Robertson. Robertson lobbied very strongly making a series of personal calls
and writing several telegrams and letters to various members of the Ministry of
Supply, including Christopher Hinton who was charged with deciding upon the most
suitable site, to promote Dounreay as the best choice.
470 The other two options,
Golspie in Easter Ross and Harlech in North Wales, were ruled out due to the
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dispersed  rural  population  and  very  heavy  influx  of  holidaying  population
respectively.
471 As a result Dounreay was the most suitable site for the new reactor.
However, it did not satisfy the conditions set out perfectly and it took some tinkering
to ‘make’ it suitable. Sir Christopher Hinton of the UKAEA (Britain’s chief nuclear
engineer) headed the engineering team that constructed models to forecast potential
radiation leakage from the new facility. If the results of a model, based on the design
of the intended development, produced unacceptably high risks to the surrounding
populous (in this case radiation poisoning of the local population), then it is standard
to amend the design of the development in order to satisfy the model’s forecasts,
erring on the side of caution, to ensure the safety of the surrounding area. However,
this was not the case for the Dounreay facility. In a lecture given at Strathclyde
University, Hinton describes the process:
We assumed, generously, that there would be one per cent leakage from the
sphere, and dividing the country around the site into sectors, we counted the
number of inhabitants. To our dismay, this showed that the site did not comply
with the safety distances specified by the health physicists. That was easily put
right;  with  the  assumption  of  a  99  per  cent  containment  the  site  was
unsatisfactory, so we assumed, more realistically, a 99.9 per cent containment,
and by doing this we established the fact that the site was perfect… we knew
we had found the right site for the reactor and were quite prepared to adjust
what  were  only  guessed  figures  to  support  a  choice  that  we  knew  from
experienced judgement was right.
472
Thus, the estimates that didn’t fit with the plan were adjusted with new estimates that
did, allowing the go-ahead for the new plant. There is no evidence to support why this
was the case, but it is safe to say that modifying the model was a far cheaper option in
comparison to modifying the design of the reactor.
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Hinton’s amendments meant Dounreay was now a suitable site for the new
reactor. Indeed, Sir David Robertson, the MP for the area, was one of the first to write
to the Ministry of Supply to express his pleasure, stating,
The siting of the plant in my constituency is the greatest event that has occurred
in the Far North of Scotland and it will transform the economy of the whole
region and stop our greatest affliction, depopulation. Any credit that can be
given to me will please my constituents, particularly those who voted for me in
two elections, and it may well convince them that the right man was returned!
473
Robertson’s joy at seeing Dounreay selected to be the site and eagerness to be
credited with its selection was understandable given his political position. Robertson
held a majority of just 269 from the 1950 election
474 (an improvement of the majority
of just six votes that the previous holder (EL Gandar-Dower)
475 had won the seat by
for the Conservatives in 1945)
476 and he was understandably keen to retain his seat.
Relative to the industrial aspects of nuclear power, the fast reactor development was
viewed as crucial to the country’s industrial and domestic needs in the long-term, but
the technology needed to be developed before it could reach that stage, meaning
Dounreay was to be experimental in nature and nowhere was it mentioned that it
would be of immediate economic, industrial or domestic benefit. However, Robertson
grasped the potential benefits to the economy of the facility’s locating in Dounreay,
as did the Marquess of Salisbury in his representations to the House of Lords on 2
nd
March 1954 stating ‘it [the new development] has the further merit that development
on this site should make a big contribution to the economic welfare of this part of the
Highlands’
477, although the government was keen to play down the economic benefits
to the area through further industrial development emanating from the establishment,
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stating that it was ‘primarily a research and development establishment’ during the
first phase of the plant’s operation.
478
The pronouncements of Robertson and the Marquess were the first in what were
to become a series of claims about the benefits of the reactor’s location in the far
North.  That  the  government  sought  to  play  down  the  potential  industrial  and
economic benefits of the new reactor is interesting in itself - the second reactor’s
location at Dounreay would see the Scots’ opinion on the industrial worth come to the
fore and effectively ‘win’ the second reactor for Dounreay. Governmental policy in
respect  of  the  Highlands  was  determined  during  this  period  by  the  Board  of
Agriculture at the Scottish Office, which unsurprisingly given its name, was mainly
concerned with agricultural matters as part of the Home Department. Thus, Scottish
problems were dealt with at the regional level and not UK level. The location of the
reactor at Dounreay paved the way for the view, held initially by Robertson and the
Marquess of Salisbury, that large-scale technologically advanced industrial ventures
could  be  used  to  solve  the  problems  in  the  Highlands.  Dounreay  was  thus
experimental in more ways than one.
Eccles announced to the public on the 1
st March 1954 that the new reactor was
to be sited at Dounreay. Dounreay was a part of the first wave of nuclear power
facilities commissioned by the government in the 1950s. The first of these was Calder
Hall in Cumbria (the world’s first nuclear power station); followed by four more,
including Dounreay, Chapelcross in Dumfriesshire, Windscale in Cumbria and
Winfrith in Dorset, all operating different reactor types.
479 The decision to build the
Dounreay experimental fast reactor was explained in a letter from the Department of
Atomic Energy (on headed note paper formerly belonging to the Ministry of Supply
Division  of  Atomic  Energy,  but  scored  out  such  was  the  recentness  of  the
changeover) to the Treasury dated 14/04/1954 that stated ‘there are psychological and
political reasons why ability to generate power will be an advantage and an electrical
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generating plant of 10MW capacity will therefore be coupled to the reactor after
initial reactor operating experience has been gained.’
480 The letter went on stating that
the objectives of the new development were to be classified as follows:
a)  To  construct  a  prototype  fast  fission  reactor  with  economical  power
generation as a primary product and de-natured plutonium as a by-product; and
to solve the technological problems of heat exchange from small fuel elements
with very large amounts of heat.
b) Determination of safe and effective reactor control conditions.
c) Development and production techniques for fuel elements which will run at
high temperatures for long periods in the reactor.
d) Establishment of design factors for high powered fast reactors which will
follow and which will generate large amounts of power relative to the Nation’s
future energy needs.
e) To train and familiarise design and operating staff in the needs of this type of
reactor.
481
Thus, the new development was to be experimental and research-based in nature and
was not designed to be of any explicit short term economic benefit to the area in
which it was to be situated, other than of course residual benefit from the increased
numbers of people coming to work at the plant. It was however to be of considerable
perceived advantage to Britain on the world stage. This perceived political advantage
of being seen to be the world leader in the development of nuclear technology is
made clear in Peck’s letter to Tompkins where he states ‘The whole operation will
clearly have an important bearing on our prestige in the atomic world and on our
uranium supply position... If the McMahon Act is to be amended and our knowledge
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to be no longer such a valuable asset abroad, it seems all the more important for us to
keep as far ahead of the Americans as we can in the quality of our research.’
482
Even at this early stage there was the realisation on the part of government that
generating electricity from nuclear energy could be a valuable psychological tool in
gaining the confidence of the people by claiming to be the party or government of
modernity, a tactic used to considerable effect in the following decade by Harold
Wilson’s Labour government, most famously in his ‘white heat of technology’ speech
that paved the way for the creation of the Invergordon aluminium smelter and the
further investment by the government in industrialising the Highlands. Indeed,
Wilson’s speech committing the government to utilising technology to improve
industrial and economic performance is central to the story of Highland development
in the post-war period. Modernity was at the heart of the industrial projects in the
Highlands this thesis details - they were intended to bring the Highlands up to speed
with the rest of the country in terms of being a viable economic community and
contributing to the national economy. The issue of modernity is thus central to
understanding  why  the  developments  took  place  -  Wilson’s  government  were
committed to rejuvenating the British industrial structure through new the use of new
technology. Without the Wilson government’s commitment to this it is arguable that
the developments in the Highlands wouldn’t have taken place. For example, the stated
intention to build new aluminium smelters powered by nuclear power stations gave
rise to the possibility that Invergordon could be the recipient of one of the new
smelters. Similarly, the commitment to the high-technology venture of fast reactor
research meant that Dounreay, as a result of the DFR, was well placed for future fast
reactors being located there.
Whilst the government was keen to emphasise that Dounreay was not intended
to be of explicit economic benefit to the area, it was aware of the need to diversify the
wider Scottish industry in order to offset the decline of the Staple Industries and
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reacted accordingly to localised regional problems through its regional and industrial
policy. Dounreay was one such example of this in the sense that it would, by virtue of
bringing new workers to the area that could not be found locally (scientists and
engineers mainly) and the residual economic and social effects on the local area of
such a large industrial undertaking, go some way to addressing the depopulation
issues of the area Although the government made no claims towards the industrial
and economic significance to the area of siting the fast reactor at Dounreay, due to its
lack of knowledge about the practicalities of fast reactor use in an industrial capacity,
Robertson and the Marquess of Salisbury obviously had no such qualms. Dounreay
was the recipient of the fast reactor because of its geographical and geological
suitability, but the economic and social concerns had not escaped the attention of
Robertson, which is why he brought Dounreay to the attention of Hinton, believing
that it could help remedy the ills of the area. Indeed, after Eccles’ announcement,
Robertson made the claim that the siting of the fast reactor at Dounreay that ‘They
[the people of Caithness and Sutherland] will realise that perhaps a new era is
beginning, and that an old one, which depopulated the Highlands, is ending. I believe
it heralds the second industrial revolution.’
483 Such sentiment was to find increasing
favour with many in the future. Given the first industrial revolution effectively passed
the Highlands by, it is no surprise.
In order for the project to move forward, the purchase of several farms and an
agreement with the Admiralty for part of its disused air base, constructed in 1944 and
never fully operational, was required.
484 Reaching an agreement with the Admiralty
proved to be much easier that the purchase of the farmland from the local tenants. The
Admiralty’s air base at Dounreay was of a more strategic concern than actual regular
use. However, the Admiralty were keen to keep the part of the base that would not be
used by UKAEA (the reactor was built further over from the actual runway) in case
of war but eventually relented when it became clear that due to the nature of the
development planned and the height of the new buildings, any such suggestions were
                                                
483 Hansard, vol. 524, House of Commons Debate, 01/03/1954, col. 870.
484 UKAEA, History and Achievements of UKAEA Dounreay.182
out of the question.
485 Hinton had worked out a sum of £37,000 for the purchase of
the farms necessary for the development. However, the locals proved very adept at
wringing more out of the government for their troubles. This is shown more clearly in
a letter from CJ Highton of UKAEA to AHK Slater, the Private Secretary to the Lord
President of the Council, Privy Council Office on 28/05/1954,
I told you last week that Sir Christopher Hinton’s guess at the cost of settlement
at Islaud and Lower Dounreay was as follows:
1. New House for Mrs. McDonald    £3000
2. Extra farm buildings and roads etc to be worked as one unit:            £5000
3. Purchase of Islaud Farm           £12000
4. Purchase of Lower Dounreay           £17000
          Total:   £37000
When it comes to actual negotiations Mrs McDonald showed herself to be
remarkably astute and caused so many difficulties that eventually Mr Robertson
agreed to recommend compensation amounting in all to £13000. Even on these
terms  Mrs  McDonald  was  not  prepared  to  agree  to  vacate  earlier  than
November  1955.  Her  Solicitor,  however,  has  promised  to  do  his  best  to
persuade her to give up at an earlier date…
486
Hinton’s calculations clearly did not factor in the difficulties that the landowners of
the farmland needed for the Dounreay facility would present. These difficulties could
have perhaps been avoided had the valuer, the aforementioned Mr Robertson, been a
little  less  heavy  handed  in  his  dealings  with  the  owners.  Through  various
correspondences between Sir David Robertson MP for the area, the AEA, the Chief
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Valuer for Scotland and the District Valuer of the Inverness area (Mr Robertson), and
of course the owners of the farmland itself (amidst their threats of forming a
Landowners Association to fight the proposed compulsory purchase order threatened
by the district valuer), an agreement between all was finally settled upon.
487 The
initial estimates for the cost of the new facility, before construction had commenced
were as follows:
Table 4.1 Pre-construction estimates for Dounreay
Initial
Construction £m
Follow-on
Construction £m
Reactor Group (without
generating plant)
5.74
Power generating plant 0.70
Chemical Group (minimum
labs and batch process)
1.22
Chemical Group plant for
final processing)
2.10
General Services and
Administration Group
2.24
Sub Total 9.20 2.80
Contingencies (25%) 2.30 0.70
Total £m 11.50 3.50
Source: Letter from TB Le Cren, Department of Atomic Energy to JDK Beighton,
Treasury, 14/04/1954. TNA PRO T225/716.
The above estimates were calculated in 1954 before construction started and before
the designers, engineers, builders and the authorities knew fully what was required for
the site. The total estimate of £15m was provisional. The government, as detailed
earlier, was very keen to get the project up and running in order to ensure its position
as the world leader in the development of nuclear technology was secure. As a result,
its planning for the development during the initial stages was very much geared
towards this with little attention paid to further cost increases.
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RS Brocklesby, the Chief Architect to the Industrial Group of UKAEA,
designed the facility, including Dounreay’s famous distinctive dome described by The
Times, and Sir David Eccles in his speech announcing its construction, as being the
‘dome of discovery’
488 and Whatlines Ltd, a Glasgow firm, commenced construction
on the site in February 1955.
489 In all there were three main companies involved in the
construction of the facility: Whatlines Ltd - charged with building and civil work, TW
Ward Ltd - charged with plant and pipework erection and James Scott and Co. Ltd -
charged with electrical installation. The estimates for the contracts and expenditure
relating to these companies can be seen in Table 4.2:
Table 4.2 Estimated Contractors’ costs for construction of Dounreay Nuclear
power facility
Contractor Oct. 1957
Estimate
July 1958
Amount on term.
of contract
Estimates of
value of work
remaining to be
done [July 1958]
Total
Whatlines Ltd.
Building and
Civil Work
£5,860,000 £6,006,000 £267,000 £6,273,000
TW Ward Ltd.
Plant and
Pipework
Erection
£972,000 £1,107,000 £200,000 £1,307,000
James Scott and
Co. Ltd.
Electrical
Installation.
£1,322,000 £1,542,000 £24,000 £1,566,000
Total £8,154,000 £8,655,000 £491,000 £9,146,000
Source: Treasury Report on Dounreay Works (July, 1958). TNA PRO AB16/1638.
Excavations for the DFR began in March, followed by excavations for the Dounreay
Materials Testing Reactor (DMTR) the following June.
490
                                                
488 Glendinning, M, (ed.), Rebuilding Scotland, (Tuckwell, East Linton, 1997), pg. 159, The Times,
02/03/1954, pg. 4 and Sir David Eccles, Minister of Works, House of Commons Debate, Atomic
Energy Authority Bill, 01/03/1954.
489 Personal correspondence with Alistair Fraser, UKAEA Dounreay Communications Department.
14/05/2004.
490 UKAEA, History and Achievements of UKAEA Dounreay .185
Concurrent with the construction of the famous dome was the construction of
the less aesthetically pleasing, but equally important, infrastructure required for the
new complex. New houses were constructed, two new primary schools, a secondary
school,  hospital,  electricity  supply  improvements,  roads,  improved  amenities
including the construction of a new canteen and sports club and field, drains and
water supply, and other types of accommodation (mostly hostels, of which the
Authority spent £300,000 in total) were all commissioned.
491 As well as this, a new
college called Thurso Technical College was to be constructed after an agreement
was made between UKAEA, Caithness County Council and the Scottish Education
Department in 1958.
492 UKAEA agreed to meet half of the capital cost of £33,000 for
its construction whilst also agreeing to allow many of its professional workers
(scientists, engineers, etc) to work on secondment at the new college, as well as
loaning laboratory equipment free of charge. Accommodation was a particularly
important concern for the new development due to the nature of the workforce
employed on the construction of the facility. Of the 2000 men employed to build
Dounreay, only a minority were from the local labour force.
493 This illustrates how the
government was successful in attracting people to the area, realising its aim of
reversing depopulation (at least in the short term) and encouraging the area as a
growth point. However, accommodation had to be found for the influx of new
workers. UKAEA had already constructed 501 houses in Thurso for the influx of
workers to the area, but there was a waiting list of nine months for a house, such was
the demand. Obviously this was of some concern to all involved in the construction
since  accommodating  the  extra  workers  in  temporary  accommodation  was  not
desirable.
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UKAEA worked with Thurso Town Council, the Scottish Department of
Health and the Scottish Special Housing Association to solve the accommodation
issue by presenting a jointly prepared memorandum to the Treasury asking for
finances to pay for the construction of 200 houses necessary for the locally recruited
workers who were not entitled to Authority housing under the Authority’s policy of
only housing key workers imported into the area where the Local Authority (in this
instance Thurso Town Council) could not.
494 A total of 1400 houses were built, with
1007 being provided by UKAEA itself.
495 As a result approximately £6m was spent
on infrastructural improvements to the Thurso area for the needs of the new site.
496
The breakdown of this can be seen in Table 4.3:
Table 4.3 Estimated expenditure on infrastructure pertaining to the Dounreay
nuclear power facility
Cost £
Housing £4,500,000
Drains and Sewers £64,000
Water Supply £82,000
Electricity £460,000
Schools £992,000
Hospitals £32,000
Total Expenditure £6,130,000
Source: Briefing for Minister of Technology prepared by BR Thomas, Secretariat
UKAEA London Office, 29/11/1965. TNA PRO AB44/18.
The  infrastructural  expenditure  was  approximately  a  quarter  of  the  overall
expenditure concerned with the entire development. The infrastructure was not
designed to foster greater industrial growth, but was developed and constructed
specifically to meet the needs of the new facility. There was no attempt at attracting
other industry to the area during this period. Government viewed the construction and
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operation of Dounreay, at least in the first instance, as an experimental research based
development that had no explicit role to play in solving the economic and social
problems of the area it was located in. Of course, this wasn’t the case for the national
economic interest. Thus the distinction between national economic benefit and local
economic benefit is clear. Dounreay was about helping remedy the national economic
situation through technological advancement with any local economic benefit a
purely residual factor. The fast reactor was a national project, created and operated
with the intention of harnessing the potential of atomic energy for national needs. Of
course, Sir David Robertson and several members of the Lords were happy to point
out the economic potential of the development for the area, but nowhere was this
mentioned  in  the  intra-departmental  government  correspondence  or  public
announcements. The government was very clear that the development was not to be
considered an economic solution to the problems in the Caithness area - it was a
research and development project charged with the task of improving the knowledge
of the scientists working on it of fast breeder technology so that it could be harnessed
for industrial and civil use. Hector Hughes, Labour MP for Aberdeen North enquired
in the House of Commons about the possibility of Dounreay providing electricity for
the development of industry in Scotland and was met with the response by then
Secretary of State for Scotland, John Maclay (Conservative MP for Renfrewshire
West),  who  responded,  ‘Dounreay  is  primarily  a  research  and  development
establishment. I understand that the amount of electricity produced is likely to be
small and any surplus will be available to the North of Scotland Hydro Electric
Board.’
497 The government was principally concerned with the development of the
fast reactor before committing itself to placing the DFR at the centre of any economic
development in the Highlands.
Before construction started the Treasury asked for estimates from UKAEA for
the expected construction costs of Dounreay. Since a fast reactor on this scale had
never been built before they were effectively grasping in the dark - the original
estimates, seen in the first column of the following table under the heading ‘1955
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estimates’, were thus quite different from the final costs. The differing estimates
reflect the urgency with which work was carried out constructing the plant - there was
little cost-breakdown of expected construction and development costs at the outset
such was the haste to get the project underway. We can see from the table below that
costs began to rise from the moment construction started - this was a result of changes
to the design in the reactor and its outlying buildings, the decision to build the
Dounreay  Materials  Testing  Reactor  (DMTR)  and  difficulties  involved  in
constructing the plant itself. One example of this was the construction of the effluent
tunnel that had to be lengthened as a result of hydrographic surveys on the dispersal
of discharged liquids into the sea.
498 These surveys did not report their findings back
until after construction had started, necessitating lengthening of the tunnel and more
money being required as a result. The Treasury met the rising costs during the
construction period with some concern; although at no point did it deny any requests
for extra finance. The breakdown of the original estimate of the construction of the
facility and its subsequent amendments can be seen as follows:
Table 4.4 UKAEA Estimates for construction of Dounreay nuclear power facility
Group 1955 Oct. 1956 Oct. 1957 July 1958
Fast Reactor £6,400,000 £7,076,000 £8,147,000 £8,841,000
Chemical Plants £3,537,000 £5,531,000 £6,418,000 £6,862,000
R.E. 775 and Rigs £1,655,000 £1,788,000 £2,191,000 £2,555,000
General Facilities and
Services including NPTR
connections
£2,270,000 £3,480,000 £4,072,000 £4,186,000
Temporary Facilities £600,000 £1,112,000 £1,246,000 £1,251,000
R&D Branch schemes in
Support of fast Reactor
N/A £200,000 £200,000 £200,000
District Safety N/A N/A £100,000 £286,000
Sub Total £14,462,000 £19,187,000 £22,374,000 £24,181,000
Contingencies £3,318,000 £1,313,000 £376,000 £319,000
Total £17,780,000 £20,500,000 £22,750,000 £24,500,000
Source: Letter from VHE Cole to RA Thomson, Atomic Energy Office (UKAEA),
21/08/1958. TNA PRO T225/716.
                                                
498 Letter from RA Thompson, Atomic Energy Office, London, to I de L Radice, Treasury, 01/02/1957,
TNA PRO T225/716.189
The  ‘highly experimental’  nature  of  the  reactor  led  to  several  revisions  and
amendments to the estimates to the cost throughout the construction of the facility.
499
The design of the reactor was amended, as was the design of various parts of the plant
including the effluent tunnel into the sea and the discovery that the airfield was in a
worse state of repair than hoped, resulting in more cost revisions.
500 Given that a
reactor of this type had never been constructed before it is no surprise that there were
several amendments to the cost.  The Treasury was given a full explanation for each
revision and amendment to the cost, ranging from ‘inadequate assessment’ through
‘frank underestimate’  to  ‘changes arising from Fleck safety and organisational
recommendations’, stemming from the Fleck Report of December 1957 set up in
response to a major nuclear accident at the Windscale nuclear power plant earlier that
year.
501 The Treasury accepted these reasons and continued to agree to the revisions
and amendments. Towards the end of the construction period UKAEA, mindful of the
escalating costs and nearing completion of construction, put a programme in place
starting in 1958 of running down the constructional labour force from 1400 at the
beginning of 1958 to 300 by November that year to around 100 after March 1959.
502
As a result of the amendments and revisions of both cost and design the reactor’s
start-up  was  delayed  several  times.  As  we  can  see  from  Table  4.4,  the  pre-
construction estimate of £15m followed by the estimate of £17.78m in 1955 were
some way off the 1958 final estimate of £24.5m. UKAEA took the decision to finalise
the cost of the construction of Dounreay in 1958 stating, ‘Finally, we have drawn a
line  to  the  projects  now  proceeding  on  the  Dounreay  site  and  any  capital
improvements  or  extensions  will  be  treated  as  separate  additional  projects.’
503
Construction of the DMTR was completed in February 1958, by September the
                                                
499 Letter from VHE Cole to RA Thomson, Atomic Energy Office (UKAEA), 21/08/1958, TNA PRO
T225/716.
500 Letter from RA Thompson, Atomic Energy Office, London, to I de L Radice, Treasury, 01/02/1957,
TNA PRO T225/716.
501 Letter from RA Thompson, Atomic Energy Office, London, to I de L Radice, Treasury, 01/02/1957,
TNA PRO T225/716. Letter from VHE Cole to RA Thomson, Atomic Energy Office (UKAEA),
21/08/1958, TNA PRO T225/716. Energy Authority (Fleck Committee) Cmnd. 338, (HMSO, London,
1957).
502 Letter from VHE Cole to RA Thomson, Atomic Energy Office (UKAEA), 21/08/1958, TNA PRO
T225/716.
503 Letter from VHE Cole to RA Thomson, Atomic Energy Office (UKAEA), 21/08/1958, TNA PRO
T225/716.190
famous sphere was completed and construction of the experimental fast reactor was
completed in December of the same year, followed by completion of the fast reactor
chemical plant (for reprocessing) the following July.
504
Operation
Dounreay’s  experimental  fast  reactor  achieved  criticality  (full  reacting
operation) in November 1959 having been delayed several times after construction
had finished, most notably by the four day fire at Windscale (until Chernobyl, the
world’s  worst  nuclear  accident)  and  UKAEA’s  subsequent  preoccupation  with
remedying it.
505 The new reactor was fuelled by a mix of fertile material (uranium
238) and fissile material (uranium 235 or plutonium) that would ‘breed’
506 more
fissile material, meaning a net gain of more fissile material than it had started with
507,
hence the government’s interest in starting the project as quickly as possible. The
60MW thermal output, with 14MW of actual electrical output (often described as
‘useful output’ by various reporters) was not reached until July 1963.
508 Prior to this,
problems with using the liquid molten metal coolant (sodium or a potassium/sodium
mix, both of which are very flammable and very dangerous when they come into
contact with water) had prevented the reactor operating at full capacity. The Queen
Mother  visited  the  site  on  the  14
th  August  1961  to  launch  the  resumption  of
experimental work on the fast reactor after a number of extensive modifications had
been undertaken.
509 Once the reactor reached full operational capacity it performed
well enough that UKAEA undertook a project for a reference design for a full-scale
operational fast reactor station with a 500MW capacity, with the intention that the
Dounreay reactor would carry out the concepts in the new design on an intermediate
scale.
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The new design was supplemented with other designs that were intended to
achieve ‘higher output and higher ‘burn-up’ per fuel element’ in the new reactor and
improve upon the existing technology
510. The first electrical output produced by the
new reactor was on the 14
th October 1962, achieved on a by-product basis.
511 That is,
the electrical output was a by-product of the experiments being run in the reactor and
not an end in itself. The success of the experimental reactor at Dounreay in achieving
an electrical output prompted calls for a larger-scale fast reactor to be built from
many in UKAEA and was met with a positive response in government. Indeed, the
experimental reactor at Dounreay was performing almost as expected, with the
exception of the problems with the liquid metal coolant, and informed much of this
positive view. The government was happy with it and the people in the Caithness and
Sutherland area were happy with it. Dounreay had brought employment and people to
the area whilst increasing wages at the same time. For an establishment that was
primarily experimental and research-based, Dounreay had had some success in
alleviating the social and economic problems of the area. The belief was that a full-
scale reactor built to supply electricity to the national grid could benefit industry in
any area, not least in the minds of the locals in the Caithness and Sutherland area.
  UKAEA and the government’s desire to see a larger, more productive fast
reactor built was such that less than six years after reaching criticality and with
intermittent supply to the National Grid, the decision was taken to build a new
prototype commercial fast reactor (PFR). Between 1964 and 1965 UKAEA were
working on two different proposals for the design of the new reactor, settling on a
proposal for a 600MW thermal output station with a useful output of 250MW using
components suitable for a full-scale commercial fast reactor power station.
512 The use
of components suitable for full-scale fast reactor operation was vital if fast reactor
technology was to become a viable commercial enterprise for the government - that
is, if the government was going to be able to sell commercial fast reactor stations
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capable of producing electricity to other countries. The government’s intentions for
the fast reactor were not simply the production of extra fissile material (plutonium or
uranium  235)  or  potentially  cheaper  energy  supplies,  but  also  to  export  the
technology for financial gain and retain its position as the world leader in fast reactor
research.
513 Of the three, only one was to be achieved. The experimental reactor at
Dounreay had shown the way towards the production of extra fissile material, but it
was believed that without the construction of a larger scale prototype fast reactor, the
potential cheaper energy source and expensive export for the government may never
appear, at least in the minds of government and UKAEA during the early 1960s. As a
result, the decision was made to build a new, larger fast reactor capable of producing
electricity. The new large-scale fast reactor was viewed by UKAEA as ‘an ‘essential
intermediate step’ towards a 1000MW commercial station by 1978.’
514, this before the
construction  had  even  started  on  the  station.  The  development  of  fast  reactor
technology during this period was very much a case of trying to run before learning to
walk such was the desire on the part of government in the UK to have it operational
as soon as possible and making money for the nation. However, the question again of
where to site the reactor rose to prominence.
Dounreay’s success in operating the experimental fast reactor made it in the
minds of many, mostly in Scotland it should be said, the natural choice for the
location of the new reactor. After all, the actual physical experimentation of the fast
reactor technology had taken place there, it held the largest concentration of scientists
and engineers working on fast reactor technology, it was capable of reprocessing the
spent fuel (crucial to the project as it was this process that allowed the extraction of
the extra fissile material) and the people of Caithness and Sutherland had been willing
enough in the first place to take the risk of siting a potentially very dangerous
operation on their doorstep. It was thus felt by many in Scotland, and a few in
England, that Dounreay was a ‘natural’ choice. However, the new reactor project was
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not borne of the same desires and wants as the original. The original reactor, as stated
earlier, was a primarily experimental reactor designed to further the knowledge of fast
reactor technology amidst a culture of increasing knowledge of nuclear technology in
general in the UK. The new reactor was to be the culmination of this research as well
as capable of producing electricity to feed into the National Grid and be an attractive
proposition to potential customers looking to purchase the technology, although
importantly it was still a prototype. The aim of the new reactor was to show fast
reactor technology could work on a large scale and was to act as a shop window to
the world of Britain’s ability to build commercial fast reactors. It was to reflect the
ambitions of government - regionally, nationally and internationally. As a result
however, Dounreay’s location, the very thing that brought the experimental reactor to
the area in the first place, went from being its major plus point to its potential
Achilles  heel.  An  alternative  site,  Winfrith  in  Dorset,  was  Dounreay’s  major
competitor for the new reactor. The Ministry of Technology prepared a draft Cabinet
paper that outlined the considerations at which it was to make its choice. These were:
i)  long-term  planning  of  the  Authority’s  research  and  development
programme;
ii)  costs;
iii)  technical  considerations  affecting  the  fast  reactor  development
programme;
iv)  social and related questions.
515
The creation of the Ministry of Technology in 1964 by the newly elected
Labour government brought UKAEA under the responsibility of the Minister of
Technology, Frank Cousins. Cousins’ announcement that Dounreay had won the race
to become the site of the new reactor on 16
th February 1966 was the culmination of
considerable wrangling between UKAEA, the Ministry of Technology, the newly
created Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDB), councils in the Highlands
and Dorset, the North of Scotland Hydro Electricity Board (NSHEB) (who were to be
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the potential recipient of the electricity generated if Dounreay won the race), the
Scottish  Office,  Westminster,  the  Crofter’s  Commission  and  the  media.
Unsurprisingly, given the number of different organisations involved, the decision
making process was complicated and fraught with self-interest, not least on the part of
the HIDB who were eager to show their worth to the people of the Highlands at the
first opportunity. UKAEA preferred Winfrith, the Ministry of Technology agreed
with them; Dounreay’s supporters included Caithness County Council, the Scottish
Office (in particular Willie Ross, the Secretary of State for Scotland), North of
Scotland Hydro Electricity Board, the Crofter’s Commission and the Scottish media.
The Cabinet did not make its preference known until the decision was announced,
however. The question then to be asked is, what changed the government’s mind to
believe that the new reactor, the Prototype Fast Reactor, could become the economic
and social saviour of the Caithness and Sutherland area when the previous reactor,
also developmental, was not?
The Second Coming of Dounreay
The wrangling on the part of the different factions for and against Dounreay
illustrates the importance with which the new fast reactor was held. There was a firm
belief on the Scottish side that the fast reactor would benefit Scottish industry and
help deal with the Highland problem. The Crofters’ Commission, acting as it put it ‘in
exercise of their statutory duty under section 2(1) of the (Crofters Scotland) Act, 1955
to keep under general review all matters relating to crofting and in particular the
‘need for industries to provide supplementary occupations for crofters or work for
their families’’
516 wrote to Willie Ross as Secretary of State for Scotland to convince
him (not that he needed much convincing, it should be noted) of the importance of the
new reactor to the Highlands. The Crofters’ Commission was specifically concerned
with the welfare of its own members, but framed its point in the wider context of
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Highland  development.  It  made  4  specific  points  regarding  its  concerns  over
Dounreay. These points were:
1.  Some 1400 people travel from all parts of Sutherland and Caithness to work at
Dounreay and this employment has brought a much needed prosperity to the
area. A conservative estimate of the number of crofters’ families included in
this figure is 500.
2. The  crofting  population  in  the  North  of  Scotland,  and  particularly  in
Sutherland, requires steady employment of this kind if viable communities are
to be maintained. The Commission take the view that it is of prime importance
that every possible opportunity should be taken to extend employment.
3. The  Commission  would  particularly  emphasise  the  disastrous  effect  on
population structure when young people are unable to find employment within
their own area, and only the aged and infirm are left to look after the crofts,
with the result that many crofts eventually fall derelict.
4.  The need for industrial employment in the crofting areas will be greatly
increased if the Commission seek to implement current Government policy in
regard to the amalgamation of holdings. The Commission are seriously
concerned at the possible effect on crofting opinion throughout the whole area
if other employment is not available to make good the very considerable
reduction in the numbers engaged in agriculture which seems inevitable.
517
The points made by the Crofters’ Commission were very similar to many of those
made by the others in favour of Dounreay, albeit more focused on the welfare of
crofters specifically.  The Scottish case for Dounreay was focused on the industrial
benefits that the new fast reactor would purportedly bring helping to alleviate the
social and economic problems of the area. To this end, there was correspondence
between  the  Scottish  Development  Department,  the  Highlands  and  Islands
Development Board, the North of Scotland Hydro Electricity Board, the Department
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of Agriculture, Caithness County Council and the Scottish Office in the formulation
of the Scottish Office’s proposal to be put to the Cabinet before the decision was
taken on where to locate the new reactor. Willie Ross, as Secretary of State for
Scotland, was to present his proposal for Dounreay to the Cabinet. The SDD,
Department of Agriculture and HIDB were instrumental in the formulation of the
proposal, detailing the arguments for Dounreay and statistical data for Ross, whereas
the NSHEB provided technical details relating to line voltage, transmission costs and
work required to build the new lines.
In respect of regional policy at the time, Tom Lister at the Department of
Agriculture  in  a  letter  to  Sir  Matthew  Campbell  at  the  Scottish  Development
Department made the point that:
This over-concentration problem is facing France, Germany, Italy, indeed
almost all the modern industrial countries. If the constriction can be removed
the whole of the country’s resources can be used more efficiently. The problem
in resolving them is not primarily money but techniques. Regional development
is still a young science. The trouble is that governments outside have to proceed
by persuasion… There are however a few areas where government can act at its
own hand and Dounreay is one… The idea of concentrating scientific effort in
one area is a current European anachronism. The Americans recognise that with
the air transport revolution the benefits of propinquity can be realised together
with the benefits of deconcentration.
518
Lister’s point about the dispersal of industry from areas of industrial concentration to
other regions was an important one. The Toothill Report had recommended that
unemployment was not a sufficient criterion for the application of regional policy
recommending instead that government encourage the idea of the region and establish
‘growth centres’ in areas based on ‘geographical location, communication facilities,
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development potential or established industrial base.’
519 Dounreay of course was well
placed in relation to all four of these conditions, a point not lost on the supporters of
the Scottish case and indeed emphasised at every opportunity by them. Certainly, the
DFR had ingrained itself into the local economy, increasing the population in the area
from 3200 in 1951 to around 9000 by 1966
520 with £53m being spent up until the 31
st
March 1964 on the facility.
521 However, Winfrith was still the preferred choice of
UKAEA and the Ministry of Technology on its technical and economic merits. This
was due to its research expertise in all aspects of atomic research, the fact it would be
cheaper to locate the PFR there to the tune of about £8m at 1970 prices in light of its
proximity to existing grid lines and staffing professional grade workers would be
easier in comparison to Dounreay and its remoteness (this had be been a problem with
manning the DFR).
522
The creation of the Highlands and Islands Development Board under the
provisions set out by the Highlands and Islands Development (Scotland) Act in 1965
is crucial to the story here. Professor Sir Robert Grieve was appointed to the Board as
chairman in the autumn of 1965 and warned the Secretary of State for Scotland,
Willie Ross, that ‘an entirely new approach was needed, one ‘completely foreign’ to
the previous practice of the Scottish Office’.
523 This would be the first time in
Highland history that policy in respect of the area would be developed and executed
by a Highland-specific board. The new board was facilitated with powers to award
grants, loans, equity participation and new factory building for a wide range of
economic activities within the area it was to operate in – Shetland (then called
Zetland), Argyll, Caithness, Ross and Cromarty, Inverness, Orkney, and Sutherland,
the 7 crofting counties.
524 It was also to advise the Scottish Office on economic
                                                
519 Johnston et al, Structure and Growth of the Scottish Economy, (Collins, London & Glasgow, 1971),
pg. 321.
520 Turnock, D, Patterns of Highland Development, (Macmillan, London, 1970), pg. 169.
521 Telex from Bell, Scottish Office to Pottinger, London entitled Notes on Dounreay, 13/12/65, NAS
SEP14/1619.
522 Cabinet discussion, CC 66, Minute No. 2, 08/02/1966, TNA PRO CAB128/41.
523 Hetherington, A, Highlands and Islands, pg. 4.
524 Lythe, C & Majmudar, M, The Renaissance of the Scottish Economy? (George Allen & Unwin,
London, 1982), pg. 200.198
matters relating to these counties as responsibility for the provision of its economic
powers still lay with the Secretary of State for Scotland. The ultimate responsibility
for the counties lay not with the Secretary of State for Scotland however, but with
Westminster and Whitehall - the determinants and holders of the purse strings. The
HIDB viewed Dounreay as an ideal site for the new prototype fast reactor and
embarked on a campaign of persuasion to have it sited there, utilising its powers to
gain access to the Minister of Technology and arranging a meeting with him to press
its case as well as working with the Secretary of State for Scotland on a proposal
backing Dounreay as the choice.
The HIDB’s campaign to have Dounreay as the location for the new reactor
was as much to do with its remit of improving the economic performance of the
Highlands as it was to do with establishing itself as a branch of regional government
with meaning in Scotland. Indeed, Grieve made this clear in a letter to Willie Ross
where he stated that if Dounreay was not awarded the PFR it ‘would be a disastrous
start for the Board and [would] call into question the validity of the Government’s
declared policy of Highlands Development.’
525 Grieve then restated this view to the
media in an interview with the Aberdeen  Press  &  Journal printed on the 20
th
December 1965, the day of his meeting with Cousins to press the case for Dounreay,
stating,
If Dounreay is selected it will be in the best interests of the United Kingdom as
a whole. At least, it will be relative to the whole theme of decentralisation in
Britain,  rather  than  concentrating  major  industries  and  Government
establishments in the more thickly populated areas… It will be a tremendous
boost to the Highlands, if we succeed, and especially to the new development
board… This Dounreay project is terribly important to us especially when we
are in such an infant stage in life as a board.
526
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Other newspapers in Scotland carried similar warnings to the government of the
‘importance’ of siting the new prototype reactor at Dounreay. Jo Grimond, Leader of
the Liberals and MP for Orkney and Shetland, at an Inverness press conference
marking the end of a tour by the four Liberal MPs for the Highlands of the area, was
quoted by The Scotsman, as saying that ‘it was imperative that the Government site
the reactor at Dounreay because of their regional planning policies and their desire,
expressed so often, that business interests should go to the North.’
527 As a long-time
supporter of the idea of a Highland development authority and MP for Orkney and
Shetland it is no surprise that Grimond was of this opinion of course.
528 Grimond’s
comments echoed the sentiments expressed by the MPs themselves who argued ‘If
the new reactor is not sited at Dounreay in Caithness it will be a terrible blow to the
Highlands and to the new Government-sponsored Highland Development Board on
which the people of the Highlands are pinning so much faith.’
529 These articles were
designed to put pressure on the Minister to agree to site the new reactor at Dounreay
as soon as possible. UKAEA and the Ministry of Technology were pretty much alone
in thinking that Winfrith, for all its technical and financial suitability, should be the
recipient of the new reactor, in no small part due to the area’s chronic labour
shortage
530 and Labour’s election promises of regional development. Winfrith was
overstocked with nuclear reactors and the labour shortage meant there was little or no
lobbying for it to be the new site from the area.
Concurrent with the pressure from the Scots was the fact that the government
had also reneged on its promise to build a new hydro-electric scheme at Fada-Fionn
in Wester Ross by shelving its plans to do so, contravening the manifesto that Labour
had campaigned on that the hydro-electric schemes of this type were examples of
public enterprise that it believed should be extended.
531 This created widespread anger
in the Highlands and led many to question the commitment of the government to
solving the problems in the Highlands. This did not escape the notice of the Scottish
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Office where correspondence between the Department of Agriculture and the Scottish
Development Department over the tack Grieve and the Secretary of State should take
when promoting Dounreay’s case to the government in Westminster stated, ‘I am
clear  he  should  keep  off  the  technological  arguments  which  have  been  fully
canvassed by SDD, including the possible loss of Social Capital development at
Dounreay. The ‘political’ case - the need for government to demonstrate its sincerity
in regional development in the Highlands following Fada-Fionn have also been well
purveyed and was reinforced, if indeed it needed it, by Grimond yesterday.’
532 The
focus on the social and economic aspects of the issue was a deliberate ploy by HIDB
and the Scottish Office to put pressure on the government and make it clear to the
public what was at stake, thus helping gain public support for Dounreay’s case.
Dounreay’s technical suitability as the site for the new prototype was not as strong as
Winfrith’s and as a result it was decided to focus on other aspects to help Dounreay’s
case. The Liberals were taking advantage of the growing public feeling over the siting
of the new reactor and were strengthening the political argument for the reactor’s
location in the North. Thus, focusing on the social and economic justifications for
Dounreay meant the likelihood of success would bring with it, if all went well, a
degree of political benefit.
The approach by those in favour of Dounreay was very much a case of ends
justifying the means, such was the desire to win the race. This is illustrated by a
communication between the Scottish Office and the NSHEB in relation to the
development of the memorandum for Dounreay to be read by the Cabinet at its final
meeting to decide on the site for the new prototype reactor that stated ‘I doubt
whether the argument about transmission costs would stand up to much informed
examination but I hope it will serve the purpose’ in relation to the ‘need’ for the
prototype reactor to be sited at Dounreay.
533 The full text of the communication reads
as follows:
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The power from the PFR at Dounreay will be most valuable in meeting the
needs of the Aberdeen area. By 1975 the total demand will be of the order of
700MW and by this year there will be little surplus of hydro-power in the north.
Thus, if the PFR is not located at Dounreay, Aberdeen’s needs must therefore
be met by new generation in the North or by planned import from the Central
Belt under the assumption that ample capacity will be provided there. There are
difficult problems involved in transmitting from the South such a large block of
power over the distances involved and a much better balance would be struck if
250MW were available in the north from the PFR. It is, however, impossible at
this stage to speculate on the solution which will be chosen although it is clear
that a conventional steam station of the size required for economic operation
could not be accommodated in the northern grid. A figure for the additional cost
to the Board of meeting Aberdeen’s needs if the PFR is not built at Dounreay
can be taken hypothetically as the cost of providing transmission lines giving
full security of supply for 250MW from the Central Belt; this would be about
£3m. This assessment assumes that the basic cost of putting 250MW into the
Scottish grid if the PFR does not go to Dounreay is the same as the cost of
similar provision in the South of England if it does not go to Winfrith Heath.
534
The above is interesting for a number of reasons. The Scottish Office was clearly
prepared  to  put  into  a  memorandum  to  the  Cabinet  information  that  was  not
necessarily true but served the purpose of making Dounreay seem like a more
attractive proposition that it necessarily was. The assertion over transmission costs
was tenuous at best; the Scottish Office knew that transmitting power from the
Central Belt would be no more difficult or necessarily expensive than transmitting
power from Dounreay. In fact, since the distance involved is less from the Central
Belt, it is not unreasonable to assume that it would indeed be more expensive from
Dounreay, given the extra distance, more rugged terrain for the large part and
subsequent transportation costs. It was also based on the assumption that the PFR
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would be on full operational capacity of 250MW by 1975, which at that time was not
unreasonable, but was proved otherwise.
Grieve’s meeting with Cousins went as well as could have reasonably been
expected, although it did not finish with any promises that the PFR would be sited at
Dounreay. Indeed, if anything it was the opposite impression with which Grieve came
away  from  the  meeting.  Grieve  later  described  him  as  ‘tough, forthright and
discouraging.’
535 During the course of the meeting Cousins made it clear that he did
not favour Dounreay and was in actual fact unenthused about the idea that Dounreay
could be a trigger for future development. The minutes of the meeting state: ‘As for
Dounreay as a trigger to other development, he had been deeply disappointed during
his visit to see how little effect it had had. The changes were superficial changes. If
the stimulation of local employment was the aim they would have been better to give
£100,000 or so to each of the locals and let them get on with it.’
536 This is in contrast
to the impression given by Cousins’ biographer Geoffrey Goodman who states that:
The majority of his advisors, and quite a few of his fellow Ministers, argued
that to site it [the PFR] at Dounreay was absurdly uneconomic and physically
unrealistic. Cousins however fought for the ‘social factors’ to be considered;
there was high unemployment in the area and little hope. Building a nuclear
power plant would help to generate new hope as well as jobs in the north of
Scotland…
537
Cousins was concerned with the ‘social factors’ of the siting of the reactor, but was
firmly on the side of Winfrith as a result of the briefings he received from UKAEA
and his underlings at the Ministry of Technology, recommending that the PFR be
sited at Winfrith, with the condition that the government announce the steps it would
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take to help the Caithness area as the work from the original reactor came to an end.
538
He was emphatically not a supporter of Dounreay as the choice of site, stating during
the meeting with Grieve ‘The Scots tended to think they were losing if they did not
win three times out of three where perhaps once out of three would be a good
record.’
539 Typically, Ross’ response to this was ‘Nonsense. What have we won from
Mr Cousins?’
540
Cousins further cited a number of different reasons at the meeting with Grieve
as to why he was not in favour of Dounreay. Personal experience played a large part
in this; Cousins had visited Dounreay prior to his meeting with Grieve and was
unimpressed with what he saw, preferring Winfrith instead. Cousins did not accept
the argument that Dounreay could be an economic trigger and was ‘disillusioned’
about the ‘creation of a new atmosphere of confidence and hope. Far from the
children growing up to form a new reservoir of skilled men and women for the
Highlands, he had found parents growing increasingly anxious because they knew
there were no opportunities for them. The flow of ideas and men with ideas was still
an outward one.’
541 It was not Cousins’ remit to solve the problems in the Highlands
as the Minister of Technology. His remit was to recommend where to site the PFR at
the location best suited to its needs. Further to this, the commercial considerations of
the PFR needed to be taken into account. If the PFR was to be a commercial success
then, so the argument went, it would need to be sited closer to centres of population
and not far away on the periphery in order to allay any fears over its safety that
potential customers may have had. The PFR was intended as a ‘showroom to the
world’, but Dounreay lacked the communication facilities and crucially, the social
facilities to satisfy this particular criteria.
542
                                                
538 Cabinet discussion, 08/02/1966, TNA PRO CAB128/41.
539 Minutes of Meeting between Prof Robert Grieve and Frank Cousins, Minister of Technology
20/12/65, NAS SEP14/1619.
540 Letter from NC Telfer Scottish Office to Pottinger, Daley (SDD), Ross (DAFS) 23/12/1965. NAS
SEP14/1619.
541 Minutes of Meeting between Prof Robert Grieve and Frank Cousins, Minister of Technology
20/12/65, NAS SEP14/1619.
542 Minutes of Meeting between Prof Robert Grieve and Frank Cousins, Minister of Technology
20/12/65, NAS SEP14/1619.204
Winfrith on the other hand was ideally suited to this, already hosting all four
of the reactor types that the UKAEA was developing (the Advanced Gas-Cooled
Reactor (AGR), the Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor, the High Temperature
Gas Cooled reactor (this was an international project named the Dragon reactor) and
the fast reactor albeit on a far smaller scale), as well as five other experimental
reactors and the communication and social facilities that Dounreay lacked.
543 Winfrith
was the choice of UKAEA and the Ministry of Technology for a multitude of reasons.
It was estimated at approximately £3m cheaper in capital costs than Dounreay which
was estimated at £30m capital cost, although £2.7m of this could be written off as the
North  of  Scotland  Hydro  Electricity  Board  would  need  to  construct  several
transmission lines to meet expected demand in future years if Dounreay was not
selected; there was also concern over the losses in transmission of electricity to other
areas that building the PFR at Dounreay would incur, estimated to be 2% greater at
Dounreay than at Winfrith which would be at a capital cost of £0.6m. If Dounreay
was selected as the site for the new reactor then it would also involve the UKAEA
effectively operating two fast reactor sites which, it was argued, would result in a loss
of efficiency as well as much of the background physics work required for the
operation of the PFR was to be carried out at Winfrith where the facilities already
existed.  Further,  staffing  professional  grades  at  Dounreay  had  already  proved
problematic  and,  it  was  argued,  would  continue  to  do  so.
544 Thus Cousins
recommended that Winfrith be chosen for the site of the new PFR over Dounreay.
Cousins’ case for Winfrith over Dounreay was certainly persuasive, but it was
by no means the only proposal on the table. Willie Ross argued very strongly for
Dounreay, emphasising the potential importance of siting PFR there to the local
economy and population. Ross accentuated the social and economic aspects of the
needs of the Highlands and the ‘necessity’ of choosing Dounreay over Winfrith in
order to meet them. If Dounreay was not chosen then the work at the experimental
reactor would wind down around seven or eight years from 1966, with the numbers
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employed reduced to about 1200 by 1971 and closure in 1973.
545 Thus, there was
considerable concern over what would happen to the area should Dounreay not win
the race. This did not escape the attention of members of the Scottish Labour Party
who made it clear to Frank Cousins in meeting with him that siting the PFR at
Dounreay would be of political benefit to the party, citing the previous Conservative
government’s initiatives including the Wiggins Teape paper pulp mill in Corpach and
the BMC and Rootes factories near Glasgow. Thus, the Scottish Labour Party were
very keen on Dounreay being chosen for the site of the new PFR, pointing out to
Cousins that the government had yet to site any new industrial projects in Scotland in
spite of its stated commitment to helping the Scottish economy and if it were to site
the first one suitable for Scotland elsewhere then it would not create a favourable
impression politically.
546 Cousins accepted their advice but refused to change his
stance and pointed out that the PFR’s ‘effect on employment in the Highlands, or
wherever it went, would be negligible’, and that ‘it was very important this was
understood.’
547 Responding to this the members argued that the PFR  ‘had become
some sort of symbol in the campaign for Highlands development. If it were sited at
Dounreay, they felt sure that it would have the effect of stimulating industry in the
Highlands.’
548
Dounreay had become a political hot potato. The government did not want to
make a decision until it had the respective submissions from the Scottish Office and
the Ministry of Technology, meanwhile the media begun to question Dounreay’s
chances, increasing the pressure on the government to make a favourable decision for
the area, with The Scotsman running an article entitled ‘Reactor Hopes Fade’ on 11
th
January 1966. With the idea that Dounreay might not be the choice for the PFR in
mind the government had commissioned Sir Maurice Dean, the permanent secretary
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of the Ministry of Technology and a meticulous analyst
549, to provide an analysis of
the potential consequences for Dounreay in the event of the PFR going to Winfrith.
Dean produced the following table to show potential scenarios for the area:
Table 4.5 Numbers employed at Dounreay with and without PFR
Numbers employed at Dounreay 1966.
Professional Ancillary Industrial Apprentices Total
1966 330 580 1280 180 2320
Numbers employed at Dounreay with PFR
Professional Ancillary Industrial Apprentices Total
1971 300 560 1250 100 2210
Numbers employed at Dounreay without PFR
Professional Ancillary Industrial Apprentices Total
1971 240 500 1040 100 1880
Source: Siting of the Prototype Fast Reactor, note by Sir Maurice Dean, 17/01/1966.
National Archives Scotland folder NAS SEP14/1619.
As Table 4.5 shows, if Dounreay was chosen as the new site, the PFR would employ
a total of 2210 workers in 1971, reducing to 1190 by 1976. Should Dounreay not be
chosen however, the numbers employed in 1971 would be 1880, followed by only a
nominal number in 1976. Since atomic energy was not a ‘growth industry’ per se (it
was more capital intensive than it was labour intensive), it is not surprising that the
Ministry of Technology and UKAEA did not see the benefit in siting the reactor at
Dounreay, given the technical and economic arguments in favour of Winfrith. It
should be noted however that Dean’s figures did not account for those employed
outwith UKAEA that were dependent on the facility and the business its employees
brought to the area. It also did not account for any further employment that may be
gained from the PFR being sited at Dounreay from other industries.
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The existing reactor at Dounreay, the DFR, had hitherto been unfavourable to
the attraction of other industries to the area, however. The idea that it would be a
growth point in the mould suggested by the Toothill report had not rung true to date
and according to some (namely Cousins and the Ministry of Technology) would not
do so either.
550 Given that Dean had produced figures for 1976, ten years after his
study was produced, it does not seem unreasonable to argue that the government
could have provided the conditions necessary for the area to thrive without the PFR
being sited there. A greater focus on infrastructural developments for the Highlands
as a whole would have helped the Caithness and Sutherland area by diluting its
remoteness, reducing the difficulties in getting there and siting industry there - better
road, air and rail links, more advanced factories, tax breaks for businesses siting their
operations in the area and improved communications with the rest of the UK could
have facilitated the area with conditions better suited to attracting industry to the area
than a large scale developmental nuclear power plant with limited scope for attracting
further industrial development, as made clear by experts.
As it was, the Caithness and Sutherland area remained a peripheral economy
sited away from major centres of population and markets, without modernised
transport or communications links and increased freight expenses because of the
distance, making it wholly unattractive to industry locating there. The government
had no immediately available alternate plan for Dounreay without the PFR however
and was under pressure from the Scots to make a decision favourable to Dounreay.
The government, if it was indeed committed to developing industry in the Highlands,
would have had to make up approximately 1190 jobs in ten years, according to
Dean’s projected figures. Since the argument was made that the nuclear power
industry was not a growth industry in labour terms by UKAEA itself and the Ministry
of  Technology  in  their  submissions  to  the  government
551, this hardly seems a
prohibitively difficult task given that it had until 1973 before the original reactor was
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due to be closed down. This point was made by George Willis, Minister of State for
the Scottish Office, in the Glasgow Herald on the 14
th January 1966 when he stated
‘the development of the Highlands requires a whole lot of measures in a number of
different fields, all of which are important and without which development cannot
take place.’
552 Dounreay was of course but one of these measures, with the pulp mill
at Corpach, the development of Aviemore and (latterly) the smelter at Invergordon
being three of the other main government sponsored developments of the period. The
government  had  been  elected  on  a  commitment  to  regional  development  and
economic planning, the HIDB had been created to help achieve this in the Highlands
and Dounreay was the first major test of this commitment.
Decision Time
The Cabinet minutes detailing the discussion of the siting of the reactor show
a degree how Willie Ross framed his arguments for Dounreay. The arguments against
Dounreay from a technical and economic (in terms of fast reactor developments and
for the industry as a whole) viewpoint were considerable. However, Ross realised this
and focused his case on the economic situation of the Highlands as a whole, and in
particular the Caithness and Sutherland area. By framing his argument in this way
Ross circumvented the weakest part of Dounreay’s case and focused the argument on
the wider governmental policy towards the Highlands of economic and industrial
development. Ross argued that whilst the technological arguments were in favour of
Winfrith, the social and economic implications of denying Dounreay would far
outweigh Winfrith’s benefits. The siting of the original reactor at Dounreay had
created a community that had begun to thrive and in any event a further 1100 jobs
would be required by 1976 to maintain employment in the area at its 1966 level.
553 He
also pointed out the money spent on developing the housing and educational facilities
as well as other infrastructural improvements that would be wasted should Winfrith
win.
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The Cabinet agreed that maintaining the community that had been built up at
Dounreay  was  of  the  utmost  importance.  It  accepted  Ross’  argument  that  the
unemployment situation in Thurso would worsen without the PFR, whereas there was
an ‘extreme shortage of labour’ in Winfrith, although it was reported that locating at
the latter would be £8m cheaper than at Dounreay in 1970 prices.
554 Crucially, Ross
argued that if the government were to site the PFR at Winfrith it would contravene its
policy of regional development of industry. The Cabinet then came to the conclusion
that:
The additional cost of establishing the PFR at Dounreay was comparable with
that of the different investment grants to private industry in the development
regions.  Such  investment  grants  were  not  available  for  the  nationalised
industries, partly because their siting could be controlled by the Government as
a matter of policy. On these considerations it would therefore be contrary to the
Government’s policy for the regional development of industry and would cause
serious damage to confidence in the Government’s determination pursue this
policy in relation to Scotland if the PFR were sited at Winfrith.
555
Dounreay had won the battle on the basis of its social and economic position.
The new prototype reactor was to be located in Dounreay with the explicit promise
being made by Cousins that it would provide a ‘restoration of confidence in the
economy of the Northern Scottish area’ and that it would ‘provide cheaper electricity’
when in full operation.
556 The technical and economic considerations of siting the
PFR at Winfrith had lost out to economic and social concerns of Dounreay. The
government had no other plan for Dounreay in the event of Winfrith being chosen,
which Ross and the Scottish Office knew. Afterall, if it had then the Scottish Office
would have been involved in the formulation of it. Thus, Ross and the Scottish Office
were able to frame their argument in the economic and social implications for
                                                
554 Cabinet discussion, 08/02/1966, TNA PRO CAB128/41.
555 Cabinet discussion, 08/02/1966, TNA PRO CAB128/41.
556 BBC interview with Frank Cousins 09/02/1966 from web address:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/9/newsid_2730000/2730083.stm210
Dounreay, and by extension the Highlands as a whole, making up for Dounreay’s
shortfall in the technical and cost aspects. The government had no alternate plan for
Dounreay, and in spite of the Ministry of Technology’s warning that atomic energy
was not a growth area for employment, it went with Ross’ proposal as a result of the
mistaken  belief  that  Dounreay  would  act  as  a  growth  centre,  leading  to  other
developments, in spite of its failure to do so for the duration of the lifetime of the
original reactor. Therefore ignoring the advice of the experts and the lessons of recent
history.
The isolation of the Caithness region was not an attractive feature to other
industries  that  preferred  instead  to  locate  further  south,  closer  to  centres  of
populations and by extension, markets. Cousins and his staff had claimed, rightly as it
transpired, that the PFR would not lead to other industrial developments. The clamour
for the PFR to be sited at Dounreay had reached a crescendo however - the national
press in Scotland were making it clear that they expected Dounreay to be the
recipient; the HIDB was pushing Dounreay’s case, and by extension its own, as hard
as possible and crucially, Willie Ross was an ardent supporter of Dounreay’s case as
well as the case for Highland development. Concurrent with this however was the
wider national political situation that the Labour government found itself in. As it
turned out, Labour won the Caithness and Sutherland seat for the first time, from the
Liberals, at the following election in 1966, due in no small part to its decision to site
the PFR at Dounreay. It held the seat from 1966 until 1981; the only time it has ever
held the Caithness and Sutherland seat.
557 The members of the Scottish Labour Party
who made it clear to Frank Cousins that locating the reactor in Dounreay would help
the party in the area clearly knew what they were talking about.
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The Struggle for Power
The PFR at Dounreay was to take five years to construct and supply electric
power to the National Grid, and by 1978 was expected to have operated long enough
to facilitate the construction of a commercial fast reactor.
558 However, it did not
become operational until 1974
559, some three years later than the anticipated start-
date. The Select Committee on Nationalised Industries had stated in its May 1963
report that the ‘Authority [UKAEA] hope that a prototype will be operating by 1969
or 1970.’
560 These delays eventually began to increase in frequency during the PFR’s
construction due to the difficulties involved in harnessing the new technology. The
PFR officially reached criticality on 3
rd March 1974, just under a week before the
British Nuclear Energy Society held a major international conference on ‘Fast
Reactor Stations’ with delegates from all over the world, including the USA, France,
Europe, Third World countries and the Soviet Union. At the end of the conference the
French announced that their fast reactor project, the Phenix reactor, had also achieved
criticality.
561 Clearly the nuclear race was still on.
The  PFR’s  siting  at  Dounreay  resulted  in  little  extra  infrastructural
improvement as a result of the previous investment in the area for the DFR and the
fact that there was not a great deal more permanent staff required for the PFR. Thus,
the PFR was viewed as more of an affirmation of the Government’s commitment to
the area rather than an attempt at a whole new development. As a result, the
government’s attention was turned to attempting to attract new industries to the area.
However, Caithness and Sutherland’s remoteness did little to make this an easy task.
Transportation and haulage were still difficult problems to overcome for conventional
industry. Caithness and Sutherland are 70 miles away from the nearest city, Inverness
which in itself was not a major centre of population. The announcement in 1968 that
the Dounreay Materials Testing Reactor (DMTR) was to be shut down by mid 1969
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caused some concern amongst the local population over employment prospects.
562 As
a result, the Minister of Technology, the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Prime
Minister visited the area to assure the local population of the stability the DFR and
PFR would continue to provide, employing around 2100 people, as well as inspecting
the new PFR and the surrounding facilities.
563
The DFR provided income for the facility for the irradiation of foreign fuel
sources of £160,000 in 1967, £210,000 in 1968, and £860,000 in 1969, as well as a
further  £40,000  for  post  irradiation  examination  in  1969.  Thus,  the  DFR  was
providing a measure of stability regarding work in the area, although the intention
was that it would cease to operate approximately two to three years after the PFR was
started up and employment numbers would be reduced by approximately 3% per
year.
564 As it was the DFR closed in 1977.
565 The Prime Minister’s visit did not imbue
a sense of optimism in the future for the Highlands however. When questioned on the
future prospects of Dounreay the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, could only promise
stability into the mid-1970s. As a result, uncertainty over Dounreay, and by extension
Caithness and Sutherland’s, future began to develop. The Scotsman ran an article
entitled ‘Dounreay: Frontier without a future’ that played up the uncertainty over the
future of the establishment whilst detailing its success as a ‘social experiment’.
566 The
previous week it had run an article entitled ‘Dounreay’s post-1974 future uncertain,
indicates Prime Minister’ that observantly pointed out that Dounreay’s future was
inextricably tied to the decisions made by UKAEA and the developments of the
industry as a whole.
567
The Conservatives reorganisation of the nuclear industry (concurrent with the
privatisation of the electricity industry) along more private lines in 1989 followed the
announcement in 1988 that the PFR was to be decommissioned starting in 1994 along
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with the DMTR, leaving only two small reprocessing plants operational at the
development.
568 Fast reactor technology had proved to be very problematic, as well as
a very expensive undertaking - at no stage did the reactors ever work at full capacity
at Dounreay, in spite of the substantial sums spent on the technology. The major
problem was the instability of the liquid sodium used to cool the reactor core to
prevent overheating - several leaks in the steam generator in which the sodium was
passed caused numerous issues with the PFR, as well as one occasion when a storm in
the North Atlantic caused the off-shore cooling-water intake to suck up hundreds of
tonnes of seaweed, clogging the system and closing the generators altogether for
several weeks in October 1974.
569
Dounreay’s problems were not just limited to operational concerns however.
In May 1977 there was an explosion in the waste shaft containing plutonium and
uranium, the severity of which was not revealed to the public until 1995. Officials at
the plant released a small statement at the time describing the explosion as a ‘minor
incident’- in fact the shaft’s seven tonne concrete plug had been blown around 4m
into the air and thrown against a security fence and a steel plate of about 1.5m in
diameter, was blasted 12m into the air. Further, debris was hurtled over the security
fence including two 6m long scaffolding poles, one of which was found 40m away on
the  beach.  The  windows  of  the  control  room  and  asbestos  weather  shields
surrounding the shaft were destroyed and about 50 spots of ground contamination
were found north of the shaft and pieces of asbestos discovered up to 75m away. Not
so  much  a  minor  incident  as  serious  industrial  accident.  Furthermore  no
comprehensive log was taken of what had been dumped in the waste shaft making the
clean up operation very costly and time consuming.
570 An inventory in 1998 showed
that 16,348 items had been disposed of in the shaft including rubber gloves, paper
tissues, fire doors and vacuum cleaners, as well as fissile material estimated to be 4kg
of plutonium and 98.6kg of uranium-235 in a total of 1,165kg of uranium, totaling
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750 cubic metres of material.
571 The accident at Dounreay was followed by the
catastrophes at Three Mile Island in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986, contributing in no
small part to the loss of public confidence in the safety of the industry.
The waste shaft explosion at Dounreay is not the only example of the dangers
the plant posed to the public during its lifetime. Thurso was identified by the British
Medical Association as having six times the national average of leukaemia and non-
Hodgkins lymphoma cases between 1979 and 1984 with six cases identified. Twelve
similar cases were identified within 25km of the site between 1968 and 1991 (more
than twice the expected figure) and between 1985 and 1995 four incidences were
found (almost three times the anticipated figure.)
572 Tests are ongoing on the effect of
the plant’s activities on the local population. The elevated incidences of cancers in
and around the area may or may not be linked to the work carried out at the plant, but
the litany of safety breaches has done little to reassure the public that they are not
linked. Between 1972 and 1998 the plant had 82 accidents during a period when
UKAEA was not required to report every accident to regulators; between 1999 and
2005, when all accidents were required to be reported, there were 255 accidents at the
plant, including one case when the plant loaned radioactive waste containers to the
local community to make a Santa’s Grotto in Thurso in December 1999.
573 As
recently as August 2005 the plant was fined £2m for a spillage of more than 250 litres
of radioactive liquid and 300 kilos of cement.
574 As large a figure as this sum is, it
pales  into  near  insignificance  when  the  over  all  expenditure  on  the  plant  are
considered.
Until 1990, the government had spent approximately £3500m on Dounreay.
575
At 2006’s prices the figure is approximately £5.5bn.
576 The decommissioning of
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Dounreay is expected to take up until the mid-2030s and cost £3bn
577, bringing the
total spend on the plant to around £8.5bn. For this sum the people of Caithness have
benefited from a source of near consistent long-term employment, employing up to
5000 workers at its peak
578, albeit with fears over the safety of the plant; the Labour
Party won the Caithness seat and held it for fifteen years; Willie Ross and the Scottish
Office were able to demonstrate their beneficence to the furthermost northern part of
the UK mainland and stave off criticism, and the UK government got to believe it was
at the forefront of the nuclear fast reactor race and was investing in a technology
which  would  go  a  long  way  towards  helping  remedy  its  balance  of  payments
problems. In reality, locating the PFR at Dounreay was a politically motivated
decision that may have been successful in providing the area with a degree of
sustainability but was a miserable failure for the duration of its operational lifetime in
its stated aims of acting as a growth centre in attracting other industries to the area.
That it will continue to employ many thousands cleaning up the mess that has been
left behind for decades to come means it can be considered to be a success, albeit
more by accident than design. Had the PFR been successful in achieving full
criticality and operating successfully then it would not have required the same
numbers to be employed at the site that have been and will continue to be employed
in  its  decommissioning.  Non-local  specialist  engineering  firms,  geologists,
environmental consultancies, political consultancies and contractors for example are
required for the decommissioning of the plant, arguably none of which would have
been required had the technology worked. Ironically, some forty years after the PFR’s
location in the area and thirteen years after the announcement to close it was made,
Dounreay  has  become  an  inadvertent  growth  centre  as  a  result  of  its
decommissioning.
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Chapter Five. The Invergordon Smelter: White Heat And
The Highlands
Source: http://www.scran.ac.uk217
Introduction
Attempts at modernising industry in the Highlands are many and varied
throughout Scottish history; the pulp mill at Corpach, the nuclear power facility at
Dounreay and the small-scale aluminium smelters at Foyers and Kinlochleven,
powered by their own hydro-electric power sources, are several such examples of
this. Perhaps the most ambitious attempt at modernising industry in the Highlands
however was the Invergordon aluminium smelter, the final attempt by government at
regenerating the Highlands through large-scale industrial transplants. Created in 1967
with a projected output of 100,000 tonnes of primary aluminium per year, the
Invergordon smelter was heralded as a new dawn for the Highlands of prosperity and
symbolic  of  the  Westminster  government’s  commitment  to  regenerating  and
modernising the Highland economy. The new smelter was unique in that it wasn’t to
draw its energy source from hydropower or coal, unlike major smelters in Canada, the
United States and Norway. It would instead draw its energy from a newly constructed
Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor (AGR) nuclear power station on the Ayrshire coast at
Hunterston (to be known as Hunterston B), whilst utilising one of the deepest
harbours in Europe, Nigg Bay, for its bulk supplies of alumina, to be transported in
from the Caribbean (mostly Jamaica)
579, Latin America and Australia by ship.
580 The
labour force was to come from the surrounding areas, with the intention that the
smelter project would go some way to remedying the long-standing problems of high
outward migration from the Highlands, low wages and high unemployment, bringing
to the area long-term growth, sustainability and prosperity. The Invergordon smelter
was part of a government plan for the construction of two smelters, capable of
producing up to 200,000 tonnes of aluminium ingots per year combined, with the
intention of reducing British reliance on imports of aluminium. The attraction for the
companies invited to tender bids for the new smelters was that they were to be
supplied with cheap electricity from the newly built nuclear power stations situated
around the country, a first for aluminium smelting anywhere in the world and they
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were eligible for investment grants from the government. However, severe delays to
the construction of the Hunterston nuclear power station, poor planning and a
depression in world aluminium prices provided for catastrophic consequences for the
Invergordon smelter, resulting in its eventual closure in 1981.
This case study discusses the factors involved in the creation, operation and
eventual closure of the smelter and the resultant effect on all concerned. Within this
framework,  it  explores  the  nature  of  governmental-business  relationships  by
analysing  the  dealings  between  the  various  governments  in  power  during  the
smelter’s  lifetime  and  British  Aluminium
581, the company responsible for the
operation of the plant, and how the character of the different parties in power affected
these dealings. The study also details the impact of the smelter on the surrounding
area in labour, environmental, economic and social terms. It proposes that the smelter
project was primarily a national interest project, motivated by neo-protectionist
concerns, that failed to address the issue of appropriate Highland development
sufficiently;  that  it  was  uneconomic  from  the  beginning  and  based  upon  the
presumption of cheap power supplied by nuclear energy rather than on an actual
proven energy source. Therefore, the study is one of failure that seeks to understand
why the smelter project failed to address the long-term problems of the area and how.
White Heat and the smelters
The Britain that is going to be forged in the white heat of this revolution will
be no place for restrictive practices or for outdated methods on either side of
industry.
582
-  Harold Wilson, Labour Party Conference, October 1963.
Wilson’s quote above stated clearly and concisely the Labour Party’s commitment to
the modernisation of British industry. The aluminium smelters project was part of this
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modernisation, although it was not implemented as a policy until 4 years later. In
1965 Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ), an international mining company, made an application to
government, in partnership with the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
(UKAEA), to build the Capenhurst Project (also known as the UNCLE Project); a
combined aluminium smelter and nuclear diffusion plant. The proposal however
required 40% of the cost of the project to be supported by development grants from
government, while retaining the right to sell surplus power to the National Grid. The
government rejected this proposal, not stating publicly at any point why. Had the
development gone ahead, it would have certainly constituted a potential threat to the
Central Electricity Generating Board’s (CEGB) monopoly on power production. The
CEGB was not eligible for development grants however, meaning that had RTZ and
UKAEA’s proposal been accepted, the possibility of large industrial users grouping
together  and  becoming  the  lowest  cost  producers  of  power,  made  viable  by
government development grants, could have become reality - an unappealing prospect
for government.
583 Nevertheless, the idea of an aluminium smelter powered by
nuclear energy was not one without merit and discussions did take place detailing the
benefits and difficulties of the project resulting in the production of the Final Report
of the Official Group on Capenhurst, published in November 1966. This report
detailed  the  possibility  of  aluminium  smelting  to  the  country’s  economy  in
protectionist terminology, stating,
The object of the exercise is to give domestic production of aluminium a degree
of protection, which is does not now enjoy, and so to make possible a reduction
of 25% (15m a year)
584 or more in the expected United Kingdom imports of
aluminium.
585
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Although the government rejected the proposal, it presaged the announcement of the
plan to build the new smelters by only a year and certainly directly informed the idea
that Britain could produce more of its own aluminium, alleviating its balance of
payments problem and affording the country some protection against the possibility
of aluminium price escalation.
During the same period, the Highlands and Islands Development Board was
set up with the remit of improving the economic performance of the area.
586 The
HIDB had identified the Invergordon area as being of economic potential and ripe for
major development.
587 However, the HIDB at this point had not identified aluminium
smelting as a potential industry for locating at Invergordon, preferring instead a
suggestion by a part-time board member, Frank Thompson, of a petro-chemical plant.
Thompson, as well as being a board member, was also owner of Invergordon
Distillery, located at Nigg Bay. Two American companies, Roxalls and Occidental
Petroleum were said to be interested in the project. In order for the project to move
forward however, a plan had been set out requiring £30m capital, of which the
investors expected an investment grant under the Industrial Development Act of
£12m, with private capital of £9m (50% American, 50% British) and the remaining
£9m provided by government loan.
588 This formula bears a remarkable resemblance to
the eventual composition of the funding for the aluminium smelter at Invergordon.
However, difficulties with the petro-chemical project resulted in plans for it being
shelved,  as  well  as  a  political  fall-out  with  two  members  of  the  HIDB  (John
Robertson,  responsible  for  the  development  of  the  Moray  Firth  and  the
aforementioned Frank Thompson) quitting in protest at the government’s opposition
to the project (although the government maintained there had been no approach from
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the American companies mooted) and considerable press-attention, nationally and
locally, to the whole saga.
589 In spite of the petro-chemical project’s failure to get
started, the HIDB and government were not dissuaded of Invergordon’s development
potential  and  directed  their  collective  energies  towards  other  avenues.  RTZ’s
proposal, although rejected by the government, prompted two other companies, Alcan
and British Aluminium Co, to make their own representations to the government,
arguing for the same opportunities to be given to them as RTZ (Alcan and BACo
were the two largest producers of aluminium in the UK at the time and were eager to
protect their market share).
590 In October 1967, Harold Wilson announced the
government’s intention at the Labour Party conference in Scarborough to build two
aluminium  smelters,  putting  the  sites  for  these  new  smelters  out  to  tender.
Invergordon, with its deep bay harbour and location within a government-designated
development area, satisfied the requirements set by government for the location of the
new smelter.
The government’s announcement concerning the construction of these new
smelters was a result of a combination of different factors. The first of these was the
country’s balance of payments problem. There was a desire on the part of government
to reduce its reliance on imports of aluminium; it was believed that the new smelters
could help the balance of payments problem by £50m or £60m per year.
591 Second,
the advent of new generating techniques based on industrial applications of nuclear
power gave the government belief that it could build these smelters and provide them
with a cheap supply of the required enormous amounts of electricity for smelting
aluminium. This goes some way to explaining the its decision to build the smelters
since the country was bereft of any natural advantage in aluminium smelting.
Electricity accounted for 15% of the final cost of producing primary aluminium
592
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meaning it was of the utmost importance that a cheap source was found. Third was
the government’s commitment to pursuing the policy of regional development of
deprived areas, of which Invergordon was certainly one. In order for the smelters to
be built however, a number of criteria had to be satisfied. The smelters had to be
situated in a development area, within close proximity to the National Grid (to reduce
transmission costs) and with at least 100 acres of flat building land adjacent to a deep
bay harbour.
The balance of payments problem very much influenced the government’s
decision to increase the production capacity of the aluminium industry in Britain.
Until its announcement of its intention to build the smelters, Britain produced around
one tenth of what the new smelters were to produce in primary metal. British
consumption of aluminium at this time was 360,500 tonnes, but production (at
Kinlochleven and Foyers) was only 38,200 tonnes per year, although capacity was
only 39,000 tonnes per year, meaning the two smelters were running at 97.95%,
leaving very little room for improved efficiency.
593 The new smelters were to reduce
the reliance on imports of aluminium by up to two thirds, helping the balance of
payments  problem.  However,  there  were  two  problems  with  this.  Britain's
membership of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) meant that any element
of subsidy on the part of government for the new smelters would see it breach the
rules of EFTA.
594 Also, with the coming of the Common Market, it was clear that
Britain would be obliged to join a customs union, meaning that it would then have to
impose an import duty of 9% on North American ingots, its largest supplier of
aluminium at the time, further exacerbating its balance of payments problem.
595 Thus,
the  government  was  faced  with  a  choice  -  increase  its  domestic  aluminium
production, possibly breaching EFTA rules, or not and risk worsening their balance of
payments problem with increased tariffs on aluminium imports from North America.
In order for the former to happen a way of providing cheap power for the new
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smelters had to be found that did not breach EFTA rules. Nuclear power was
identified as the source of cheap electricity and companies were invited to tender bids
for the operation of the smelters, with the intention that a solution to the problems
posed by Britain’s membership of EFTA would be found.
The government’s commitment to regional development as part of its election
manifesto meant that it sought to site the new smelters in designated development
areas. Resultantly, the companies invited to tender bids had to propose to locate in an
area that was not only designated as a development area, but also satisfied the
aforementioned logistical requirements for operating a smelter. Invergordon, as well
as Holyhead in the island of Anglesey off the Welsh coast, satisfied all of these
requirements and were the choices for the three companies that tendered bids - RTZ,
Alcan and British Aluminium. Invergordon had been identified within government as:
…the major industrial centre in the Highlands, providing in time the range of
job opportunities which could sustain a balanced and expanding population and
act as a holding point to offset the decline of population in the rural hinterland
which must be expected to continue. As well as holding population which
otherwise would be likely to drift south such a centre would be likely to
stimulate growth over a much wider part of the Highland area.
596
Invergordon’s position as a potential growth point for the region as a whole was of
particular interest to the government through its acceptance of the recommendations
of the Toothill Report that areas be identified for growth and regional policy be
tailored to this effect in Scotland. Previously government had been more inclined to
shape regional policy in Scotland towards solving unemployment in areas rather than
focusing on areas with potential for growth. Toothill recommended that a different
approach be taken and Invergordon was to be the manifestation of this new policy.
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 The aluminium smelter project was attractive to the government not only for
the reason that it could reduce reliance on import of aluminium and help the balance
of payments, but for more straightforward political reasons also. Sir Edmund Dell, a
member of the same government, wrote ‘Politically it had the further advantage of
corresponding to the bright technological image which the Labour Government
wished to create.’
597 The Wilson government’s industrial policy during this period is
described  by  Coopey  as  a  ‘directly  interventionist,  technologically  oriented
strategy’.
598 Dell described the government rather more simply as having
‘interventionist inclinations’.
599 Labour and the Conservatives at this point were
tussling over images of modernity - each wanted to show to the nation that it was the
party that would bring about the modernisation of British industry and technological
change. Investing in high-technology projects such as aluminium smelting powered
by nuclear energy would prove to the nation that the party was committed to
modernising industry and was capable of delivering on its promises. Moreover,
helping the balance of payments problem and avoiding a further devaluation of the
pound would certainly curry favour. The aluminium smelters project was to help the
Labour government satisfy all of these aims. Further, the aluminium industry at this
point in time was ‘a highly integrated producer-to-consumer field.’
600 Thus, having a
producer on your doorstep would have been an attractive proposition to any national
consumer of aluminium, especially if you were providing them with development
grants and a cheap source of power for production. However, before any of this could
be achieved, companies needed to be chosen to operate the smelters and contracts
agreed for the provision of power for the developments.
601
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Alcan, British Aluminium and a consortium led by RTZ all tendered bids to
operate the two new smelters at the request of the Board of Trade in October 1967,
before submitting revised bids in mid-December that year after the devaluation of
Sterling.
602 All 3 companies identified Invergordon as a potential site, although only
Alcan and British Aluminium identified it as their preferred site. The RTZ consortium
identified Holyhead in Anglesey as its preferred site. British Aluminium put forward
a proposal to build a smelter capable of producing 120,000 tonnes of aluminium per
year as well as an associated alumina plant, providing an estimated balance of
payments saving to the government of £22.75m per annum.
603 Government identified
this proposal as the most attractive tendered on the basis that it provided the greatest
benefit to the balance of payments problem, resulted in the lowest cost of production
and also that the company’s terms for the contract arrangement were the most
favourable; it also identified RTZ’s proposal as the other one with which it planned to
move forward.
604 However, before this decision was made British Aluminium and
Alcan had already set about purchasing options on land in the Invergordon area,
Inverbreakie Farm and Ord Farm respectively, that was suitable for development in
early November 1967, in anticipation of being selected to operate the new smelter.
605
In the event, British Aluminium was chosen to operate the smelter, due in no small
part to its bid, but also other influencing factors. One such factor was the fact that
British Aluminium was effectively British-controlled - its parent company Reynolds
Metal Company/Tube Investments had won a takeover battle the previous decade, but
under the Treasury’s insistence Reynolds Metal Company had to retain a minority
shareholding, with Tube Investments holding a 51% stake, to ensure the nationality of
BA stayed British.
606 Tube Investments also held some influence in government - its
former employer Fred Catherwood was the former Director General of the National
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Economic Development Council (NEDC) before becoming Chief Industrial Advisor
to the Labour government in the NEDC’s replacement, the Department of Economic
Affairs.
607 Another factor was the company’s history of Highland production of
aluminium with its smelters in Kinlochleven and Foyers, operated since 1896 and
1924 respectively
608, constituting the UK’s only domestic aluminium production, and
the number of Scottish employees employed in these smelters meant the company had
previous experience of dealing with Scottish workers as well as cultural experience of
operating in the Highlands. The latter is interesting as it was something that the
company was keen to stress in its dealings with the public during the planning and
construction process, believing that stressing this point would curry favour with the
locals.  Further,  operating  in  the  Highlands,  with  its  embedded  religious
establishments (The Free Church of Scotland in particular), could prove problematic,
especially working on the Sabbath.
British Aluminium was keen to operate the new smelter at Invergordon for a
number of reasons. The company wanted to escape from its 54% holding in Canadian
British  Aluminium  (CBA),  which  obligated  it  to  take  all  the  output  from  the
company’s only smelter in Baie Comeau, Quebec (hydro-powered), a 90,000 tonne
output that between the period 1961-68 provided over half of British Aluminium’s
profits. However, there was a considerable drawback to this agreement that directly
influenced the company’s decision to tender a bid to operate at Invergordon. As a
result of Canadian withholding tax, all dividends paid to the UK were liable for a
59% tax-rate, which in turn prevented the company from making use of the capital
generated by the smelter. This arrangement was scheduled to remain in place until
1977.
609 The company reached agreement with Reynolds that if it acquired a British
smelter then Reynolds would purchase British Aluminium’s share in CBA. Ronnie
Utiger, British Aluminium’s chairman described the arrangement as the company
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taking ‘all the commercial risk for only 54% of the profits (which were then
excessively taxed) and had no access to the cash-flow.’
610 Utiger does not explain
how the company got into such a peculiar arrangement, but the answer would most
likely be found in its management. Alcan, examining the possibility of a merger with
British  Aluminium  in  1969  stated  in  a  confidential  report  that  ‘BACo  has  an
uninspiring record of management… management and market attitudes are generally
considered  archaic…  it  is  thought  that  their  approach  to  labour  relations  is
considerably behind ours.’
611 (The same management took the company into an
agreement with the government that eventually led to the closure of the Invergordon
smelter and the merger of Alcan and British Aluminium anyway.) Operating a
smelter in Britain was an attractive proposition for British Aluminium for other
reasons also. The soft loans on offer by the British government, as well as the
development grant for building the smelter, were attractive to the company, at least
initially, as was the prospect of locating in a politically stable country close to main
markets and using a power source supplying cheap power. Further, the company had
become increasingly uncompetitive in the aluminium semi-manufactures field in the
three years previous to the government’s announcement (losing £2m per year),
making the idea of operating a smelter in the UK attractive to the company in helping
it improve its position relative to the other main producers - Alcan and RTZ, both of
whom were planning smelters themselves.
612 Most important however was the advice
proffered  by  UKAEA  (who  were  charged  with  providing  consultancy  on  the
construction of Hunterston B, having operated and built several other stations around
the country) and the Scottish electricity boards. Both told the company that any
escalation of energy costs was unlikely to affect adversely any arrangements made
between the company and the boards for provision of electricity supply for the
smelter, persuading the company to agree to the contract.
613
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As mentioned, during the initial planning stages of the smelter project, it was
agreed that the smelter in Invergordon would produce an output of 120,000 tonnes per
year. However, after considerable opposition from Canada and Norway it was agreed
to reduce the output to 100,000 tonnes per year. British Aluminium was upset by this
reduction as it raised the cost of production by £4 per tonne, approximately 2.5% of
the total cost per tonne.
614 Norway, fearing for its aluminium exports to Britain,
opposed the initial output capacity, believing that the British government was
contravening the EFTA rules by effectively subsidising the creation of the new
smelters through its loans to the companies involved. Canada too was concerned that
Britain, as one of its main export markets, would considerably reduce its imports of
aluminium if it was producing its own. This is evidenced by a telegram sent by the
Canadian High Commissioner to Sir Anthony Part regarding the new smelters and
aluminium production: ‘British regional incentives in this case will adversely affect
one of the most important items of Canadian exports to Britain’. Canada, only 6 years
previously, was responsible for 55% of Britain’s imports at this point.
615 Sir Anthony
Part’s terse response was to point out that Britain’s projected output of 360,000
metric tons was insufficient to cause disruption to the projected world output of
12.2m tons for the year (1969), effectively ignoring the Canadians’ concerns.
616 The
increase in production to 360,000 tonnes per year output was a result of Alcan’s
decision to build and operate its own, coal-powered, aluminium smelter capable of
producing 120,000 tonnes of aluminium per year at Lynemouth.
617 Although the
government strenuously denied the accusations of subsidy from the Norwegians
618,
the risk of being seen to contravene EFTA rules was enough to persuade the
government to seek and ensure a reduction in projected output capacity from the
companies involved. British Aluminium issued a briefing in 1968 detailing the history
of the smelter which briefly touched upon this issue, and which attempted to defuse
the situation by stating that ‘The BA scheme will not reduce imports of metal from
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Norway [the reason for Norway’s complaint] and other EFTA countries. In fact, the
company’s present limited imports from Norway will be increased.’
619 However, Sir
Anthony Crossland, speaking in the House of Commons, stated 19 days before the
publication of the BACo briefing that ‘in agreement with the companies, we reduced
the capacity in stage one to reassure our EFTA partners that we would examine any
possible adverse effect on Norwegian exports to us.’
620 Of course, examining adverse
effects is different to rectifying them, but not as different as making it clear that they
wouldn’t exist at all. Irrespective of this, the government was not about to halt its plan
to produce its own aluminium on the basis of Norwegian complaints. It was already
clear in its belief that the projects were safe from claims of subsidy and therefore not
in contravention of EFTA rules, if not perhaps in the spirit of the agreement itself.
Thus,  a  reduction  in  production  was  considered  as  a  means  of  keeping  the
Norwegians happy, whilst still allowing the project to go ahead.
In the Event…
Before the decision to locate the smelter at Invergordon could be announced
by either government or British Aluminium a power contract had to be agreed. British
Aluminium had to agree a contract with the North of Scotland Hydro Electricity
Board (NSHEB) for the provision of electricity for Invergordon, although it was
actually the South Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) that was to be providing the
power eventually from Hunterston B. (The RTZ consortium on the other hand had
only to agree to a power contract with the CEGB, as it was the sole supplier of
electricity down south.)  This convoluted process hindered the negotiations on several
occasions and caused considerable friction between British Aluminium and the
generating boards concerned, as well as government. The negotiations were complex
by virtue of necessity. The power contract had to be framed in such a way that it did
not contain any element of subsidy on the part of government per se, so as not to
breach EFTA rules, and involved not two parties, but three as a result of the location
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of the smelter in Invergordon and the location of the power station intended to supply
it with power on the Ayrshire coast. As a result, negotiations took place between the
company and the boards with regular recourse to the government in London as well
as the Scottish Office to solve disputes and impasses during their course.
British Aluminium wanted guarantees on the price of power before agreeing
to build the smelter, arguing, rightly, that it was absolutely crucial to the viability of
the whole project. Aluminium smelting uses enormous amounts of electricity and
therefore it was expedient on both the company and the government to ensure that a
competitive price for supply to the smelter was agreed.  The price of the power supply
in aluminium smelting at this time accounted for 40% of total conversion cost from
alumina to aluminium ingot.
621 Therefore, any increase in the cost of power would
automatically affect the conversion cost for the company. A substantial increase could
have potentially disastrous consequences for the company should it occur over a
prolonged  period  resulting  in  a  deficit  build  up,  affecting  profit  margins  and
potentially jeopardising the entire operation. Obviously the company wished to
safeguard itself against any such occurrence, and sought assurances in order to avoid
as much uncertainty as possible. In the initial stages of the smelter’s operation, its
power was to be supplied by coal-powered stations with the supply being switched to
nuclear power after the construction of Hunterston B nuclear power plant was
completed,  planned  for  1974.  The  effect  of  this  agreement  was  that  British
Aluminium agreed to pay a higher sum for the power provided in the initial stages
than in the latter stages, as the power generated by coal was to be more expensive
than that generated by nuclear power. British Aluminium agreed to this under the
proviso, gained after extensive negotiations and a personal intervention by the
President of the Board of Trade, Sir Edmund Dell, that in the event of any aspect of
change in the design of the new nuclear power station that may affect the price British
Aluminium had agreed to pay, the government would agree to alter the agreement
accordingly so that the company would not be wholly responsible for the extra costs
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as a result. However, this was not written into the contract itself but took the form of
a letter written by Dell to Sir William Strath, the then chairman of British Aluminium.
This was to be known as the ‘fair clause’. This was to be a crucial element, not just in
the telling of the story of the smelter, but also to the economic future of the Highlands
as a whole.
The price agreed by the government and British Aluminium for the supply of
power to the smelter was a result of extensive negotiations between the company and
the government’s electricity boards. After much discussion and consideration of other
smelter operations in foreign countries and the prices paid there, the two parties came
to an agreement. The breakdown of the price agreement was as follows:
Table 5.1 Price agreement for electricity supply to Invergordon smelter
p/KWH mils
Capital charge on
annuity basis
0.141 3.38
Operating costs and fuel 0.117 2.81
Rates and royalty, net of
plutonium credit
0.005 0.12
Total 0.263 6.31
Source: Utiger, pg. 13.
British Aluminium had mooted a price of 0.25p/KWH as the required level for
competitiveness, which would have provided a total cost of 6 mils per unit
622, 1.5 mils
above its target level of 4.5 mils, but offset by the 40% investment grant on the
smelter. Other companies operating in foreign fields experienced prices ranging from
2.5 mils (Canada, Norway and the West Coast of the USA) to 4/4.5 mils (Tennessee
in the USA and France).  The final agreed price was set at 0.263 p/KWH that gave a
total  of  6.31  mils,  5%  over  the  company’s  target  power  cost.  The  smelter  at
Invergordon would therefore be operating on a more expensive power price at nearly
2 mils per unit more expensive than its nearest rivals in Tennessee and France. BA
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agreed  this  figure  as  over  half  was  from  the  capital  charge  incurred  for  the
construction of Hunterston B, which would not vary after construction and therefore
began to proceed with the deal.
623 Herein lies the crux of the power contract, and by
extension the entire project. From the beginning the smelter was uneconomic without
governmental  subsidy.  The  price  agreed  was  above  the  required  level  for
competitiveness. It is clear from the numbers presented that smelting on such a scale
in the UK was uneconomic. Dell says: ‘No nuclear reactor could supply electricity at
prices comparable with hydro-electricity in Norway. The electricity therefore would
not have been cheap enough to make had it not been for the subsidy on the plant
represented  by  the  40%  investment  grant.’
624 Smelter operations can operate
profitably  as  long  as  their  power  prices  remain  competitive  and  the  price  of
aluminium remains at a profitable level. So, even though the power price agreed was
above the required level for competitiveness, the investment grant was designed to
offset this. As a result, the company accepted the proposed price.
The siting of the smelter in the Cromarty Firth area under NSHEB auspices
gave rise to frustrations during the negotiations for British Aluminium as when
figures changed the company sought explanations only to find that they had to go to
both boards for them. The company also found that there was apparent collusion
between the Scottish boards and the CEGB, and that they were unlikely to get any
special concessions in the negotiations.
625 That the company was not to get any
special concessions should not have come as any great surprise however as the
NSHEB could not provide industry with more favourable pricing arrangements for
electricity supply than domestic customers by virtue of its statute.
626 Thus, even
though NSHEB was negotiating on a short-term basis for supply to Invergordon,
there was almost certainly the mindset that the NSHEB could not provide any
concessions to BA that would see the company receive a better rate for electricity
provision than domestic consumers. The board were very keen to safeguard the price
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their domestic customers were paying and unprepared to give any concessions to
British  Aluminium  that  would  result  in  their  other  customers  subsidising  the
company’s price. A further irritation to the company was the fact that the NSHEB
insisted on negotiating the contract by itself, even though many key aspects of the
contract necessitated the SSEB’s consent for later provision of electricity from the as
yet unconstructed Hunterston plant:
There was an animated exchange on the subject of electricity supply, on
which BACo said that they were nearing the end of their discussions with
NSHEB but felt that they were being required to deal with a blinkered small
middle man who was not the real supplier (which was SSEB), with the result
that they were getting an unimaginative response not in the best interests of
the UK economy [my emphasis]; in particular their broad assessment was that
electricity costs of their competitors in Canada and the US was 20% less than
here and this was an unfair handicap.
627
It is clear from the above that BA were negotiating on the basis of the whole smelter
development was a national interest project with Highland concerns secondary to the
arrangements. The NSHEB’s statute preventing it from providing industry with
favourable pricing for electricity provision was viewed as a hindrance to BA rather
than an integral part of the whole function of the board. Highland concerns were
subordinate to the national interest of getting an aluminium industry up and running
as soon as possible and contributing to the UK economy. In spite of the difficulties
that transpired in these negotiations however, they were completed on time and
mostly to the satisfaction of all parties. The main points of the contract were as
follows:
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1)  BA was to make a capital contribution to the construction of the
Hunterston B AGR nuclear power station to the sum of £30m, advanced to
them by the government in the form of a loan.
2)  BA was to make a proportionate contribution to the estimated operating
costs of the coal-fired
628 power stations run by NSHEB and SSEB up until
March 31
st 1974. After this date, the company would then make a similar
contribution in place of the earlier agreement to the estimated operating
costs of Hunterston B. (Under this agreement, the cost of power from the
coal-fired power stations would be appreciably higher than from the
nuclear power station.)
3)  An annuity calculation was made to convert the loan interest charges and
capital repayments from point 1) and the annual contributions to operating
costs from point 2) above, to an equal total payment payable annually over
the whole 28 years of the contract.
4)  In addition to the above, the company was to pay the addition to power
cost arising from the escalation of operating costs determined by the
following: i) Scaling up the underlying coal cost in proportion to the actual
NSHEB and SSEB cost in relation to the base of 4.7d/therm (the agreed
price). This would be in effect until 31
st March 1974 and prior to the
equalisation process mentioned in the previous point (3), ii) Within the
same timescale, scaling up the underlying operating cost for coal-fired
stations in proportion to the actual average operating cost for coal-fired
stations in proportion to the actual average operating cost of the Scottish
generating boards, iii) From 1
st April 1974 onwards, scaling up the
underlying nuclear fuel cost in proportion to the actual Hunterston B
nuclear fuel cost in relation to a base of £83000 per tonne as agreed, iv)
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scaling up the underlying operating cost estimate for Hunterston B in
proportion to the actual operating costs of Hunterston B.
629
The contract provided that the company would determine the amount of power
Invergordon would use in respect of its actual operating experience. This would be in
the range of 189 MW +/-10% which represents the figure against which all prices
were  agreed.  The  company  and  the  electricity  boards  agreed  that  the  figures
dependent on the actual operating experience of the smelter would be determined by
the 31
st March 1973.
630 There needed to be agreement on both sides over pricing, but
there also needed to be transparency in the arrangements so as to avoid any criticisms
of subsidy and denial of cheaper energy for ordinary consumers.
From the view of the government, the contract was a well-designed solution to
the claims of subsidy and the subsequent claims of ordinary consumers being
deprived of cheap energy. By having British Aluminium contribute towards the
capital cost of starting up the new nuclear power plant through the loan provided by
the government, it was effectively giving the company part-ownership of the plant,
tying the company and operation of the smelter to the plant for twenty eight years:
The capital contribution from BA was not to create a physical asset within
their control. If BACo were to fail and default on the loan, the Government
would be left in no worse position than if it had paid the whole cost of the
power station directly. It would lose a customer if the smelter were not sold as
a going concern, but then demand for electricity has tended to outstrip
supply.
631
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Thus, the government was able to avoid the potential pitfall of contravening the
EFTA agreement and the criticisms of denying ordinary consumers cheaper energy
by having British Aluminium pay for 40% of the Hunterston B power station. The
only potential complaint was that the government was still paying for the start up of
the new smelter at the outset through the loans it was making to the company. These
complaints were minor however as they were loans and not grants, at least ostensibly.
The government, and the electricity boards, felt pleased at the final draft of the
contract. From the company’s point of view however the agreement did not invoke
the same sense of satisfaction. The company had tried and failed to obtain guarantees
over escalations in power costs written into the contract. However, the generating
boards were statutorily bound to ‘protect both their own interests and those of their
customers’
632 and as a result were not prepared to give any guarantees that would
jeopardise the prices their other consumers were paying. As a result, the Board
insisted that an account, imaginatively titled the ‘Smelter Account’ be created so as to
make clear the distinction between this agreement and its domestic provision of
electricity.
633 Further, the contract contained no provisions for a revision of the
agreement in the event of price escalation. The company was very unhappy at having
to assume risks on matters that it felt it had no control or knowledge on, but
eventually assented only after Sir Edmund Dell had personally intervened with a
letter  reassuring  the  company  of  the  government’s  willingness  to  review  the
agreement in the event of an escalation in the power price. The contract was agreed
and signed on the 24
th July 1968.
The details of the contract were deemed confidential and were unavailable for
scrutiny by anyone other than those involved in their formulation and agreement,
much to the chagrin of the Expenditure Committee in Parliament who noted in their
report ‘Public Money in the Private Sector’ that ‘the inability of Parliament to
discover either the very large amount paid out in investment grants or the unit cost of
electricity supplied to the smelters must greatly weaken any serious attempt to judge
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whether the public expenditure was justified.’ The committee noted further that the
basic motive was export saving although they did acknowledge that there were
elements of regional development policy in the siting of the smelters also.
634 This led
to calls in the House of Commons for disclosure over the details to ensure that the
consumers of the nations energy at large, the general populace, did not incur any of
the  financial  burden  created  by  the  construction  of  the  new  smelters.
635
Representatives in the House of Commons asked numerous questions, of which many
were to be somewhat prophetic. Teddy Taylor, the MP for Glasgow Cathcart, asked:
What will the position be in the event… of the price of the power coming out
being in excess of the estimates which are considered now?
636
Edmund Dell, speaking as Minister for the Board of Trade, responded that ‘the
company has negotiated the contract and takes the risk of escalation’
637, contrasting
with his earlier letter to British Aluminium stating:
We  agree  that  the  Board  of  Trade  and  BACo  will  consult  together  if
circumstances arise which, in the opinion of either party, substantially modify
the assessments which at present underlie the project.
638
This apparent contradiction illustrates the government’s desire at the time to appease
both those critical of the project, in terms of alleged subsidy, and British Aluminium;
without actually committing itself wholly to either argument, such was the desire to
get the smelter up and running as soon as possible without further delay. Of course, in
the terms of the actual power contract itself, the company had little recourse to the
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government for help with any potential escalation in the power price for whatever
reason, save for the letter from Sir Edmund Dell stating that there would be a review
of the agreement in any such event. This was termed the ‘Fair Clause’ as a result of
the ‘novel form of the arrangements and the inability to foresee and provide for every
contingency that might arise over the duration of the Contract’.
639 It was however to
be a misnomer. Unfortunately for the company, the clause was to hold little sway
with future administrations that did not feel duty bound to honour a promise made by
an erstwhile Cabinet member in a letter that was not part of the official agreement.
This omission of the agreement between the Board of Trade and British Aluminium
was to be a fatal blow to the future of the company in light of subsequent events. All
of the fears the company had going into the agreement would ring true and all of their
good faith in the government would be rewarded with failure on a massive scale.
Construction, Operation and Deficit
After the successful conclusion of the negotiations for the contract to operate
the smelter, plans for the construction and operation phases were implemented. Sir
Edmund Dell presented a draft of the Aluminium Industry (Invergordon Project)
Scheme, 1968 to the House of Commons on the 6
th November 1968 preceding its
approval by Parliament on the 20
th November. During the debate for its approval,
Nicholas Ridley, Conservative MP for Cirencester
640, said of the plan:
The motive is said to be import saving… This is a policy of protectionism
designed to slow down world trade. If it does not pay us - as I believe it does
not - to make aluminium here, we are distorting the whole mechanism of trade
to save a few paltry pounds.
641
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Ridley’s analysis of the project as a means towards protecting British interests further
illustrates the true intentions of the smelters. He was correct in asserting that it did not
‘pay’ the UK to make its own aluminium - the smelter project was uneconomic
without subsidised electricity provision and even more so in the Highlands due to the
inflexibility of the electricity board’s statute of limitations concerning electricity
supply, not to mention the increased transport costs of the finished products to
markets. However, the promise of cheap electricity from nuclear power stemmed
from the technological strides being made by the Fast Reactor facility at Dounreay
and the UK’s position at the forefront of the nuclear race. The government then was
looking to exercise what it believed would be its comparative advantage in aluminium
smelting  stemming  from  its  belief  in  the  ability  of  nuclear  power  to  produce
electricity ‘to cheap to meter’. That it was trying to distort the mechanism of trade is
not in argument. Tariffs, the traditional form of protection, were not an option under
EFTA rules meaning an alternative way of safeguarding British interests through
increased production of necessary goods was sought. If nuclear power could provide
cheap electricity and alumina could be bought in relatively cheaply, what was to stop
Britain exercising its ability to produce Aluminium cheaply as a result? In spite of
Ridley’s protestations, as well as several other concerns over the power contract, loan
arrangements, grant provision and potential escalation of costs and the effects on
domestic consumers voiced by other MPs, the House passed the bill.
642
Ridley wasn’t the only sceptic concerning the new smelter, the Scottish Tourist
Board was of a similar volition, stating in The Scotsman,
From the tourist point of view we cannot look on the Invergordon project as an
outstandingly good idea. We still think tourism is the solution for the problems
in that part of the country, but we cannot dictate.
643
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However, Marjorie Linklater, chairman of the county council sub-committee on
tourism and chairman of the Easter Ross Tourist Association, responded
If the board had shown more imagination and initiative to tourism in the North
of Scotland I may have believed them that tourism was the only solution to the
problems of the Highlands. Their view is totally out of touch.
644
Linklater stated further that she believed the two industries would be complementary
to one another. The Scottish Tourist Board was the only governmental agency to
express  any  kind  of  reservations  about  the  smelter.  The  HIDB  welcomed  the
smelter’s construction at Invergordon warmly, viewing it as ‘an important source of
employment which will aid their ‘Operation Counterdrift’, aimed at preventing
further depopulation and attracting labour back to the Highland counties.’
645 Indeed,
dissent  over  the  smelter  is  only  conspicuous  by  its  absence  concerning  the
introduction  of  a  significant  industrial  complex  into  what  was  a  previously
predominantly agricultural area. Before construction could commence the rights to
Ord Farm (a piece of farmland on which the part of the smelter was to be sited)
needed to be purchased by the company. British Aluminium initially experienced
some difficulty in obtaining these rights as Alcan had secured them some time
previously in anticipation of winning the smelter contract and siting their operations
at Invergordon. Alcan were being obstinate in British Aluminium’s attempts to buy
them outright, possibly a result of sour grapes as a result of its failure to secure the
rights to the Invergordon project or more likely in an attempt to get the best price for
the rights to the land from BA. This matter was eventually resolved with British
Aluminium purchasing the rights to the land, which it needed for access to its
development, from Alcan after some negotiations
646, although a figure was not
divulged. This purchase allowed British Aluminium the chance to allow for a possible
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extension to the plant should the need occur. Once the rights to the farm had been
secured, the smelter’s construction began to accelerate.
Government started planning and implementing new infrastructure for the
surrounding area to support the new development immediately. Included in this was
the provision for 500 new council houses to support the expected inward migration of
new workers for the 600 strong workforce at the plant, increased connectivity to the
National Grid, new provisions for transport linkage to the area, new water supplies,
sewage improvements and other changes to the existing infrastructure of the area.
647
The Invergordon Steering Group was created to assist the implementation of the
plans, comprising of members from the Scottish Development Department, Ross and
Cromarty Firth County Council, Invergordon Town Council, the HIDB, British
Aluminium and Grampian Chemicals (the company involved in the discussions for
the  proposed  petro-chemical plant).
648 This new group was described by the
Invergordon Newsletter as ‘a clearing house to augment and integrate activities in a
pioneering way that has not been matched in any regional industrial development
elsewhere in Britain.’
649 British Aluminium put the contract for building the smelter
out to tender and Taywood Wrightson, a newly formed amalgamation of Taylor
Woodrow Construction and Head Wrightson, eventually won the contract.
650
BA sited an information caravan on the construction site where members of
the public could quiz employees of the company about the smelter. The willingness of
the company to attend public meetings concerning the construction of the smelter and
its potential impact on the area helped public relations between the company and
locals. The company’s long standing association with the Highlands through its
                                                
647 It is not clear from the sources how far the infrastructural improvements were designed with
expansion of industry in the area in mind, although the later advent of new developments designed to
meet the needs of the newly created North Sea oil did not appear to put an undue strain on the
infrastructure. This can also be explained by the cannibalising of the Invergordon workforce by these
industries however, more of which is discussed later.
648 Invergordon Newsletter No. 2, September 1969, NAS DD12/3180.
649 Invergordon Newsletter No. 2, September 1969, NAS DD12/3180.
650 SDA brief for Parliamentary Secretary’s visit to ‘Highland Fling’ exhibition January 1969,
NAS SEP4/502.242
operations in Kinlochleven and Foyers and its good reputation in the communities it
operated in also helped smooth the passage to the smelter’s completion. The people of
the Invergordon area came to look upon the new development with some degree of
pride, viewing it as a symbol of renewed hope and optimism for the future of the
Highlands.
651 The production of newsletters detailing the developments during the
construction phase of the smelter and various company-sponsored activities in the
area did much to smooth the relations and allay the fears held by locals over the new
smelter and its impact on the area. It was important for the company to maintain good
relations with the locals, as there was some consternation at the fact the plant was
being built on prime farmland, as was the case for many developments in the
Highlands.
652 The land had to be re-zoned from agricultural use to industrial use in
order for the smelter to get the go-ahead. In doing this, concerns were raised by locals
about the possible effects on surrounding farmland that the new smelter may have.
The company pursued an active role in the community during this time in order to
facilitate good relations between the people of the area and the company so that a
sense of common purpose could be developed. The company, along with Grampian
Chemicals (the other proposed developer in the area), also sponsored an economic
and sociological impact survey carried out by Professor Maxwell Gaskin of the
University of Aberdeen, contributing £5000 each to the three-year study.
653 This
policy of inclusion benefited both sides as it meant that the people of the area
experienced the ‘feel-good factor’ associated with the large-scale development and
subsequent money being spent on the area and the company experienced harmonious
operating conditions. British Aluminium and the government could ill afford a build
up of local resentment if the smelter was to be constructed on time and fully
operational.
The need for an improvement to the existing infrastructure of the area in order
to cope with the new development was all too apparent to the government. The
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contract between British Aluminium and the government for the operation of the
smelter included an agreement that the government and its local agencies would be
responsible  for  the  creation  of  the  new  infrastructure  required  for  the  new
development, both social and industrial. The multiplier effect of a development this
size meant that concurrent with the creation of the obvious housing needed; sewage
supplies, educational provisions, recreational and social services, service sector
employment, transport linkages, water supplies and port facilities would all have to be
satisfied for the development to have a chance of being successful. The government
estimated that the proposed infrastructure improvements would cost around £42m in
order for them to be implemented fully, as a result of the remoteness of the area from
materials and labour supplies.
654 It was noted on more than one occasion in the
various correspondences between governmental departments that the building of the
infrastructure would put considerable strain on the local area and that up to 2000 men
would be required to fully implement its plans
655, of which 50% would be incomers
from outwith the local area.
656 The government was tasked with co-ordinating,
organising and implementing these developments so that they would be finished on
time simultaneously with the smelter and able to accommodate extra industrial
expansion (relating to the idea of Toothill’s growth points recommendation). All of
this was at the behest of the government itself; such was its desire to stimulate the
economy of the area and the Highlands as a whole. As a result, a concerted effort on
the part of central, regional and local governments as well as the generating boards
and the company itself was undertaken in order to complete the process on time and
within budget. The successful completion of the smelter on time and within budget
was in stark contrast to the delays faced in later years by the nuclear power station
Hunterston B, that Invergordon was to be dependent on from 1974 onwards, and the
Dungeness B nuclear power station that the Anglesey smelter was to be dependent on
also. It should be noted here that Dungeness B was still not completed by the time
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Invergordon was closed in 1982.
657 The planning process of the smelter benefited
from the National Plan for Scotland’s detailed linkages between employment growth
and social expenditure, as well as its espousing of the need for new industries,
through the application of the plan by regional and local agencies (e.g. the HIDB and
Highland  councils).  Both  HIDB  and  the  Highland  councils  were  keen  for  the
smelter’s construction to go without hitch and contributed to the Invergordon Steering
Group as well as liaising with the company to ensure construction was completed
smoothly.
During the construction phase, British Aluminium set up a staff of thirty
people in London tasked with the job of evaluating the need for manpower
658 on the
basis of the smelter design and the technique of production. The team was originally
set up in London at BA’s head office before moving the recruitment process to
Invergordon after the personnel requirements were decided. The team separated the
composition of the smelter’s workforce into seven distinct groups:
i)  Management
ii)  Accounting
iii)  Engineering
iv)  Industrial engineering
v)  Personnel
vi)  Production:  - a) carbon, b) casting and c) reduction
vii)  Technical
659
Once this structure was agreed on, the company began to recruit in the area itself. The
initial estimate of the creation of 550 jobs was usurped by the eventual creation of
700 positions at the smelter. Potential workers came from all over Scotland with the
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local office of the Department of Employment in the Invergordon area recommending
a third of the jobs and acting as a filter for those selected. Once selected the
applicants were interviewed and sat aptitude tests to determine their suitability as well
as having a medical.
660 The composition of workers’ origins can be seen from Table
5.2 and Chart 5.1 below:
Table 5.2 All Employees at July 1973. Place of Birth by Percentage Distribution
Area Hourly
Rated
Clerical Salaried Total
Invergordon burgh
and district
5.1 9.6 1.3 4.8
Easter Ross
(remainder)
20.9 45.8 3.2 19.8
Moray Firth 4.6 20.5 5.1 6.8
Highlands 19.7 9.6 12.2 16.6
Scotland
(remainder)
41.1 9.6 53.2 40.0
United Kingdom 5.4 4.8 24.4 9.8
Rest of the world 3.6 N/A 0.6 2.2
Totals: 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Mackay, pg. 69.
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Chart 5.1 Invergordon Employees at July 1973
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Table 5.2 and Chart 5.1 indicate that there was an approximately even split between
workers coming from the Highlands as a whole (Invergordon burgh and district plus
Easter Ross plus Moray Firth plus the Highlands) and from the rest of Scotland. This
indicates that there was some success in achieving the initial aim of attracting inward
migration to the area as well as providing work for the unemployed there too.
However, the fact that the figures are from 1973 is important here. The newly created
Highland Fabricators Company was responsible for many of the initial compliment of
BA’s employees leaving for more gainful employment at the new company. As a
result, the company had to look for new employees from outside of the Highlands. In
terms of the salaried workers, 77.6% of salaried workers at the smelter were from
outside the Highlands. an overall majority of them came from the rest of Scotland at
53.2% and a further 24.4% from the rest of the UK. This indicates that the best-paid
jobs went to workers from outside the Highlands.247
 The construction of the smelter was completed on time and within budget,
having employed a total of 2567 people at its peak.
661 Before the construction was
completed, British Aluminium sought to recognise only one union in the plant in
order to avoid any inter-union rivalry in the smelter, as well as making it easier for
the company to deal with any potential disputes. However, the company soon realised
that this policy was not going to be a viable one when the union it was planning on
recognising in the smelter, the proposed amalgamated union of the General &
Municipal Workers and the Electrical Trade Union, did not materialise. Further, the
company’s intention to recognise only one union provoked threats by the principal
Scottish officer of the AEU, John Boyd, to call out every member of the AEU from
the smelter unless it too received recognition by the company. Given the climate of
worker management relations across the nation Boyd’s was no idle threat and resulted
in the company abandoning any hope of recognising only one union in the smelter.
662
In January and the early part of February there was an unofficial labour dispute
concerning  an  argument,  apparently  long-standing,  between  members  of  the
Construction and Engineering Union (CEU) and Redpath Dorman Long (RDL), the
contractors responsible for steel erection, over lodging allowances. This resulted in
CEU members working for other sub-contractors and Transport and General Workers
Union members working for Taylor Woodrow. As a result there was an almost
complete stoppage in work between the 9
th and 26
th January 1970.
663 In the early part
of February another dispute ended in some RDL employees quitting their positions
with the company and there was another unofficial stoppage by TGWU workers again
in early March.
664 The seeds of future discontent were sewn in the construction phase
and the cooperation shown by all parties from the outset was beginning to fade. These
unofficial stoppages, whilst doing little harm to the time taken to construct the smelter
marked the beginning of poor worker-management relations, a symbol of a wider
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pattern in the UK as a whole throughout the 1970s
665, that were to characterise much
of the smelter’s lifetime.
666
By the time the smelter’s construction was completed, the government’s
balance of payments problem had improved, in 1969, when it moved into the positive
posting results of £180m to the good, an improvement on the previous year’s result of
negative £380m. In 1971, it posted results of £770m to the good, a considerable
improvement.
667 As meticulous as the planning and development of the smelter and
the associated infrastructure was, its success depended not on these factors, but
instead upon the issues of power price and the world price of aluminium, both of
which it was assumed would pose no threat to the smelter. The company on the other
hand made no such presumption and worked on the premise that prices were always
subject to change. As a result, the company made a concerted effort to ensure that the
price it was to pay for power was one that gave it enough room for manoeuvre should
prices in the world market for aluminium or alumina change. Any price change in
supplies of alumina for example would directly affect the company’s profit deriving
from its Invergordon arrangement as the agreement with the government was set up
on the basis of a total cost approach, covering as many variable and capital costs as
possible as well as allowing for profit. If any of the variable or capital costs increased,
predicted or not, it would be the company’s profit that would be squeezed. This was a
feature of the aluminium industry worldwide under the producer pricing system until
the introduction of new producers into the market (mostly additional non-OECD
producers) and the introduction of aluminium onto the London Metal Exchange,
significantly enlarging the previously small ‘free market’ in aluminium in the
1970s.
668
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Having completed the building of the smelter on time and within budget,
British Aluminium struck up the first pots in 1971. However, the start-up also
coincided with a world slump in aluminium prices that began in 1970 and lasted until
the oil shocks in 1974 resulting in high prices for aluminium on the basis of higher
energy costs.
669 This can be more clearly seen in Chart 5.2:
Chart 5.2 Annual Average Aluminium Price, 1959-1998 (1992 prices)
Source: http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/aluminum/050798.pdf
As a result of the slump, the smelter was only able to operate at 50% of its intended
capacity. This was an expensive and frustrating episode for the company, but one it
accepted due to its belief that the cyclical nature of the industry meant that the hitch
was temporary. This belief coupled with the growth rate of 8% per annum in demand
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over the previous twenty years in the industry led the company to take the decision to
operate at less capacity without any great concern.
670 The success of the planning and
construction phase had buoyed the company and they were confident about their new
operation. Morale was high, the start-up had gone well and capital costs were low.
This was against the backdrop of the discovery of oil in the North Sea and a
subsequent influx of labour and interest into the Highlands. Suddenly the Highlands
looked like it was within touching distance of the promised prosperity and there was a
palpable sense of excitement as a result. It looked as though British Aluminium had
managed to inadvertently set up home in an up and coming area just before the rents
went up.
The positivity of timely completion was short-lived however. The world price
slump in aluminium during the period 1970-72 placed the smelter project on the back
foot from the outset. The inability of the smelter to operate at full capacity effectively
meant that the company was playing at catch-up from the beginning. This was further
exacerbated by the labour shortages caused by the discovery of oil in the North Sea
and the subsequent rush to create the new industry in order to take full advantage of
the newfound source of wealth. This employment shortage adversely affected the
smelter in a number of ways. With the advent of the oil industry came demand for
enormous steel platforms needed for the rigs to drill for oil. As a result, a new
company, Highland Fabricators formed by Brown & Root and Wimpey, was created
and situated just a few miles from the Invergordon smelter at Nigg Bay. This new
company had won orders for the platforms but was working on a very tight schedule.
As a result, it needed welders, machinists and fitters to create these platforms in this
short time and was willing to pay very well for them. These workers were readily
available at the Invergordon smelter and as a result many changed jobs to go and
work for the new company with the attraction of increased overtime, higher wages
and bonuses available. Within two years from 1971, the workforce at Highland
Fabricators rose from zero to 2000.
671 The effect on British Aluminium’s operation
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was threefold.   The company lost many of its best men to the newly formed rig
company, resulting in an increasingly unhappy workforce resentful at earning less
than those who had left and becoming increasingly restive. The company obviously
had to replace those who had left and sought to do so immediately, but was unable to
hire workers of a similar standard. Resultantly, this led to an influx of workers from
the industrial belt, which the company had sought to avoid initially but now had little
choice but to continue doing as a result of the desertion of many of its workers. With
this influx of new workers came the problem of housing. The creation of the new
housing infrastructure was designed purely for the workers needed for the smelter.
Thus, when the extra workers were required they had no accommodation to move into
and as a result BA had to purchase 100 caravans in which to house the incoming
labour force. Domestic life in a caravan after a hard day’s, or indeed night’s, shift was
not the most harmonious. This led to even further unrest meaning the virtuous circle
of good relations between the employers and employees became increasingly more
strained the longer the situation continued. The goodwill shown on both sides had
almost disappeared completely within two years of the smelter starting operations:
‘the development of any identity with the company or even what might be called the
external fortunes of the smelter… was largely absent, as was the presence of any
positive wish to be consulted on any non-wage related or non-disciplinary matter’.
672
As problematic as the world price of aluminium and the labour shortages were
to the smelter, they paled in comparison to the major problem that was beginning to
arise in the delay in construction of Hunterston B. As noted, aluminium smelting
involves the usage of enormous amounts of electricity and any kind of change in the
price of electricity supplied could have potentially disastrous effects on the viability
of the whole project. Any delay in the construction of Hunterston B meant that the
smelter would have to continue to use the more expensive coal-fuelled electricity,
which the company had planned on using only until 1974 and believed it would be
able to offset the cost of which against its capital outlay on Hunterston B and
subsequent supply of cheap energy, as per the power contract. The obvious downside
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of this was that using more expensive energy meant that the company was making
less of a profit on the aluminium it was producing and would have to continue with
the more expensive coal-fuelled electricity. Concurrent with this was the fact that
operating costs were rising as a result and if the profits weren’t there to cover this rise
then a deficit would occur. Further compounding this rise in costs was the increase in
the price of coal in 1972 to 5.5 d/therm; whereas the agreed price for British
Aluminium was 4.7 d/therm.
673 The effect of this were yet further increases in the
costs of energy for the smelter. As a result, the company found itself on the receiving
end of price escalations that it had no control over. Details of the power contract
become central to the story here. The conditions of the contract, ostensibly agreed to
safeguard British Aluminium against any such escalations, were inadequate when the
company sought recourse to them during this time. Indeed, the letter from Sir
Edmund Dell was the only real safeguard that the company had. However, the
reassurances written in letter were never inserted into the contract and as a result were
useless in the company’s representations to the new Conservative government and the
electricity boards who stuck rigidly to the legal interpretation of the contract:
It is clear… that there are likely to be very substantial extra costs in supplying
the smelter because of the forecast delays of Hunterston ‘B’. These extra costs,
and in particular the interest charges on them, are such that the Smelter Account
is unlikely to recover when Hunterston ‘B’ comes into full operation. The
Board considered this review at their January Meeting and I was asked to raise
the  whole  matter  with  the  Department  in  the  context  of  understandings
previously given to the Board that the interests of their ordinary consumers be
safeguarded.
674
The delay in completion of Hunterston B meant that the capital cost escalation
would exceed the original estimate provided by the SSEB (who were in charge of the
construction of Hunterston B), and was double what the company had provided for.
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SSEB tabled revised estimates that put the company’s contribution at £29m for 189
MW, compared to £27.3m in 1968. By October 1972, it became clear that the capital
cost escalation was going to exceed £30m; the limit of the loan agreed by British
Aluminium and the Government, without taking into account that Hunterston B
would be operating potentially at only 80% of the design rating due to corrosion
caused by seawater getting into the reactor.
675 As a result, the company invoked the
Sir Edmund Dell letter in January 1973, believing that this protected it from any such
escalations. The company argued that the possible reduction in operating capacity and
coal and nuclear fuel price escalation were reason enough that they would, in the
terms of the letter, ‘substantially modify the assessments which at present underlie the
project.’
676 This was a perfectly reasonable request on the part of the company, given
that it entered the contract in good faith and on the understanding that it would not be
left to bear the full cost of any such escalations. However, there was no response from
the Government concerning the escalation in costs until October later that year, when
the  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  (DTI)  (previously  the  Board  of  Trade)
indicated that it was prepared to enter discussions regarding the situation. It should be
noted however that there was correspondence between the two sides, at the behest of
government, concerning the value of the aluminium smelters’ production to the
balance of payments with the company providing an analysis of projected savings on
imports provided by the new smelters. This can be seen in Table 5.3:
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Table 5.3 Projected import savings from new aluminium smelters
Year 1972 1973 1974
1. UK Primary Production
(000m.T)
171.0 252.0 355.0
2. Less Lochaber &
Kinlochleven (000m.T)
(32)    (36)    (36)
3. New smelters
production (000m.T)
139.0 216.0 319.0
4. Price per tonne of
imports (£)(a)
221.0 233.0 256.0
5. Equivalent import value
(£m)
30.7 50.0 81.7
6. Alumina required
(b)(000m.T)
271.0 533.0 622.0
7. Price per tonne (c)(£) 34.0 34.0 40.0
8. Cost of alumina (£m) 9.2 17.8 24.9
9. Other material costs (d) 2.0 3.2 4.0
Import savings £m = (5-
(8+9))
19.5 30.0 52.8
(000m.T)= 1000 metric tonnes.
a)  Actual average price for imports of pure primary aluminium in 1972 adjusted
in proportion to actual or expected change in Alcan world price.
b)  Assumed 1.95 tonnes of alumina per tonne of aluminium.
c)  Actual for 1972, adjusted in proportion to rise in aluminium price.
d)  Petroleum coke, cryolite and fluoride.
Source: Letter from John Wall, Chief Economist British Aluminium, to FC Carter,
Department of Trade and Industry, 29/06/1973. TNA PRO FV54/56.
677
It is clear from the table above that the benefit of the smelters project to the balance
of payments problem, if the above figures were realised, was to be quite substantial.
More to the point, the timing of the correspondence reveals that the government was
perhaps more interested in what benefits the smelters were bringing to the country’s
economic situation than rectifying the concerns expressed by British Aluminium over
the escalation of the energy deficit, unsurprising given that the country had lapsed
back into deficit in its balance of payments again by this stage.
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In March 1973, a letter from AM Cochran, writing on behalf of the Chief
Engineer for the NSHEB to HFG Kelly of the Scottish Development Department
stated:
There is really very little that can be said about fuel or capital escalation
assumptions made in 1968. At that time escalation was not uppermost in
people’s minds, as it is today, and the provisions in the agreement were the
normal ones to be expected in a long-term agreement. The BACo [British
Aluminium Company] are well aware that the price of fuel is outwith the
control of the Electricity Boards and that any forecast of trends could be no
more than speculative. Similarly, the effect of inflation and design changes on
Hunterston ‘B’ could hardly have been anticipated. No doubt the BACo took
the best possible advice from all sources before opting for a 100% nuclear
supply tranche from 1974/75 onwards.
678
This illustrates the electricity boards’ attitude towards understanding the predicament
the company found itself in and their role in it. The company had predicted  the
possibility of inflation and design changes in Hunterston B and had sought guarantees
covering it against any such occurrences. The company also entered the agreement on
the basis of estimates and suggestions concerning the unlikelihood of escalation costs
posing a threat to the viability of the smelter and the power arrangements made by the
electricity boards (and UKAEA). When these estimates and suggestions turned out to
be inaccurate, as was the case now, the electricity boards, as apparent in the letter
quoted, neglected to acknowledge their own input into negotiations. The Government
during the course of negotiations was unprepared to give any guarantees and the
electricity boards similarly so. Instead of dealing with one centralised agency charged
with negotiating on the Government and electricity boards’ behalf, the company had
to deal with the NSHEB who were inexperienced in such matters and who had no real
knowledge of what would be required of them, as well as being the middle man
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between the SSEB and the company. Moreover, NSHEB’s statute concerning the
primacy of domestic consumers in its provision of electricity in the region meant it
was unlikely to provide for an amenable partner in these arrangements. The problems
inherent in such an arrangement are obvious, which is why the fact that negotiations
and construction were completed within the timeframe set can be considered a
success. Of course, as successful as the completion of the negotiations on time was,
had more time been taken and a more understanding approach to British Aluminium’s
concerns been undertaken, then the problem of nuclear power cost escalation needn’t
have been as significant problem as it was turning out to be.
The change of the government as a result of Labour’s narrow win in the
February 1974 election signalled a change in policy towards discussions over the
power escalation. Sir Edmund Dell became the Paymaster General in the new
government and as any agreement to cover the costs of the price escalation would
have to go through the Treasury, this was deemed to be good sign for the smelter.
However, it wasn’t until August that the company was able to obtain a meeting with
the new Paymaster General where he agreed that his letter was significant and
January the following year before any decision was taken. During this period
discussions were ongoing between the Treasury, Department of Energy, the Scottish
Economic Planning Department, the Department of Industry, the Scottish Office and
NSHEB about how best to deal with the situation. This resulted in a Treasury
recommendation to the Secretary of State for Industry that the company be offered
assistance on the basis that NSHEB shouldn’t pass on to British Aluminium the cost
of the company’s contracted share of any derating of Hunterston B and the NSHEB
be given guarantees by Government to make good on the deficit run up by the
smelter.  Further,  the  Treasury  recommended  that  the  company  be  offered  a
Government loan of the amount necessary to cover the company’s share of the
increased capital cost of Hunterston B, also stating that those involved in negotiations
should be prepared to concede to an extension of the current loan arrangements at257
7%.
679 Willie Ross, reinstated as Secretary of State for Scotland under the new
government, gave an undertaking to NSHEB that:
In present circumstances it is not possible to reach a firm view on the eventual
outturn of the BACO smelter account. But to the extent that the eventual
payments from the Smelter Company fall short of the costs of the NSHEB, the
Government  accept  that  the  deficit  should  not  fall  on  the  Board’s  other
consumers, and will take an appropriate opportunity to seek statutory powers to
make payments to the Board meeting the deficit.
680
This was only after the company had detailed the consequences of the price escalation
without governmental help however.
The consequences of price escalation were that in order for BA to continue its
operations without governmental help, it would need to borrow £16m on top of the
already existing borrowings of £35m. This would mean that the company would have
to pay an additional £3m interest per annum on these further loans which would add
nearly 0.2p/KWH to the power price. The company could not justify borrowing such
an amount as it would be prejudicial to its other operations and the board of the parent
company (Reynolds and Tube Investments) would not agree to it. As a result, the only
option for the company would be to reduce the operating capacity of Invergordon to
between half and two thirds, which is what could be supported by the original £30m
capital contribution. This in itself would be uneconomic and as a result BA would be
forced to close the plant.
681 Further, reducing its operations to this level would mean
its contribution to the import/export balance would also be affected. The DTI then
made a decision in March to offer the company a loan of £7m at an interest rate of
14.5%, more than double the rate of interest for the original loan and 4.5% more than
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the Bank of England minimum lending rate of 10% at the time.
682 However, the
company would be protected against further derating on the operating capacity of the
delayed Hunterston B power station, but not further costs. The consequences of the
new agreement were that the annual capital charge for Hunterston B rose from £2.1m
(in 1968) to £3.6m per annum; resulting in an increase of 71% of an element of the
power price, which it was claimed in 1968 would be stable.
683 Had it not been for the
personal intervention of Sir Edmund Dell, it is not entirely inconceivable that the
company would have been left to deal with the problems it was facing alone, given
that there had been little or no progress made prior to the new Paymaster General’s
actions. As a result of Dell’s intervention, a payment of £113m in 1976, approved by
Parliament, was made to the NSHEB to cover the energy deficit in the Smelter
Account, now subsequently known as the Smelter Deficit Account. In order for this to
happen the government passed the Electricity (Financial provisions) (Scotland) Act of
1976.
684 This was followed by a further payment of £57m in March 1977.
685 Sir
Edmund was proving to be a good friend to the project, but the smelter was becoming
an increasingly expensive venture for all concerned, not least the government. In
formulating these agreements there were questions raised at the Department of
Energy over whether or not the CEGB should receive parity of treatment with the
Scottish boards. It was decided however that the CEGB should not receive the same
treatment as the highest figure for exposure to losses caused by the Anglesey smelter
was 1.4% of its total sales (£25.8m) for the period 1973/74, compared to NSHEB’s
exposure of 26.5% of total sales (£14.6m) for the same year.
686
Hunterston B eventually became operational in 1976, two years after its
projected start date. However, the much-heralded cheaper power it was meant to
bring failed to materialise. This can be seen more clearly in Table 5.4:
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Table 5.4 Increases in annual running costs for power
Year £m p/KWH % (a) % (b)
1976/7 4.2 0.241 198 40
1977/8 8.2 0.472 387 64
1978/9 10.9 0.627 514 26
1979/80 14.8 0.850 697 30
1980/1 16.4 0.936 767 9
1981/2 23.6 1.354 1110 40
(a) Increase over contract figure from 1968.
(b) Increase over previous year.
Source: Utiger, pg 33.
As the table shows, the increases in power cost were considerable. Any substantial
increase  in  the  cost  of  power  in  aluminium  smelting  can  result  in  disastrous
consequences for the operation involved. As the case of the Invergordon smelter
unfolded, so the point was proven. From the agreed price of 0.263 p/KWH to a price
of 0.503 p/KWH at the beginning of Hunterston B’s lifetime, and subsequent
increases from then on, the price of nuclear power was nowhere near as competitive
as it was meant to be. The agreed sum of £83,000 per tonne for nuclear fuel elements
rose to £214,000 in 1976/7 and then to £287,000 in 1977/8, excluding reprocessing,
as a result of the extended delays in completing the AGR nuclear power stations and
the subsequent failure of demand to meet the supply. British Nuclear Fuels operated a
two-part tariff system in order to ensure that its profit margins were not affected by a
lowering of demand. As a result of the delay in completion of the AGR power
stations, the cost of the fuel rose accordingly. SSEB had failed to build Hunterston B
on time
687 and NSHEB who insisted on negotiating the discussions itself on behalf of
SSEB. Thus, as a result of the delay, the company refused to pay £24.5m in running
costs and a further £3.9m in ongoing capital charges, but made provisions for them in
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the accounting balance sheets as a matter of financial prudence
.  The company
believed that the increases were not solely attributable to inflation, but were in fact a
result of massive under-estimation of costs in the 1968 agreement on the part of the
generating boards.
688 Whilst this may be true, it should also be noted that the company
should never have agreed to enter into an agreement with open-ended escalation
clauses and non-specific clauses relating to design changes. That, put simply, was
writing the government a blank cheque. The contract relied, at least on British
Aluminium’s part, too much on good faith in the projections of UKAEA and SSEB,
neither of who had any experience of constructing an AGR nuclear power station on
time.
689 Perhaps the most damning part of the story here is the price British
Aluminium were paying for its nuclear based power in its last year of operation in
1981 - 29mils/KWH - almost five times the agreed price of 6.31mils/KWH in 1968.
690
Closure
Excluding the problems with the energy deficit it was running, the smelter
was profitably run for most of the late 1970s. According to a briefing for the
Industrial Development Board, it was in fact the most efficiently run smelter in the
country, with the brief stating that
The  smelter  has  given  no  major  technical  problems,  and  the  delays  in
commissioning have been from causes largely outside the company’s control.
The company is, in fact, regarded as the most efficient producer of aluminium
in the UK. In 1973 average earnings per employee were £2050 per employee
per annum and output per employee was almost £9000.
691
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Regarding Invergordon as the most well run smelter in the country was faint praise
however. By 1973 the smelter projects commissioned by government the previous
decade were all running at a loss. The smelters at Anglesey and Lynemouth operated
by the RTZ consortium and Alcan respectively, were operating at losses of more than
£4m, with each companies being accountable for approximately £0.5m and the CEGB
and National Coal Board (NCB) exposed to the remaining £3.5m.
692 The total gross
trading profit from 1971 to 1975 for Invergordon (when the smelter finally reached its
intended capacity of 100,000 tonnes), excluding the disputed power charges was
£4.65m. From 1975 to 1981 when the plant closed its doors, the total trading profit
was £14.482m, a considerable improvement in operating performance from the
previous year. This was helped by a recovery of the price of aluminium when it rose
from £371 per tonne in 1975 to £780 per tonne in 1980.
693 Admittedly, this profit
disappears when the power supply escalation cost is taken into account, since the
company had been in dispute with the NSHEB over the power escalation costs since
1976, but it is an operating profit nonetheless showing that, given a competitive rate
for power price, the company was capable of performing to expectation. The effect of
the power costs on the profitability of the smelter can be seen in Table 5.5:
Table 5.5 Trading Profit and Disputed Power Costs at Invergordon
Year Ending
March
Trading Profit
(£m)
Disputed Power
Charges (£m)
1976/77 4.224 1.8
1977/78 8.815 4.7
1978/79 7.724 6.1
1979/80 4.578 8.0
1980/81 0.577 8.7
1981/82 -19.131 9.4
Source: Utiger, Appendix: Table 1 & Table 2B. Figures are before tax and interest.
The table shows that the smelter ran at a net profit until 1979 including the disputed
power prices. It also shows that 1981 was the disaster period for the smelter, coming
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on the back of poor trading profit for the previous 2 years. Whilst the disputed power
charges (which the company refused to pay) on first appearance don’t look to be of
any great concern to the company, when tax and interest is included in the figures
they become more damaging. This combined with a falling price in aluminium
conspired to push the smelter’s operations into the red. From operating at trading
profit from 1976 to 1981, the company posted losses of £19.131m in 1981/82. These
losses, the burgeoning energy deficit and fall in world prices began the viability of
British Aluminium, its parent company Tube Investments (the majority shareholder),
and was making the position of the Invergordon plant increasingly untenable and
indeed undesirable. Consumption in the aluminium market fell by 5%, the exchange
rate  of  $2.80/£  and  a  general  depression  in  world  aluminium  meant  that  the
company’s good operating performance in the previous 5 years counted for nothing.
The actual price received for Invergordon products between January and May 1981
fell by £60/tonne below the 1980 average of £780 and the price for new sales fell by a
further £70/tonne. This was compounded by NSHEB posting escalated power prices
for  the  smelter  of  40%  more  than  in  the  previous  year,  which  also  included
retrospective charges for the same year. The result of these factors was losses of
almost £2m per month for the smelter.
694 This led to the company to conclude that
continuation of the situation as it was would result in one of three things; default on
its loan repayments to the government, attempt to negotiate a further subsidy from the
government  or  close  the  smelter.  After  the  company  made  this  clear  to  the
government, the Scottish Economic Planning Department (SEPD) was tasked by the
new Conservative government with calculating the cost of further subsidy of the
smelter compared to closure. They produced the following calculations:
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Table 5.6 Smelter Figures: Closure Costs
Closure £m (1981/82 prices)
1981/82 (Jan/March) 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85
Net Cash to BACo.                         30* N/A N/A N/A
Loss of Revenue to
NCB by coal displaced
by Hunterston B
2** 8 5 2
Loss of Capital
Repayments
on loan by BACo.
                        0 2 2 2
Extra Expenditure by
HIDB*
                        1 5 5 5
Unemployment Pay                         1 3 2 1
Loss of Tax Revenue 2 1 1
Total:             34* or 4 20 15 11
Grand Total: £80m* or £50m
*      Opposed by Treasury.
**    Assuming that NCB cannot find alternative markets or rundown production in
late years.
***  Provisional figures subject to examination by officials of remedial measures for
which expenditure may be required.
Table 5.7 Smelter Figures : Continuation Costs
Continuation £m (1981/82 prices)
1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85
NSHEB loss on supply to BACo 4 (iv) & (v) 14 14 13
Grand Total for 3 years: 45
(i)  In addition to other costs it will be necessary to place an Order before
Parliament in 1982 to reimburse the disputed charges to NSHEB. These
would amount to a total of approximately £59m. In exchange for this
write-off the Government will take a charge on the tranche of Hunterston
B previously held by BACo.
(ii)  Financial support for the deficit payments would be necessary until the
end of the contract.
Source: Letter from George Younger, Secretary of State for Scotland to the PM
Margaret Thatcher, 14/12/81, NAS SEP4/4055.264
The calculations apparently show that it would have been cheaper for the government
to continue the operations of the smelter than to close it down. However, the figures
for continuing the smelter only account for the first 3 years following 1981/82.
McCrone writing in a letter to George Younger advised:
We have shown… the cost of continuation over the next three years is less than
closure… but the essential point is that continuation is likely to involve an
obligation  beyond  three  years…  I  remain  of  the  view  therefore  that  on
economic grounds alone this scale of support cannot be justified.
695
McCrone  felt  that  the  Government  would  be  taking  an  unacceptable  risk  of
potentially having to subsidise the smelter for a period much longer than the three
years envisaged if it decided on continuing it. McCrone also indicated that he felt the
cost of subsidising the smelter for the three years alone to the tune of £14m per year
plus writing off the disputed charges was ‘an excessive amount to pay for 900 jobs
(or even 1500 if the indirect effects are included).’
696 The government was thus to
close down a plant that was indirectly responsible for 1500 jobs in an area historically
beset by problems of high unemployment, low wages and high outward migration,
resulting in an increase in unemployment in the area up to 25%
697, undoing all that
had been done to remedy these very problems. Faced with an underperforming
money-pit and elected on the platform of no longer supporting ‘lame ducks’, the new
Conservative government was unlikely to prove as friendly to the smelter as Sir
Edmund Dell had been in the past.
George Younger, acting as Secretary of State for Scotland understood full
well the implications of closing the smelter and sought to ensure its continuing
operation, at least initially. Writing in a letter to the Prime Minister the day before
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receiving McCrone’s advice, Younger states: ‘As… seen from the table the costs of
closure exceed those of continuation over the first three years. I therefore recommend
strongly that we offer arrangements to the company which will enable the plant to
continue.’
698 Younger’s advice appears to be founded on an optimistic reading of the
calculations made and on the assumption that the government would not have to
continue subsidising the smelter after the period. McCrone of course was not so
optimistic. Younger was also looking at the situation from a political as well as
economic perspective - closure would mean high unemployment and potential outcry.
The Anglesey smelter was one factor that was foremost in Younger’s mind when
considering the closure of Invergordon. The Anglesey smelter was to operate on the
same premise as the Invergordon smelter, taking its power from the new Dungeness B
AGR nuclear power plant. However, Dungeness B, like Hunterston B, was not
completed on time. Moreover, Dungeness B was still not completed by the time
Hunterston B had been and as a result the Anglesey smelter continued to draw its
power from the state-owned CEGB at a rate much lower than Invergordon had drawn
its power from the NSHEB and Hunterston B, allowing it to operate profitably. This
is indicated in the same letter with Younger pointing out:
If closure is decided on, an aspect which is particularly difficult for me is the
continuation of much larger subsidies from CEGB to the Anglesey smelter.
Because Dungeness B is still not in operation this smelter gets its electricity at
about a third of the cost at Invergordon with CEGB meeting the deficit.
Invergordon would of course be viable at this price also.
699
The agreement between the Anglesey smelter and the CEGB was not made
public however, just as the agreement between Invergordon and the Scottish boards
wasn’t. The government then took the decision to close Invergordon on purely
economic grounds, advised at length by the Scottish Economic Planning Department
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and British Aluminium itself: ‘The company’s attitude provides further information
that there is no good economic case for keeping the smelter open.’
700 However, the
company was not aware of the Anglesey arrangement at this point. Indeed Utiger,
upon  scrutiny  of  the  Anglesey  plant’s  accounts,  was  particularly  dismayed  at
discovering the Anglesey smelter had apparently enjoyed a cheaper power source
than Invergordon, writing in his 1995 book on the subject:
What was outrageous from BA’s standpoint was that another state-owned
organisation was supporting the Anglesey smelter by a comparable, if not
larger  amount…  If  this  was  so,  then  it  clearly  amounted  to  blatant
discrimination between competing companies, despite the verbal assurances
given in 1968.
701
Utiger was of course correct in his assertion, as evidenced by Younger’s letter
to the Prime Minister - Anglesey did have a more favourable pricing arrangement
than Invergordon for power supply from the CEGB.  Clearly the government did not
wholly reciprocate the good faith shown by the company in agreeing to two different
power contracts in 1968 for the new smelters. It would seem that there was an
element of duplicity about the government’s part in the negotiations throughout the
smelter’s lifetime, given that it was the purse holder for the generating boards and
would surely have had full knowledge of, and indeed influence over, the negotiations
that took place between the aluminium companies and generating boards. As Utiger
argues
When it suited them, government exercised considerable pressure on the
generating boards, particularly in 1967/8 [the year of the negotiations for the
power contract]… When it did not suit them… government maintained that the
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power arrangement was entirely a commercial matter between NSHEB and
BA.
702
The  government,  British  Aluminium  and  the  generating  boards  had  all
exhausted each other’s patience by the end of the project. The Conservatives were not
interested in paying for what they viewed as a Labour error and British Aluminium
and NSHEB were threatening each other with legal action in an attempt to settle the
Smelter Deficit Account. The idea of closing the smelter became the only real option
left when it was made clear that there would be no further intervention on the
government’s part to keep it running. The final cost however would amount to
considerably more than the £37m originally envisaged by the Labour government in
1967. The overall cost of the project can be seen from the table below. The estimated
figures for the closure of the Invergordon smelter (in 1981 prices) are as follows:
Table 5.8 Final Cost of Closure of the Invergordon Aluminium Smelter
Category 1981 Prices in £m
Grant 1969 55.6
Loans 1971-81 (net of interests and
repayments)
76.3
Electricity Deficit Repayments:
1977
1979
1980
1981
122.5
23.8
18.2
9.2
Electricity Capital Addition 1976 20.9
Regional Employment Premium 1.0
Recycling Costs 1981 47.0
Payment to BACo 1981 20.0
Value of NSHEB Surplus Supply -13.4
Grand Total: 381.1
Source: Scott, A & Cuthbert, M, Reviewing Industrial Aid Programmes: (I) The
Invergordon Smelter Case, (Edinburgh, David Hume Institute, 1985), pg 10.
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As Table 5.8 shows, the government’s initial estimate of a £37m outlay proved to be
somewhat short of the actual final cost of the smelter. Indeed, Dr McCrone’s estimate
of £80m as the cost of closure was not inclusive of the money already spent on
keeping the smelter in operation. The final cost of the smelter project at £381.1m was
the result of various governments throwing good money after bad, paying large
chunks of the deficit off instead of amending the contract to give the smelter the
chance of survival.
The Invergordon aluminium smelter closed its doors for the final time on the
31
st December, 1981. By the time of its closure the smelter had been taking almost a
quarter of all electricity sold in NSHEB’s region. George Younger argued that for the
smelter to remain open it would have required 60% of the board’s full hydro capacity
to meet its power needs on a continuous basis.
704 (It’s not clear what he thought
Hunterston B’s contribution to Invergordon’s supply would be in this case.) Central
to the story are the mistakes made in the planning stage. First of all, the promise of
nuclear power supplying cheap electricity was an empty one. Had a bespoke power
station  (non-nuclear)  supplying  electricity  specifically  for  the  smelter  been
constructed, as the Alcan smelter at Lynemouth (which is still in operation today)
operates on, then there is every possibility that the Invergordon smelter would still be
in operation today. Of course that wouldn’t have fitted in with Labour’s modernity
drive  of  the  1960s.  Alternatively,  had  an  arrangement  been  found  to  supply
Invergordon with electricity at a competitive price, as Anglesey received, then there
would have been a greater likelihood of success. As successful as the planning and
implementation stage was in constructing and running the smelter on time and within
budget, it was a false success. The hurried nature of the negotiations of the power
contract meant that the company effectively signed a blank cheque to the generating
boards for its power supply. The government was eager to begin production to offset
its balance of payments problem and prove it status as the party of modernity; the
company was eager to start operations at Invergordon to start making money.
However, the increases in the power price coupled with the drop in the world price
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for aluminium led to the company incurring unsustainable losses of up to £2m per
month on the smelter. This inevitably led to its closure.
Aluminium smelting on a large-scale in Britain was simply uneconomic from
the  beginning.  It  could  not  be  done  without  some  form  of  subsidy  from  the
government or favourable pricing arrangement for power supply. The smelter was
capable of operating with some degree of efficiency, but was profitable only when the
power price was competitive. The belief in nuclear power as a source for cheap
electricity turned out to be a false hope. The real problem however lay in the
agreement of the power contract. The contract contained no provisions for protecting
the smelter from power price escalations, delay in the construction of the power
station it was designed to rely on - Hunterston B - and was wholly insufficient in the
price set from the outset. The unit price agreed was too expensive to begin with and
was not guaranteed. This meant that the smelter was starting off at a disadvantage
from other operations in the same field so when escalations in the price of power
occurred the smelter fell further behind and eventually got to the stage where it
became too expensive to run as a viable operation. Fault lies on all sides for this. The
company was at fault for entering such an agreement in the first place, the generating
boards for their inflexibility, but most of all the government for not taking a more
active role in the negotiations for the power contract. As the purse holder for the
generating boards the government was the only body that could ensure that the
smelter could have a competitive power price, free from escalation that would have
allowed it to continue operations. Instead, the government took the line that the
agreement was a commercial one solely between the company and the generating
boards. The fact that it was based on a government-sponsored idea seemed to be of
little consequence. Of course there was a concern over EFTA, but this was not
insurmountable. After all, the Anglesey smelter was effectively being subsidised by
the CEGB, another government owned organisation.
The story of the smelter then is a valuable illustration of the problems in the
Scottish economy and governmental attempts at remedying them. It is indicative of a270
wider trend in governmental policy towards the Scottish economy as a whole. From
the interventionist policies of the 1960s and 70s to the more hands-off philosophy of
the Conservative government from the 1980s, the smelter is the embodiment of the
change in governmental approaches to the Scottish economy and the problems
inherent in it. It is also a stark warning to future governments of the problems of
trying to stimulate the economy through interventionist policies and transplanting
unsuitable  industries  into  unsuitable  areas.  As  Sir  Edmund  Dell  writes:  ‘The
aluminium smelters are the most original product of the Labour Government's
industrial policies. But originality has not in this case tempted imitation.’
705 It’s
perhaps no wonder.
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Chapter Six. Conclusion
The preceding four case studies have raised a number of issues that are best
dealt with thematically. Consequently, this chapter assesses the themes present in the
following sub-sections: ‘Regional Policy, The Scottish Office and the Highlands’
deals with the regional policy aspect of Scottish Office policy towards the Scottish
national and economic structural problems, set within the UK national economic
context but viewed as a distinct entity; the section ‘Statistical analysis’ assesses the
impact on population and unemployment and the final totals for Governmental
expenditure on the four developments between 1960-1990; the section ‘Political
economy of Highland development’ discusses the themes of neo-protectionism,
modernity and the UK national interest inherent in the four case study discussions;
the section ‘The politics of Highland development’ details the importance of the
political climate at both Scottish and UK national levels and its relationship to
Highland development, followed by some concluding remarks.
The four industrial developments in the Highlands were not complete failures
in achieving the purposes for which they were intended. Their contribution to the
population increase in the Highlands is as clear to see as their failure to act as ‘growth
centres’ and attract further industries to the area. Equally, the developments had the
effect of stabilising population levels while they were operational and focusing
attention at central governmental level on the region. The eventual closure and run
down of the three main labour-intensive developments of the four discussed resulted
in significant unemployment hikes in the areas in which they were situated, however,
and  in  many  respects  should  be  seen  as  having  failed.  The  election  of  the
Conservatives  in  1979  brought  with  it  the  government’s  refusal  to  continue
subsidising the underperforming Invergordon and Corpach developments, resulting in
their closure. The reorganisation of the nuclear industry in 1987 by the Conservatives
saw a move towards operating on more private enterprise based lines before the
decision was taken that Dounreay should be entirely self-funded from 1994. The plant
is now in the process of being decommissioned. Of the developments mentioned, only272
Aviemore has flourished from the Conservatives’ reversal of the government’s policy
of industrial intervention in the Highlands, based in no small part on the fact that it is
located on the two main arterial transport routes that run north through the region -
the A9 road and the Perth-Inverness rail route - which are the two crucial transport
routes in the tourist industry in the area. The retreat from state intervention and
economic planning in the Highlands was based on evidence that it had failed. The
HIDB,  although  relatively  successful  in  helping  the  region,  was  replaced  by
Highlands and Islands Enterprise in 1991, a government agency whose metier is to
facilitate  small-scale  industrial  development,  completing  the  government’s
withdrawal from economic planning and intervention in the Highlands.
The failures in the Highlands sit together with the failure of governmental
attempts at establishing a motor vehicle industry in Scotland at Linwood and Bathgate
as well as the large steel plant constructed to service it at Ravenscraig. Payne has
accurately  described  the  failure  of  these  developments  as  ‘transplanted organs
rejected, despite repeated surgery, by the economic body.’
706 The failure of the
planning process in the Highlands was a result of the desire for a quick fix to national
economic and political problems as well as regional economic and social problems -
put simply the area was unsuited to large-scale industrial developments. However,
regional policy in the Highlands was shaped in no small part by public opinion and
the belief that the area ‘deserved’ large-scale industrial developments to bring it to
parity with the policy direction in other parts of the country, particularly the Central
Belt.
707 The developments in the Central Belt failed in part due to their peripherality.
The Highland developments suffered similarly, but with added problems. The failure
to pay more attention to the need for wider infrastructural development in the area -
particularly transport - in order to help the four developments exacerbated their
operating problems, condemning them to failure in their stated aims of acting as
growth  centres.  The  operation  of  each  development,  except  Aviemore,  was
problematic in respect of transport costs and remoteness from markets. Political and
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economic concerns at the Scottish and UK national levels usurped social concerns at
the regional level in economic planning in the region. In Scotland the view was that
the Highlands is a specific region with specific problems that needed bespoke
answers. This is evidenced in part by the establishment of the Hydro Board as well as
the creation of the HIDB, the first regional development agency ever in the UK and a
precursor to the SDA, both by the prompting of the Scottish Office. Whitehall’s view
was  that  Scotland  was  one  whole  region-  UK  national  accounts  contained  no
breakdown of Scottish regional performance, focusing on Scotland as a whole
instead. That Scotland was viewed as one whole region from London is perhaps more
clearly seen in figure 6.1 below:
Figure 6.1: Economic Planning Regions of Great Britain
Source: HMSO, A Strategy for the South East, (HMSO, London, 1967), pg. x.274
The figure demonstrates quite clearly that Scotland was considered to be one whole
planning region. The Highlands was and still is a demonstrably distinctive region
from the rest of Scotland however. Its highly dispersed population, peripherality,
geographical make-up, culture, size, lack of transport infrastructure and lack of
labour-intensive industry clearly set it apart from the other areas of Scotland as well
as the UK. Many of these distinct characteristics were largely ignored in locating the
large-scale developments discussed, however. The work of the HIDB from the 1960s
through to the early 90s means that there is now a detailed record, albeit patchy, of
economic activity in the Highlands which has undoubtedly helped towards the greater
understanding of the economic capabilities of the region at present and the area’s
growing economic performance. This was not the case when the four developments
discussed were conceived and created. Consequently, the belief that large-scale
industrial developments could be successfully transplanted into the region was
pursued.
The lack of a detailed knowledge or understanding of the economic activities
in and potential of the area impacted on the regional policy decisions taken at the
time. The peripheral nature of the Highlands from the centre - physically and
psychologically – in economic and social terms gave rise to a lack of understanding in
the Scottish Office of its potentialities for economic growth. The Highlands and
Islands Advisory Panel - the body set up to advise the Secretary of State for Scotland
on Highland development - offered little actual advice on the developments other than
agreeing with them. That the area had been effectively ignored for the previous
century didn’t help matters much either. The Scottish Office focused on the area only
when it was politically advantageous to do so. Thus, the deliberate policy in the post-
war period of grand gestures of large industrial plants that caught the public eye and
offset the threat of Nationalism
708, was pursued as a means towards economic
regeneration.  They  were  hopelessly  unsuited  to  the  Highlands  however.  The
discovery and exploitation of North Sea Oil in the 1970s shifted attention in the
Scottish Office away from directing industrial diversification and regeneration in the
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area in favour of encouraging the construction of the rigs necessary in order to take
immediate advantage of the oil boom
709, although Nigg Bay and  Kishorn offered the
opportunity to do both.
710 The election of the Conservatives later the same decade put
paid to any hopes of revitalising the Highland economy through government-directed
industrialisation - the troubles experienced by the developments meant that they were
high on the list of ‘lame duck’ operations with a limited shelf-life. It has only been
very recently with the growth and dominance of the tourist industry in Scotland, the
expansion of communications technology, the more detailed economic records of the
area and the continued encouragement of small-scale enterprise by HIE (building on
the  work  of  the  HIDB)  that  the  Highland  area  has  begun  to  play  a  vital  and
contributing role in the Scottish economy.
The outcome of the lack of understanding of the area was a group of projects
that were essentially grand economic gestures based on short-term social remedies,
intended to offset political problems rather than acting as harbingers of long-term
economic growth and sustainability. An HIDB note on government policy in the area
described regional policy decisions aimed at solving the problems as ‘fire brigade
action’
711, demonstrating in succinct terms the reactionary nature of policy undertaken
that was purported to prescribe growth in the area. Haddow’s suggestion of ‘chucking
buns across the fence’ in order to keep the area quiet is pertinent to understanding
post-war Highland development in the context of the four developments discussed in
this thesis. The political advantage of being seen to be pursuing a policy of Highland
development was an important tool in ensuring the Union was protected and the
Scottish Office kept public opinion onside.
712 Buns the developments were, albeit
very large and indigestible ones with a UK flavour.
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Regional Policy, The Scottish Office and the Highlands
Regional policy in Scotland in the Highlands post-1945 should be understood
within the context of the governmental response to the wider Scottish national
industrial and economic structural problems, set firmly within the UK national
economic context but directed primarily by the Scottish Office.   Inherent in the
Scottish Office’s policy formulation and action was the tacit admission that the
Scottish economy, and by extension the Highlands, was unable to provide its own
solutions  to  the  problems  present.  Consequently,  economic  intervention  by
government was identified and pursued as the answer to the problem to the extent that
Marr describes Scotland in the post-war period as an ‘interventionists’ economy’.
713
The Scottish Office acted as the overseer of development on behalf of Westminster
with the Scottish Secretary’s role being determined primarily by what he could ‘win’
for Scotland. The long drawn out decline of the staple industries in Scotland meant
that the Scottish Office felt compelled to act in order to diversify the industrial
structure - a recommendation made clear in both Cairncross and Toothill’s reports.
The developments in the Highlands were all examples of this and utilised new
technologies such as nuclear power, integrated paper-pulp making and large-scale
aluminium smelting, as well as the new focus on tourism development. However,
crucial to explaining the failure of three of the Highland projects is that these attempts
at diversification were not sophisticated enough to move away from the focus on
manufacturing  that  required  a  large  labour  pool,  existing  developed  transport
infrastructure and a closeness to markets. Moreover, it was the only approach to
solving the problems that was  considered. Heavy industry was  brought to the
Highlands through top-down regional policy direction in an attempt at bringing
prosperity and sustainability to the area. However, the peripherality of the Highlands
meant  that  the  developments  were  too  far  away  from  markets  and  centres  of
population, a problem concentrated by the lack of ease of getting to and from the area
as a result of its poor infrastructural state. Similar developments further south in
Scotland failed in part due to their distance from the growing markets and populations
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of the South East and the Midlands of England. That the Highlands was even further
away and with poorer transport infrastructure meant its problems in these respects
were consequently magnified.
Policy  decisions  regarding  Highland  development  are  therefore  best
understood as the product of peripherality and its constituent problems framed within
the then political climate. The growth of Scottish Nationalism in the 1960s was of
concern to the Scottish Office at all levels. Further, ex-pat Highlanders made clear
their unhappiness at the area’s continued decline. Thus, when it was no longer
politically acceptable to allow the area’s population to drift, the government was left
with no option but to pursue a policy of grand gestures of industrial development in
the region that failed due to the peripherality of the area and its poor infrastructure -
as Payne said, ‘transplanted organs’. The Highlands was (and still is) unsuited to
large-scale heavy industry - the population was too dispersed, the road and rail
networks underdeveloped and it was simply too far away and too difficult to get to
and from. Focusing policy on developing the infrastructure was not considered as an
option however as it would have created far fewer jobs than the four developments
this thesis has detailed did, but had it been a part of the overall focus on Highland
development then the developments would have stood a better chance of succeeding
as growth poles. Since one of the main publicly and privately stated reasons for
developing industry in the Highlands was the reversal of population decline caused by
a lack of jobs, the option of developing an integrated infrastructure was untenable due
to the insistence that all investment in the Highlands and elsewhere was linked to job
creation - infrastructural improvements would have cost a substantial amount of
money but involved little job creation and thus have been very difficult to sell to
Whitehall, let alone the other departments of the Scottish Office. The under-secretary
responsible  for  regional  development  Ronald  Johnson  made  this  clear  in  his
opposition  to  road  improvements  in  the  ‘tourist  interest’  in  the  discussions
surrounding the Aviemore development.
714 Further any jobs created by infrastructural
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development  would  have  been  naturally  impermanent.  Thus,  the  attempts  at
establishing large-scale heavy industry in the Highlands were constrained by the
regional policy statutes in place - in particular the link between industrial creation and
establishment and cost per job. Prescribing labour-intensive industries was politically
and socially desirable, though a primarily short-term measure. The only way of
attracting  other  businesses  North  however  was  by  governmental  financial
inducement.
 The role of the Scottish Office in the establishment of the industries discussed
in this thesis is of great importance. The activities of its head, the Secretary of State
for Scotland, and its civil servants meant that the Scottish Office was integral both to
the notion and the reality of Highland development. The role of the Scottish Secretary
of State was particularly important. Willie Ross described the post of Scottish
Secretary as ‘approaching the archangelic’ for its far-reaching responsibilities over
the length and breadth of Scottish political, social and economic life.
715 These
responsibilities covered several areas that in England were the responsibility of
ministers for the Home department, education, health, agriculture, electricity, and
local government.
716 As a result, the Scottish Secretary held a general political
responsibility for the economic well being of the country.
717 Thus, when the Scottish
Secretary was convinced of the merits of a particular development being located in
the Highlands, he was in a position of considerable strength to help the area succeed
in winning the crucial support from other areas of government, not least his position
as a permanent member in the Cabinet. The influence of the Secretary during the
period in relation to industrial location and development was such that as President of
the Board of Trade, Reginald Maudling was moved to say to John Maclay before
entering a Cabinet meeting ‘I do wish you’d tell me when you are going to take over
my office in Scotland!’ This was in light of Maclay’s role in securing support for the
establishment of the Forth Road Bridge, the mill at Corpach and his success in
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securing governmental support in the form of grants for companies wishing to locate
in Scotland, in spite of it being the responsibility of the Board of Trade’s office in
Glasgow.
718 This demonstrates in part how marginalised the Board of Trade were in
respect of the administration of regional policy in Scotland. They may have had a
great deal of influence whether or not a project, such as those in the Highlands, went
ahead on the basis of cost per job (under the Local Development Act guidelines) at
the latter stages, but the political manoeuvrings of the Scottish Office at the highest
levels of the UK government ensured that the Board of Trade did not always have the
final say. If and when support was secured from the Prime Minister, such as in the
cases of Corpach and Aviemore, the Board of Trade found it very difficult to argue
against the Scottish Office and its head’s position, particularly with the bogeyman of
Scottish Nationalism ready to be used by the Scottish Secretary at any point and the
issue of Scottish sentiment for the area.
Regional policy in Scotland was subject only to a very loose control by
Whitehall during the period, primarily on the granting of funds. St Andrew’s House
utilised all the political tools at its disposal during the period to ensure that Highland
development especially was given ‘special status’ in considerations for locating new
industries around the country, irrespective of its actual suitability, and particularly
when it was politically advantageous to do so. The special legislation required for the
Invergordon and Corpach projects for funding and high cost-per-job characteristics of
all four developments go some way towards demonstrating this. The high cost-per-job
rate was justified by Scottish officials on the basis that the developments would act as
the  ‘growth  centres’  or  breeders  for  industry  that  Toothill  recommended.  For
example, the Board of Trade made it clear in relation to the Corpach development
that the maximum cost-per-job limit it would go to was £2500 and to go higher would
require ‘very special justification’.
719 However, Scottish officials knew of at least
three cases where the Board had gone higher - one of which was the Rootes car
factory at Linwood where the cost-per-job was £3000 - and so used this as leverage in
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their representations to Whitehall for Corpach. In the end the £10m committed by
government  on  the  project  was  equivalent  to  £3500  per  job  created  at  the
development
720, almost 50% over what the Board of Trade had originally said it was
prepared to go to.
Whilst Tomlinson’s argument that ‘unemployment remained the key issue for
regional policy’
721 may be true of the rest of the UK, it doesn’t quite hold entirely true
in relation to the Highlands, with the Scottish Office providing an alternative focus
point in regional development.
722 Unemployment was certainly a key issue in the
Highlands, but not the key issue. Quelling depopulation (particularly the HIDB’s
‘Project Counterdrift’ population policy), encouraging repopulation and establishing
the Highlands as a place where industry could successfully locate were of more
immediate concern to the Scottish Office, not least in light of the political advantage
to be accrued from this approach. Harvie argues that the more developed nature of
Scottish regional policies versus the English regional bodies contributed to their
relative success.
723 The creation of the SDD predated Labour’s election in 1964 and
the National Plan and allowed the department time to gain experience and develop a
perspective distinct from other UK regional planning bodies based on acceptance of
Toothill’s growth pole recommendations. Highland Development was consequently
firmly focused on the ‘growth centre’ aspect of regional development whereas
elsewhere in the UK, particularly in England, the alleviation of unemployment and
the relief of congestion in the Midlands and South East were the main focuses of
policy, as detailed in the National Plan.
724 The Rootes car factory being located in
Linwood is an example of the attempts at alleviating congestion in the Midlands and
focusing on unemployment in Scotland - Rootes had originally wanted to expand
operations at its site in the Midlands, but were coerced into locating in a depressed
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area in Scotland through the use of the Industrial Development Certificate scheme.
Another example of a depressed area receiving special attention was the North East of
England. The North East Development Council was created in 1961 as a reaction to
the growing unemployment in the region, but also to the findings of the Toothill
Report, closely followed by the appointment of Lord Hailsham as Minister with
special responsibility for unemployment in the North East in 1963.
725 The area had
been suffering from severe unemployment and the Council’s predecessor The North
East Industrial and Development Association was a vocal critic of economic policies
in the area until the Council’s creation. However, the two regions differed on the
focus of regional policy in each: the focus in the North East was on unemployment
alleviation whereas in the Highlands it was primarily on repopulation. Tomlinson’s
point about unemployment alleviation as the focus of regional policy certainly applies
in relation to the North East, but less so in the Highlands.
The unsuitability of the Highlands for housing large-scale, labour intensive
industries is vital in understanding the failure of the four developments to act as
growth centres for industry. The Highlands has suffered and continues to suffer from
a lack of transport infrastructure. The 2005 HIE document A Smart and Successful
Highlands and Islands called for an improvement to transport links in the region
arguing that ‘continued improvements in the transport infrastructure are essential to
the long-term development of the Highlands and Islands.’
726 The same calls were
being made by the SC(DI) in its report on Highland transport costs in 1951, but have
gone mostly unheeded - with the exception of the improvements made to the A9,
which still remains a trunk road to this day, but is the main arterial road route through
the Highlands. There is a stramash currently regarding upgrading of the A9 to dual
carriageway status for its entire length with the road being responsible for 83 deaths
in the past five years alone.
727 The Highlands has suffered from a severe lack of
investment with many of the roads remaining single lane with passing points. The
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lack of roads suitable for freight as well as even simple two-way lanes in the area was
compounded by the scarcity of rail lines to take the pressure off the road network.
The rail network in the Highlands is primarily based on the old lines built to serve the
great hunting lodges of the Highland Lairds, not heavy industry. The transport
infrastructure in the area was dealt a blow by the Beeching Report’s insistence on a
shift in the focus of funding to rail lines that ran profitably and the loss of several
Highland lines. The Glasgow to Mallaig line was kept open in spite of its lack of
profitability as a result of a meeting between Dr Frankel of Scottish Pulp and Dr
Beeching and the agreement that the line would be used to transport wood to the
Corpach development. It is now used primarily to transport tourists to Fort William
and the surrounding areas, contributing in no small measure to the growth of tourism
in the area.
The growth of tourism in the Highlands has seen it become the biggest industry
in the region, but has taken some time. During the 1960s tourism was considered by
some as the ‘soft option’
728 for solving Highland problems - a seasonally fluctuating
industry that could be relied on only to assist with ‘consolidation in some of the main
centres [of population] and give a supplementary income to the dispersed population
engaged in primary and service industry’.
729 Regional policy was thus focused
primarily on other more traditional industries such as agriculture and fishing, but
primarily on manufacturing. Robert Grieve, in his first report as Chairman of the
HIDB, acknowledged the negative view of tourism held by some stating ‘There is a
tendency in some quarters to rate employment in the tourism industry as second-rate
or menial.’
730 Grieve was aware of the tension between the encouragement of tourism
and the desire for the Highlands to be industrialised claiming that the latter contained,
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…the implicit assumption that any manufacturing industry, no matter how
useless or dubious its product in terms of sense, is somehow more honourable
than an industry which is designed to give a visitor a warm welcome, a
comfortable bed and good food.
731
It wasn’t the case that establishing manufacturing in the Highlands was considered
more honourable in the confines of St Andrews House (although it may well have
been in wider Scotland), rather that it brought people to the area and provided more
full-time, non-seasonal, jobs, thus silencing the critics and quelling nationalist
fervour. That it served these purposes was certainly deliberate - the protection of the
Union was important to the Scottish Office as Westminster’s overseer of Scottish
development. Levitt’s description of the Scottish Office as being in the Dundas mould
-  massaging  if  not  manipulating  Scottish  opinion
732 - is pertinent here. The
establishment of new manufacturing plants elsewhere in both Scotland and the UK
meant  that  any  exclusion  of  the  Highlands  from  the  same  policy  would  have
inevitably been met with dismay and accusations of leaving the area behind in
industrial development - witness the responses to the government’s announcement
that the Fada-Fionn hydro-dam was not going ahead; as a result the Scottish Office
was clear that it needed to demonstrate its ‘sincerity in regional development in the
Highlands’ in its attempts at securing Dounreay as the location for the PFR. Scottish
sentiment in many respects dictated regional policy decisions in the Highlands
resulting in the belief in the Scottish Office that only grand gestures of large,
technologically advanced manufacturing plants could demonstrate and deliver its
sincerity  to  Highland  development  in  a  way  that  investment  in  tourism  and
infrastructural development never could. Furthermore, it was symptomatic of the
Scottish Office’s unerring commitment to top-down planning.
The problem of the lack of infrastructure in the Highlands meant that Toothill’s
idea of establishing ‘growth centres’ as a means towards achieving greater economic
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growth in Scotland would never be fully realised in the area. More pertinently,
Toothill at no point made it clear in the seven mentions of the area in his report that
he was even suggesting the Highlands as a place in which such a policy could be
pursued successfully. The Scottish Office ventured and acted upon the idea that the
four developments could act as growth centres of its own accord. Toothill made the
suggestion  that  ‘geographical  location,  communication  facilities,  development
potential or established industrial base’ offered the best potential for growth. The
Highlands offered none of these, explaining in part why the idea of growth centres
was never realised. That there are still calls in the present day for improvements to
transport infrastructure in the region demonstrate how little has been achieved in this
respect. The lack of infrastructure combined with the small labour pool and lack of
easy access to and from the developments to markets meant that there was little or no
incentive for companies to move to the area other than the considerable financial
inducements provided by government and the fact that Industrial Development
Certificates were difficult to come by without acceptance of government direction in
where to locate. Without the inducements and certificates, it is unlikely many
companies would have chosen to locate in the area at all.
Statistical analysis: impact on population and unemployment
and final cost of the four developments
Population
The reversal of depopulation and addressing unemployment were two of the main
aims of the four developments. The population decline the Highlands had experienced
over previous hundred years or so from the period 1851 onwards was identified as
being a major obstacle in the way of the area’s regeneration. Willie Ross made this
clear in his introduction to the bill
733 to establish the HIDB as well as it being an issue
discussed within the Scottish Office at length in various correspondences. The
concern over the declining population in the area and its consequent strain on the
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Exchequer was one that really came to prominence as a result of the 1961 Census.
The Census confirmed the suspicions many held in government and elsewhere that
the Highlands was suffering from serious depopulation that, if left unchecked, could
leave the area behind in the pursuit of economic growth. The widespread loss in
numbers resident in the area as a whole during the period can be seen more clearly in
Table 6.1:
Table 6.1 Long run Highland population change compared to Scotland and UK,
1851-1961
Area 1851 1921 1931 1951 1961 % Change
+/−
Highlands 423880 371372 323277 316471 304161 -28.2
Scotland 2888742 4882500 4803000 5096400 5179300 +79.3
UK 22259000 44072000 44074000 50290000 52807000 +137.2
Source: HIDB, Annual Report, 1970 to 1981, HIDB, Review of the HIDB Economic
& Social Change in the Highlands, (HIDB, Inverness, 1987), pg. 4,
www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-111.pdf
www.geo.ed.ac.uk/home/scotland/pop.html &
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D3400.xls
The Census revealed that between 1921 and 1961 the population of the area declined
from 371,372 to 304,161
 - a percentage loss of 28.1% in only 40 years. The long run
of population loss in the area was marginally higher at 28.2%, but the recent loss was
serious enough to prompt action. Compared to Scotland’s population, the Highlands’
loss was considerable against what was a fairly small increase nationally at the
Scottish level of 6.1% for the period 1921-61, despite the ongoing loss nationally
represented by emigration during the period - between 1951 and 1981 753,000 Scots
left the country.
734 The long run comparison however is even starker. The Highlands’
population had declined by just over a quarter in the same period that Scotland’s
population increased by nearly 80% and the UK’s population had increased by
137.2%. This is understandable in terms of the effects of industrialisation - the
Highlands missing out on the large-scale urbanisation and mechanisation of labour
other parts of the country experienced meant there was a natural drift towards
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industrial areas for people in search of jobs, greater economic reward and increased
social interaction.
Table 6.2 shows the longer term population changes between 1921 and 1989:
Table 6.2 Population by Highland areas related to developments by year
1921 1931 1951 1961 1971 1981 1989
Caithness 28285 25656 22710 27370 27915 27636 26560
Ross &
Cromarty
31753 28995 28713 28199 30480 46924 48310
Lochaber 11426 11090 13783 14236 15597 19491 19110
Badenoch &
Strathspey
10944 6794* 9497 9093 9099 9860 10880
HIDB Area 371372 323277 316471 304161 307532 342098 345489
* Badenoch figures only.
Source: HIDB Annual Reports, 1975-90. (1989 last publication of population stats by
HIDB)
Table 6.2 demonstrates the impact of the developments on the population of the
Highlands and the areas in which they were located was marked, except in the case of
Aviemore with the Badenoch & Strathspey area staying relatively constant. Of the
four developments, the Invergordon smelter’s impact is perhaps most obvious with
the population increasing by 66% between 1961 (prior to any construction starting on
the smelter) and 1981 just prior to it closing. North Sea oil linked work (primarily
Highland Fabricators’ operations at Nigg Bay) and the operations at Invergordon
Distillers  meant  that  the  population  levels  in  the  area  were  at  least  sustained
throughout the 1980s. The Corpach mill also had a considerable impact on the local
area with the population increasing by 37% between 1961 and 1981. The impact of
Dounreay needs to be considered over a longer period as the first reactor predates the
1961 figures, but its effect is still clear - between 1951 and 1981 the population
increased by 22%. It should be kept in mind when assessing the impact of these four
developments discussed that there were other industries in operation in the areas of
course, but crucially to any evaluation of the ‘growth centre’ aspect, none of them
were attracted to the area by the developments or offered any kind of synthesis with287
them. The developments nonetheless had an overall positive effect on the population
of  the  areas  in  which  they  were  located.  With  this  is  mind,  the  question  of
unemployment levels must then be addressed in any assessment of the developments’
impact on the areas.
Unemployment
The closure of the Corpach and Invergordon developments had a massive impact on
unemployment  levels  in  these  areas.  Table  6.3  demonstrates  the  change  in
unemployment levels from 1971 to the levels experienced by the areas after the
closure and run down of the three main labour-intensive developments.
735
Table 6.3 Average percentage unemployment by Highland areas related to
developments (excluding Aviemore) compared to Scotland by year
1971 1981 1982 1983 1984 1989 1990
Caithness 8.8 12.4 14.2 13.9 14.0 10.1 10.0
Ross &
Cromarty
   10.0 12.3 19.7 17.6 19.0 11.3 12.5
Lochaber 5.3 14.2 17.2 19.4 18.4 11.9 9.1
HIDB
Area
7.9 11.7 14.1 13.7 14.2 9.9 8.9
Scotland 7.4 10.7 11.8 12.4 12.7 9.3 8.2
Sources: HIDB Annual Reports 1977 – 1990, Scottish Economic Bulletin, 1984-
1994.
Table  6.3  shows  that,  with  the  exception  of  Lochaber  in  1971,  Highland
unemployment was consistently higher than the Scottish national figure for the period
1971-1990. The Lochaber area went from having full employment prior to the
opening of the Corpach development, to suffering from 5.3% unemployment in 1971
- in part a result of second generation unemployment through the failure to attract
further industries to the area. Unemployment grew because children of those who had
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been  attracted  to  the  area  to  work  in  the  mill  couldn’t  find  work  whilst  the
underperformance of the mill meant that there were few spare jobs available there
either. Worse was to follow however. As a result of the pulp mill’s closure the area
suffered a substantial increase in unemployment figures to 19.4% in 1983. From
being an area of full employment only twenty years previously, Lochaber found itself
with almost 1 in 5 of its residents unemployed in 1983, but back in the situation of
being  hugely  dependent  on  the  aluminium  smelter  again  for  non-seasonal
employment. The closure of the Invergordon smelter the same year saw a similar
trend. Unemployment levels in the vicinity jumped from 10% in 1971 to 19.7% -
almost double the 1971 figures. From being intended as acting as growth centres, the
closure of the developments instead resulted in burdening the areas in which they
were located with unemployment on a large scale.
The success of the HIDB’s focus on small-scale business start-ups and the
effect of the oil industry’s maintenance requirements for the rigs meant that the
Highlands, having been the recipient of enormous levels of funding for large-scale
industrial development that increased unemployment levels when the developments
failed,  eventually  found  itself  redressing  the  problems  caused  by  previous
governmental actions through its own efforts and responses to market requirements.
North Sea Oil developments in the form of Highland Fabricators and the maintenance
of oilrigs in the Cromarty Firth saw unemployment levels lessen in the Ross and
Cromarty area somewhat from the mid-1980s onwards, as shown in Table 6.3. The
Caithness area also fared better from the same period, in part because of the efforts of
the HIDB in encouraging business start-ups such as Norfrost and Caithness Glass, but
also due to the large numbers employed at Dounreay. The plant’s decommissioning, a
decision taken in the 1990s, is expected to take until 2036 and cost almost £3bn,
employing several thousands in the process.
736 When the region was left to fend for
itself it performed much better, a point made by Hunter recently.
737 The facilitation of
growth through supporting small-scale enterprise, coupled with the North Sea Oil
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effect, was and has been a more successful policy. However, North Sea Oil wasn’t
discovered until the 1970s and the policy of encouraging small-scale start-ups was not
a realistic option for the government in the Highlands in the 1960s when the rest of
the  country  was  receiving  large  technological  ventures.  Consequently,  the
government was faced with very little choice but to embark on the projects discussed.
Consideration  had  to  be  given  to  developing  the  Highlands  industrially  and
technologically due to the political capital that could be realised by ensuring that the
area wasn’t left out of the ‘dynamic, exciting, thrilling change’ promised by the
Wilson government.
738 However, the approach was flawed in that it didn’t go far
enough by including infrastructural development as well. In spite of this, the result
was expenditure on a significant scale.
Government expenditure on the four Highland developments, 1960-1990
Modernising and industrialising the Highlands had become of such concern to
the government that by the end of the 1960s the area was receiving 10% of all
government expenditure in Scotland, in spite of having only around 5% of the
population.
739 Public expenditure per head in Scotland was over 20% higher than the
British average at the same point.
740 By 1970, according to the estimates given for
each development at their time of construction, government had either spent or
committed approximately £151.34m on the four industrial ventures in the Highlands.
Table 6.4 shows the agreed cost of each development to government at the outset for
the four developments by 1970:
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Table 6.4 Composition of government expenditure on four developments in the
Highlands (at 1970 prices)
Area Amount (£m)
 *
Corpach                   13.50
Aviemore 4.74
Dounreay 99.45
Invergordon 33.65
Total 151.34
* Figures given are calculated using the values agreed by government from the year
of the agreement for each development using Lawrence H. Officer’s, ‘Purchasing
Power of British Pounds from 1264 to 2006.’ http://www.MeasuringWorth.com,
2007.  Years  of  agreement  for  government  expenditure  for  each  development:
Corpach - 1963, Aviemore - 1966, Dounreay - 1964 & 1966, Invergordon - 1968.
Source: Figures taken from discussion of each development’s agreed cost at planning
stage in Hansard, vol. 675, House of Commons Debate, 10/04/1966, col. 1377 - 1437
(Corpach), Letter from Pottinger to Law, Department Agriculture and Fisheries
Scotland, 14/01/1963, NAS SEP12/519 (Aviemore), Cabinet discussion, 08/02/1966,
TNA PRO CAB128/41 & Telex from Bell, Scottish Office to Pottinger, London
entitled Notes on Dounreay, 13/12/65, National Archives Scotland folder NAS
SEP14/1619  (Dounreay) & Hansard, vol. 773, House of Commons, col. 1455,
20/11/1968 (Invergordon).
The total spent on the developments of approximately £151.4m by 1970 works out at
£1.62bn at 2006 prices.
741 Highland development was then an expensive undertaking
by the government, with little left to show for it save for the Aviemore development,
ironically enough the cheapest of the four developments the government invested in.
If the figures are taken to be even semi-accurate, there can be no conclusion other
than the money was wasted on a colossal scale. The money spent may have achieved
short-term aims of satisfying political ends, but the long-term economic objectives set
out for the developments were not met and resulted in the exacerbation of the social
problems they were intended to ameliorate. There is the counter argument that the
developments at the Corpach, Dounreay and Invergordon would have happened
elsewhere if not the Highlands which is certainly true but, crucially, this in itself
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illustrates one of the central arguments in the thesis; the developments in the region
were not about primarily about the Highlands. They were about satisfying Scottish
and  UK  national  needs,  both  economic  and  political,  and  only  happened  as  a
consequence of convergence of policy aims at the Scottish and UK national levels.
An example of this is the neo-protectionism and contribution to the balance of
payments aspect present in each of the developments.
Political economy of Highland development – neo
protectionism, modernity and the UK national interest
Neo-protectionism and the balance of payments
Each of the four developments in the Highlands possessed an aspect of neo-
protectionism relative to the British balance of payments problem. Proposals by
Scottish officials regarding each of them made clear the potential benefits they would
have to the UK national economic situation and in particular the balance of payments
problem. Consequently, boosting domestic production of certain vital products
provided the country with a degree of protection against potential price increases
from foreign imports. During the planning phases the Scottish Office presented all
four developments to Whitehall as potential considerable contributors to the balance
of payments problem and a means of ensuring a degree of domestic protection against
external price fluctuations that could hinder progress on that front. Britain’s balance
of  payments  situation  during  the  planning  and  discussion  period  for  all  four
developments can be seen in Table 6.5:292
Table 6.5 British balance of payments in the 1960s (£m)
Year Visible
Balance
Invisible
Balance
Official
Balance
Private
Invisible
Balance
Long-term
capital net
outflow
1960 -406 +151 -282 +433 -175
1961 -152 +158 -332 +490 -134
1962 -102 +224 -360 +584 -130
1963 -80 +204 -382 +586 -145
1964 -519 +143 -432 +575 -159
1965 -237 +185 -447 +632 -170
1966 -73 +156 -470 +626 -139
1967 -552 +254 -463 +717 -197
1968 -643 +355 -466 +821 -327
Source: Tomlinson, J, The Labour Governments, 1964-70, vol. 3: Economic Policy,
(MUP, Manchester, 2004), pg. 13.
The Visible account and Official balances in the first three columns are of most
interest relative to the discussion here. The visible account balance represents trade in
goods - for the entirety of the 1960s Britain was in deficit on this count, just as it was
for the Official balance.
742 Thus, pitching the developments in the Highlands as being
important  to  the  UK  national  interest  through  immediate  or  near  immediate
contributions was vital. The Invergordon aluminium smelter and Corpach paper-pulp
mill are direct examples of this. It was made absolutely clear that the smelter project
that Invergordon was a part of was aimed directly at contributing to the balance of
payments to the tune of a mooted £15m per year. The Corpach project was expected
to save Britain £8m per year on paper and pulp imports. Aviemore was about
encouraging domestic and dollar-based tourism through the development of the site
as the ‘Scottish St Moritz’ and contributing to the balance of payments concern
through the encouragement of domestic spending and dollar-tourism in Scotland,
which accounted for £7.29m by the end of the 1950s - over half of all tourist spending
at the time. The PFR at Dounreay was primarily about sourcing a cheap form of
energy production and selling the technology abroad, protecting British energy
supplies whilst helping offset the balance of payments imbalance, at least in theory if
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not practice. Had fast reactor technology been successful it would almost certainly
have raised tens if not hundreds of millions in export value. The Scottish Office’s
political nous allowed it to steer the discussion towards the political and social
argument of helping the Highlands with the national UK economic benefit firmly
embedded in the proposals.
Technology and Modernity
The technological aspects of three of the four developments and their explicit
connection to the idea of modernity were a deliberate move on the part of government
at showing its commitment to the modernisation of the Highland economy and
diversification of Scottish industries through economic planning and intervention.
Wilson’s ‘white heat’ speech characterised Labour’s commitment to modernity -
technology was to be used to improve Britain’s economic fortunes and the Highlands
were no different. The Conservatives were similarly committed to modernising
industry in Scotland, having been in charge of the decision for the first reactor at
Dounreay, much of the planning for the Aviemore development and the planning for
the Fort William mill. This was as much a case of leaving the Scottish Office to its
own devices as anything else however – the Scottish Office was though very keen to
utilise  new  technologies  to  help  solve  the  economic  problems  of  the  country,
evidenced by its eagerness to take Toothill’s suggestions onboard. The paper pulp
mill at Fort William was the first fully integrated paper pulp mill in the country using
the new Swedish Stora process in its operations. The second reactor at Dounreay was
at the cutting edge of technology and intended to demonstrate Britain’s lead in the
Fast Reactor technology race and the aluminium smelter at Invergordon was to make
use of the newly constructed Hunterston AGR nuclear power station for its ostensibly
cheaper electrical supply. Crucial then to explaining the failures in the Highlands of
three of the developments is the issue of technology and its failure. The Corpach
mill’s adoption of the Stora process was a major flaw from the beginning - it was
adopted on the basis of producing a less obnoxious smell than the cheaper Kraft
process used by Scandinavian producers, but caused operational problems from an294
early stage, was expensive meaning the mill had to run at full operational capacity to
remain profitable and was then made obsolete by its lack of adaptability to change in
the international paper market. The Invergordon smelter suffered a spectacular failure
in technology being based as it was on the promise of cheap nuclear-powered
electricity from the Hunterston AGR station that never materialised, resulting in
massive deficits in its accounts with NSHEB. Dounreay’s technological woes were
also considerable with fast reactor technology never proving workable on a large
scale  without  severe  safety  issues  and  with  it  environmental  damage.  The
technological problems from poor choices to outright failure thus contributed in no
small  measure  to  the  difficulties  leading  to  the  closure  of  three  of  the  four
developments.
Aviemore managed to avoid the major technological problems that beset the
other developments. The Aviemore development was as much about commitment to
modernity as the others, but with a subtle twist. Developing the new industry of
tourism, in the face of no small criticism, through support for the establishment of
facilities to encourage winter sports and conferences in the area was arguably the
most successful policy pursued by government during the period. It didn’t rely on
high-technology manufacturing, but was arguably the most post-modern approach to
Highland development and the most successful example of diversification of industry
in the area. There is now a thriving tourist industry in Scotland with Aviemore
playing no small role in it - over the last five years around £80m has been spent
redeveloping the site of the original development to modernise it further
743 with about
£8m  of  this  coming from  the public purse.
744 Where Aviemore was a modern
approach to the region in terms of its focus on developing tourism and the service
sector, the other three developments were ensconced firmly within the paradigm of
manufacturing-focused development. Manufacturing was what the Scottish economy
had been primarily focused on and it was clearly the case that many believed new,
more modern manufacturing industries were the future. The archaic structure of the
                                                
743 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/4284788.stm accessed 15/04/2006.
744 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/725437.stm accessed 15/04/2006.295
Highland economy prior to the establishment of these new developments and its focus
on crofting and fishing meant that realistically any new manufacturing-focused
industries located there represented a massive step forward in the technological status
of  the  area.  That  the  industries  were  located  there  however  was  a  result  not
necessarily of a genuine desire to improve the status of the Highland region through
technology  and  modernisation  of  industry,  but  of  what  the  potential  political
consequences of ignoring the area would be.
The Scottish Office was fully aware of the pitfalls of ignoring the region and
consequently fought hard for continued investment for it. Haddow’s assertion that the
Highlands was a problem area that had to be kept quiet is a clear indication of this.
With the rest of the UK being gripped by the dash for technologically focused
industrial development it was only natural that the Scottish Office would seek to
capitalise on this for Scotland. However, in taking such an active and direct role in
the economy of the region, and more generally Scotland, the Scottish Office can be
assessed to have achieved less economically and industrially in the period 1945-82
than could reasonably have been expected given the vast sums of money spent. Of the
developments pursued across the country Dounreay has been decommissioned and
the developments at Invergordon, Corpach, Ravenscraig, Bathgate, and Linwood
have  all  closed.  The  dream  of  a  technologically  modern,  manufacturing-based
Scottish economy severely dented as a result. The Highlands had suffered the closure
of its large manufacturing plants ten years previously however, leaving it with North
Sea oil activities as its main heavy industry, effectively devoid of government
interference. The area may have experienced an economic boom in the 1960s and
early 70s with the attention and money from government, but when the inward
investment was withdrawn disaster struck. This proved to be a blessing in disguise as
the Highlands now has a modern economy based on the natural resources of the area
through tourism and a strong communications infrastructure that has only grown
since government attention switched to a market driven approach of facilitating rather
than prescribing growth with the HIE. Governmental investment of millions of
pounds in the development of the communications infrastructure in the area over the296
past decade and into the future has helped establish an ‘integrated digital services
network’
745 in the Highlands and has been described as a ‘communications
revolution’.
746 Modernity came to the Highlands, not through governmental economic
planning and intervention, but perhaps ironically by taking the route Frank Cousins
mentioned in relation to Dounreay and leaving the people to it, albeit without the
beneficence he suggested.
The politics of Highland development
Politically, the relative decline of the Highlands gave considerable cause for
concern amongst many in government, at both Scottish and British levels, and
directly informed the development of policy aimed at halting the migration flow
south. Haddow’s suggestion of keeping the area quiet by chucking buns across the
fence  was  one  that  characterised  post-Second  World  War  development  in  the
Highlands. It was not desirable to have large-scale population movement from the
Highlands given its importance to the vocal Highlanders who’d moved to the Central
Belt region between Glasgow and Edinburgh where the majority of the Scottish
population, and Scottish based parliamentary seats, were located. Unemployment in
the area was rife and continued to be so until the developments took root and began to
operate. Further, the area accounted for around two thirds of the entire Scottish
landmass and it was considered a potential security concern to have effectively
nobody living there. In addition, any development in the Highlands was of course
predicated on people actually being there. Privately, Willie Ross viewed Highland
development as a way of strengthening the Union and diluting support for the
growing nationalist movement, finding support for this view in the corridors of St
Andrew’s House, not least his head civil servant Haddow. Support for the SNP in the
early 1960s grew markedly. The nationalists saw their position and influence in
Scottish political life develop - putting up 15 candidates in 1964, winning 64,000
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votes followed by putting up 23 candidates in 1966, before then going on to win 69
burgh and county seats in 1967, gaining 200,000 votes. Both Halkier and Marr
pinpoint Winnie Ewing’s by-election win in Hamilton in 1967 in a staunchly Labour
seat and on paper the safest one the party had in Scotland as the real sign that the
Nationalists were a growing force in Scotland.
747 This was proof that Nationalism was
a growing threat to the Union and the assessment of the UK Cabinet was focused on
two explanations and answers to it: 1) that it was confirmation that the relationship
between local and central government needed to be addressed (especially in light of
the large variations in British local elections at the time) or 2) that it was a protest
vote that either had to be tolerated or slapped down.
748 Willie Ross firmly believed
that it was a protest vote that needed to be slapped down and acted accordingly,
winning more developments for the country and demonstrating how the Union
benefited Scotland.
The growing support for the Nationalists was of great concern to the Labour
party in Scotland at this point and Ross increased his attacks on them, famously
labelling them ‘Tartan Tories’ at one stage.
749 As Harvie makes clear, Ross viewed his
role as part of the Labour Party to preserve the Union and combat the growing
Nationalist sentiment through ‘socialist policies’
750, i.e. gaining as much as he could
‘win’  for  Scotland;  following  happily  enough  in  the  footsteps  of  his  Labour
predecessor  Tom  Johnston  who  had  perfected  the  art  of  using  the  Nationalist
bogeyman as a means of securing investment and increased powers for use in
Scotland. The second reactor at Dounreay is a perfect example of Ross’ attitude
towards Scotland and Westminster and the primacy of politics in regional policy as
conducted in the Highlands. It was a grand gesture to locate the new reactor in
Dounreay,  in  diametric opposition to  the advice of  experts  in  the Ministry  of
Technology and UKAEA in favour of Harwell, and designed to show the beneficence
of the UK government and its commitment to arresting industrial decline in both the
                                                
747 Marr, A, The Battle For Scotland, pg. 118 & Halkier, H, Institutions, Discourse and Regional
Development, pg. 153.
748 Harvie, C, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes,  pg. 148.
749 Marr, A, The Battle For Scotland,  pg. 118.
750 Harvie, C, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes,  pg. 148.298
Highlands and Scotland. Ross and his team pushed heavily for it, aided and abetted
quite ably by the HIDB and Robert Grieve. The new reactor was intended primarily,
at least in the minds of those in London, to help the UK national economic and
political situation in respect of the balance of payments however. That it would also
help Labour gain a crucial extra seat at Westminster was kept unsurprisingly quiet.
Cousins, previously a firm opponent of Dounreay’s claims to the new reactor and its
likelihood of bringing more industry to the area, announced that its location there
represented a ‘restoration of confidence in the economy of the Northern Scottish area’
to the BBC, demonstrating a swift about turn any military drill commander would
have  been  pleased  with.  The  reactor  wasn’t  representative  of  a  restoration  of
confidence in the area at all. It was a result of effective politicking on the part of the
Scottish Office and Secretary of State. Ross cajoled his way into ‘winning’ the PFR
for Dounreay, in spite of it being made clear by officials at UKAEA and the Ministry
of Technology that it simply wouldn’t act as a growth point. Thus, the question of
whether the PFR should have been sited at Dounreay at all is pertinent.
Dounreay is very remote and difficult to get to - it has very little transport
infrastructure and very distant from markets and centres of population. Bringing
potential buyers of the technology to the UK then flying them up to Dounreay to
demonstrate the safety of the reactor, up on the most northerly part of the UK
mainland and several hundred miles from the most populated area in the country,
would  hardly  have  been  a  selling  point  even  if  the  technology  had  worked
successfully. Even today it takes about 6 hours driving or 8 hours by train from
Glasgow and Edinburgh - London is more easily reachable than Dounreay as well as
being  further  away  from  Scotland’s  two  main  cities.  The  peripherality  of  the
Highlands, and in particular Dounreay, from centres of populations and markets is
emphasised, albeit inadvertently, by O’Hara’s assertion that:
Britain’s distressed areas were seen as another and central part of Britain’s
economic  problems.  These  regions  -  particularly  South  Wales,  Central
Scotland, North East England and Merseyside - had long suffered from a299
number of economic handicaps. They were hundreds of miles from the new
industrial heartlands and markets of the Midlands and South East England.
751
Dounreay of course is even further away and suffered from poor transport links,
declining population and a lack of industry. The decision to locate the PFR there then
should only be understood as a political decision taken in light of the political climate
the government was operating in at both Scottish and UK levels. Dounreay helped
Labour win the Caithness seat at a time when it was hanging on by its fingertips in
London and consequently helped maintain the strength of the Union. In short, politics
won out over effective regional planning.
That the PFR was located in the most northerly part of the UK mainland over
seventy miles away from the nearest centre of population was hardly a demonstration
of the safety aspect of it or a decision that took transmission issues (in the event of
electricity production to the grid) into account. Patterson asks whether it makes sense
to locate it there ‘even to win a seat for Parliament?’
752 The answer was clearly yes to
Ross et al. Further, relative to the role of the Scottish Office, the PFR was essentially
an experimental venture, albeit one that was expected to reap dividends in terms of
workable and sellable technology and when fully working, produce electricity for the
National Grid. It was made clear, quite correctly, by Cousins, the Ministry of
Technology and UKAEA that it would not act as a growth centre in attracting
industries to the area. The only notable industries in the Caithness area other than the
reactor have been Caithness Glass, an ornamental glass manufacturer, and Norfrost, a
refrigeration company - both of whom have experienced considerable difficulties in
remaining afloat since their creation in the 1960s and 70s respectively but are still
operating nonetheless.
753 Locals set up both companies and neither is on record as
having been influenced by the reactor being there. Cousin’s assertion that the
government would have been better giving each local £100,000 and letting them ‘get
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on with it’ has more credence as a result. For Dounreay to have a chance of coming
anywhere near to being a growth centre then extensive infrastructural investment was
required to reduce its peripherality and make it more attractive to business and people
to move there.
Cousin’s suggestion, irrespective of how unrealistic it was at the time, has
resonance given the current successful strategy of Highlands and Islands Enterprise
(HIE) and its market driven approach to economic development. HIE has presided
over  considerable  growth  in  the  area  since  its  inception  in  1991  -  the  area’s
population is now more than 435,000 and it has 19,000 businesses in operation.
 754755
Its focus on small-scale industrial development finds its roots in the approach of the
HIDB and its limited resources for encouraging development. The HIDB played a
public role in the location of three of the developments the thesis details - Corpach,
Dounreay and Invergordon - but did not contribute financially in any way towards
them. Instead, the HIDB focused on the promotion of the Highland cause in regional
policy terms, emphasising the need for development and encouraging central Scottish
and UK departments to consider the area as being suitable for larger industrial
projects whilst encouraging smaller businesses, including the likes of Norfrost and
Caithness Glass, to start up with loans and grants being made available where
necessary.
756 The Scottish Office’s approach was conditioned as much by political
necessity as a genuine desire to see the Highlands be able to support itself. Ross was a
staunch supporter of the area but was fully aware of the political desirability of being
cast as the public face of Highland development and how well it would play with the
Scottish public at large. Ross’ sentimental and emotive introduction of the Highlands
and Islands Development Board bill to the House of Commons in 1965 tapped into an
ongoing argument that found its roots in the 1930s that the treatment of the Highlands
constituted a ‘special case’ due to its unique characteristics. Coupled with his
passionate defence of the proposed new board in the ensuing debate, Ross showed he
was well prepared to argue the case of the area at national level and use whatever
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emotional pull he could. The intransigence Ross displayed in relation to locating the
PFR at Dounreay and his willingness to argue the case in the face of considerable
opposition at Cabinet level demonstrated his clear belief that Scottish economic and
industrial development was central to Labour’s parliamentary ambitions. Given that
the party was proportionally more politically successful in Scotland than south of the
border, it made sense to continue to support Scottish causes, as was the case with the
party in other Labour heartlands.
757 These were two very powerful arguments; the
political case for keeping the Highlands and Highlanders quiet and being seen to be
sympathetic to its needs converged perfectly with the politically advantageous policy
of catering to Scottish sentiment for the area.
The idea of Scottish sentiment for the Highlands is therefore an important one.
It was recognised in the Scottish Office from the outset of Highland post-war
development in discussions regarding the Corpach mill that the Scottish public was
prepared to see the area ‘treated specially’. Cameron’s assessment that sentimental
feeling for the region unduly constrained Highland policy is consequently difficult to
counter.
758 The idea that the area deserved special treatment in light of the
depopulation and unemployment problems sparked off by the Highland Clearances of
the crofters from their lands was powerful enough to characterise much of the
discussion regarding Highland policy in the 1960s, helped in no small measure by the
commercial success of John Prebble’s The Highland Clearances depicting the vicious
widespread  evictions  throughout  the  area  in  the  name  of  modernisation  and
capitalism.
759 Hunter contends that this was due to the Highlands and Islands being
‘treated harshly and exploitatively by the Scottish state… and the United Kingdom’
and  that  the  area  was  owed  help.
760 Hunter has also claimed recently that the
development in the Highlands in the post-war period was ‘blood money’ and a
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consequence of the guilt felt on the part of government at the area’s decline.
761 Ross’
assertion that the Highlander was ‘the man on Scotland’s conscience’ crystallises the
belief that the area was somehow owed special consideration. The implication of
Ross and Hunter’s positions was that there was culpability on the part of the state at
Scottish and UK levels for the Highlands’ situation and it should be rectified. The
feeling that the Highlands deserved these developments would later turn to anger after
the closure of the Corpach and Invergordon developments. Levitt makes the issue of
sentiment a central feature of his work on the Corpach mill, arguing that it played a
defining role in the location of the mill in the West Highlands and persuading the
Treasury to accept the Scottish proposal on the basis of social grounds.
762 Sentiment
for the area as a result of the ills of the past was a strong influence on opinions within
the Scottish Office and the desire to utilise economic planning through regional
development was acted on to help achieve this. This, coupled with the fact it was a
clear  populist  measure  and  vote  winner  only  served  to  strengthen  the  public
commitment of the Scottish Office to be seen to be attempting to arrest the decline in
the  Highlands.  Large-scale  industrial  ventures  were  the  perfect  vehicle  for
demonstrating that commitment.
Final remarks
The  developments  discussed  reveal  a  number  of  differing  constraints  on
economic policy as applied to the Highlands and Scotland as a whole during the post-
war period. The difference between the political timeframe for action and the need for
time for effective economic development to take place is one constraint that is
obvious from the story of the developments in the region. Economic development
takes time to occur and is not immediate, whereas the political necessity of being seen
to act quickly to solve the economic problems that a politician or party has been given
a mandate for means that economic development can often be interrupted and
impaired by political circumstances that demand action. Savoie makes a similar point
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in relation to economic development in the Maritime region in Canada stating: ‘There
is  a  disconnect  between  political  and  economic  development  time.’
763 This is
particularly true of the Highlands. For an area like the Highlands in the immediate
post-war period to have lasting success in industrial or economic development a
comprehensive plan emphasising the importance of transport and communications
development as well as an integrated approach to repopulating the area would have
been necessary. However, political circumstances - in particular the rise of Scottish
Nationalism and growing discontent over the plight of the Highland area - dictated
that action had to be taken and fast, meaning short-term decision making impacted on
the long-term economic performance of the area significantly. Large-scale labour-
intensive, technologically advanced manufacturing plants answered the calls for
Highland development that had been ongoing since the 1930s and satisfied the
Scottish level policy aims of industrial diversification and decentralisation from the
Central Belt, repopulating and developing the Highlands, making an immediate
contribution to the UK national economic and political concern and demonstrating the
munificence  of  the  government  and  strengthening  the  Union  in  a  way  that
infrastructural economic development would have taken far longer to achieve, if at
all.
The Highland developments took place only when Scottish Office policy
aims, Highland needs and UK national economic and political interests converged, be
it contributing to the balance of payments or helping win a seat in the Westminster
parliament. Although the Scottish Secretary wielded such power over Scottish
interests to the extent he was able to influence UK national decisions to directly
benefit the Highlands and Scotland, it was only an effective tool when convergence
allowed it to be. When this was the case, economic intervention in the Highlands was
used as a political tool to demonstrate the UK’s commitment to its most peripheral
area. However, with each new development located in the region as a consequence of
the  Scottish  Office’s  direction,  the  area  became  increasingly  dependent  on
government to the extent that when government’s involvement stopped, the area and
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industries found themselves facing considerable economic difficulties and increased
unemployment. This demonstrates the importance of pursuing regional economic
development in areas like the Highlands as part of a long-term comprehensive
strategy that, whilst taking on board political considerations, looks beyond the short-
term political mandate afforded by parliamentary election and includes development
of the framework which allows industry to settle and flourish. In this instance then the
role of government is perhaps better as a facilitator rather than a prescriber of
economic growth. Transplanting industries to locations leads to difficulties if the
areas chosen are underdeveloped and far from markets, not to say under-populated as
the Highlands was, particularly if the industries and locations are inappropriate for
each other. If the industries and locations are appropriate for each other, as in the case
of Aviemore, then the likelihood of success is increased.
 The importance of infrastructural development in establishing the projects in
the Highlands was overlooked as a result of policy constraints and political short term
needs, leading to implementation failure - the developments were not implemented
properly to act as growth centres to pull other industries in. The tension between the
short-term requirements of being seen to be running the country effectively and the
long-term needs of the region are clear. Whilst an improvement in the infrastructural
characteristics of the region may not have saved the developments from closure, it
would have markedly improved the chances of the developments achieving their
stated  aims  of  acting  as  growth  centres  by  making  the  area  a  more  attractive
proposition for more industries to locate in by reducing its peripherality and providing
the area with a workable environment in which to operate. The only other real
alternative would have been to leave the area to continue its depopulation unchecked
- a politically impossible course of action at the time. The developments in the
Highlands were all subject to considerable political influence which explains, in part,
their  difficulties  in  achieving  the  publicly  and  privately  set  out  goals.  The
developments  at  Corpach,  Dounreay  and  Invergordon  were  expensive  and
inappropriate industrial ventures that were a product of the firmly interventionist,
manufacturing-focused  Scottish  Office  mindset  at  the  time.  The  Aviemore305
development, although considered the soft option and by far the smallest of the four
developments, is the only one that has provided any hard evidence to suggest that not
all government expenditure on the four developments detailed in this thesis was
inappropriately spent. As it turned out, the smallest bun happened to be the most
digestible.306
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